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Abstract 
The thesis explores the continuities that underpin public debate about Russia 
in the post-Soviet era. It approaches the question using the conceptual 
framework of new Cold War warriors and re-invented fellow travellers for two 
reasons. The first is that debates that seek to re-conjure spectres of Marxism 
or socialism in contemporary Russia are not a notable feature of the work of 
today's academic scholarship. Instead most of the analysis is centred on 
evaluating either civilizational or sociological perspectives on the country. 
Much of it is focused too on the governance of Vladimir Putin, an approach 
which includes a singular amount of psychologlsing about his alleged personal 
fallings, both as a leader and as a foreign policy strategist. 
The second reason is that, though radically opposed, these two concepts 
anchor the dissertation in the spectrum of liberal thought from classical 
Liberalism, to economic Liberalism, to neo-liberal utopianism and, more 
recently, liberal pluralism. The implication is that. In one way or another, for 
most commentators, both within Russia and internationally. Western liberal 
norms provide a benchmark with which to appraise Russia's response to the 
demands of modernity and modernisation, the vagaries of capitalism and the 
institutionalisation of democratic freedoms. 
Within these contentious arenas, the dissertation falls broadly into two 
camps. On one side are those who are still welded to either a Cold War 
scepticism or an Ideological rigidity that invites a ready condemnation of the 
new Russia; and on the other are those who are more hopeful that the 
country's future can be more humane than its past. The approach is not 
aimed at adjudicating about which side will carry the day. Rather It 
constitutes an inevitably selective, innovative and ambitious commentary 
about commentaries. Its intention is to foster In both writer and reader a 
more reflective understanding of the assumptions and presumptions, as well 
as the areas of uncertainty, in interpretations of today's governance. 
Admittedly, given the breadth of historical and ongoing research, as v/ell as 
the myriad ways real existing social worlds defy easy categorisation, the 
result is more likely to veer towards an impressionistic effect. Admittedly too, 
it is also an effect which veers towards an antipathy about many of the claims 
of the new Cold War warriors. 
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There can be no spectacle as disgusting as that of a 
post-revolutionary tyranny dressed up in the banner of 
liberty. ' 
Isaac Deutscher, Heretics and Renegades and Other Essays, 
1955. 
'But in seventy-year-old totalitarian soil, what 
democracy can sprout overnight?' 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Russia Question, 1994. 
What follov^s is about the public conversations about Russia among 
contemporary scholars and commentators in the wake of the Cold War. It 
focuses on the work of a number of prominent figures in Britain, Europe and 
America, Including emigre Russians, as well as Western-oriented intellectuals 
working from within Russia. Above all, it Is informed and framed by the 
contentious history of liberal ideas. The assumption Is that this conversation 
is carried out not only at a theoretical level by an elite coterie of experts, but 
is part of an influential trans-Atlantic world of argument, opinion and 
prejudice about the Putin government that Is determining attitudes to 
contemporary crises, for example in Iraq, Ukraine or Syria. 
So what specifically gives focus to this conversation? For a start. It is 
everywhere steeped In memory and history, seeking to weave strands of 
continuity and consistency out of the debris of contingent ideas and events. 
Russia has had an iconic role in contemporary thought - a country whose 
revolutionary road prompted generations of Intellectuals to articulate the 
fallings of their own societies. As British socialist politician Richard Crossman 
wrote: 
The Intellectual attraction of Marxism was that it 
exploded liberal fallacies. It taught the bitter truth that 
progress is not automatic, that boom and slump are 
inherent in capitalism, that social injustice and racial 
discrimination are not cured merely by the passage of 
time.. J 
Grossman was seeking to explain the hollow idealism of some of the West's 
best and brightest in the savage Russian decades after the Bolsheviks seized 
power in 1917. By their own testimonies, prominent intellectuals including 
Stephan Spender, Arthur Koestler, Andre Gide and founding member of the 
Italian Communist Party, Ignazio Silone, embraced Soviet Marxism out of 
despair of Western liberal hypocrisy. As the essays in Grossman's book also 
seek to explain, many in this generation were to become equally disillusioned 
with the Soviet Union. Especially in the years following the Second World 
War, this rejection was underlined by the increasingly pervasive sense that 
hubristic Enlightenment ideas of rationality creating a man-made earthly 
heaven had forged a direct path to the century's European bloodlands. For 
Russian/ Jewish philosopher Isaiah Berlin, for example, who as a young man in 
St Petersburg had experienced directly the aftermath of the 1917 Bolshevik 
coup, those barbaric years should teach us to be terrified of the oppressors 
and liberators alike, 'because anyone who has a cut and dried scheme, a 
straightjacket which he wishes to impose on humanity as a sole remedy for 
human ills, is ultimately bound to create a situation intolerable for free 
men. 
Admittedly, these days the post-Gold War Russian Federation is unlikely to 
inspire such high-minded ideological deprecations. Nevertheless, assertions 
about the depressing deficiencies in Western democracies continue to have a 
strong currency in comparative analyses of the Putin regime. In the century, 
the Russia conversation is about whether or not, in the arenas of 
egal i tar ianism, toleration, the rule of law, par l iamentar ian i sm, 
cosmopolitanism, or geopolitics, the West stands condemned of a Eurocentric 
'one-size-fits-air approach to liberal democratisation. 
' Crossman,Richard (Ed), The God That Failed, Harper and Brothers NY 1949, p5 
2 Berlin, Isaiah, Russian Thinkers, Penguin Classics 1978 p227 
The concepts of the new Cold War warriors and the re-invented fellow 
travellers provide a framework for charting the polarities of this conversation. 
Both groups have a rich and resonant intellectual history: the first group with 
a predilection for embracing worst-case scenarios about Russia in the guise of 
strategic geopolitics; and the second group generally maintaining the happy 
conviction that much can be tolerated at a distance that would be culturally 
insufferable at home. Historically, the endorsement of Liberalism by this 
second group was somewhat muddled and unsteady, but one which 
nonetheless softened their disenchantment with Western democracy and 
tempered their embrace of communism. As historian Caute writes: 
The fellow-traveller retains a partial faith in the 
possibilities of progress under the parliamentary system: 
he appreciates that the prevailing liberties, however 
imperfect and however distorted, are nevertheless 
valuable.^ 
Fellow travellers were thus primarily heirs, he argues, to Enlightenment 
Liberalism, rather than century Marxism. Their commitment to idealistic 
notions of progressivism and modernisation served as a kind of philosophical 
consolation zone which often circumscribed their fantasies about Russia, 
particularly as information filtered out about the horrifying realities of 
communist rule there. 
By contrast, the beliefs of traditional Cold War warriors became firmly 
embedded in the century American policy of containment, of which NATO and 
the European Union became emblematic. The emergence of this version of 
strategic geopolitics was anchored in a series of credenda about Stalin's 
Soviet Union, famously and comprehensively articulated in 1946 by US 
diplomat George Kennan. Kennan wrote that the country had an enduring, 
paranoid and antagonistic sense of democratic capitalist encirclement; that it 
saw no possibility of peaceful co-existence with the West; and that at bottom 
it was a neurotic, xenophobic, insecure, militaristic, expansionist. 
' Caute, David, The Fellow Travellers A Postscript to the Enlishtenment, Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1973 
p5 
economically backward, morally bankrupt, police state/ Moreover, it had not 
shrunk from inflicting cruelties on its own people, so that Marxism's 'basic 
altruism of purpose' had become for the heirs of Leninism no more than a 'fig 
leaf.5 A liberal conservative, Kennan saw the way forward in USSR/West 
relations at the end of World War II, not in terms of further military 
confrontation, but through informed diplomacy and firmness of purpose in 
American foreign policy. Above all, he saw the struggle as a cultural and 
socio-economic one, in which victory rested on the fostering of shared 
certainties that West is Best: 
To my own countrymen who have often asked me where 
best to apply the hand to counter the Soviet threat, I 
have accordingly had to reply: to our American failings, 
to the things we are ashamed of in our own eyes, or that 
worry us; to the racial problem, to the condition in our 
big cities, to the education and environment of our 
young people,...^ 
For Kennan, America's role therefore should be as a beacon for liberty and for 
the tolerant, nurturing, forward march of prosperity. His highly-influential 
contribution to the containment doctrine is described by Kissinger as 
epitomising 'an extraordinary theory...[that] assumed the collapse of a 
totalitarian adversary could be achieved in an essentially benign way.'^ As for 
the West's Cold War arch-enemy, Kennan's observations left no doubt that the 
Soviet Union was an alien, intractable place, whose power elite operated in a 
poisonous atmosphere of 'oriental secrecy and conspiracy'.® Even the most 
sympathetic and well-intentioned foreigner would find the world of the 
Kremlin opaque and darkly sinister. And though there was little about 
' ' Kennan, George, 'Long Telegram', February 22, 1946, www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/ 
episode-1 /kennan.htm 
5 Kennan, Op Cit. p4. 
' Kennan, George, Russia, the Atom and the West, Harper a Brothers, New York 1957 p 13 
' Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy, Simon a Schuster, 1994 p 471 
8 Kennan, Op.Cit. p 4 
Kennan's insights that were original, they were to prove integral to thought 
and debate about Russia for the next half century and beyond. 
It should be emphasised though, that despite a reputation to the contrary, 
traditional Cold War Warriors were by no means uniformly crude militarists, of 
the kind that inspired the Anglo-American classic movie satire, Dr 
Strangelove, or the nuclear enthusiasms of the Rand Corporation's Mutually 
Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine. Generally, Cold War warriors were a 
staunchly conservative kind of liberal, who idealised classical Liberalism both 
on the homefront, and globally in the form of a kind of 'tough love' 
democracy promotion. 
Paradoxically, though, their foreign policy stances were often infused with 
what Western governments saw as a purely defensive form of Realism. More 
pragmatic than ideological, contemporary Realism holds that international 
relations are at heart a series of strategic power struggles between states, in 
which there exists no bedrock of an enforceable cosmopolitan rule of law. 
Instead, economically and geopolitically, each country seeks to maximise its 
national interests. As a global system believed to be dominated by the self-
regarding notions of status and legitimacy of Great Powers, it was exemplified 
during the Cold War years by the confrontational bipolarity of America versus 
the Soviet Union. This was interpreted by both sides as the need for an 
expansionist approach to maintaining strategic alliances, such as NATO or the 
Warsaw Pact, in order to foster and protect spheres of influence. A 
determined, strongly militarised resistance to any perceived threat of armed 
aggression was seen as a guarantee of the enduring success of the system. 
From a Western perspective, in a Cold War world beleaguered by 'ceaseless 
conflict that is never far from the state of war,''the Manichean battle of good 
versus evil was seen as synonymous with global democratisation versus the 
Red Peril manifest in Soviet communism. 
And the new Cold War warriors? Despite the ongoing wars in Syria and 
Ukraine, it is clear that Russia no longer occupies centre stage in transatlantic 
' Gray, John, Biack Aiass, Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia, Penguin UK, 2007, p273 
foreign policy priorities, especially since the events of 9/11/2001, the 
resulting intensification of Islamist terrorism, and the destabilisation of the 
Middle East. Still, the question remains where have Kennan's Cold War 
presumptions about the legacies of despotism in Russia gone? Are his ideas 
ready for final demolition, alongside the demise of Soviet communism? Or do 
they still inform the judgments of those cohorts of academics and policy-
makers v^ho cling to Cold War postures despite the nev^ realities? As Said 
noted in 1996, many of these contemporary analysts came to maturity in a 
1950s' America dominated by the McCarthyism that 'shaped a mystifyingly 
bloody-minded intelligentsia, to this day hung up on a wildly exaggerated 
internal and external menace. 
For the hardliners in this group, Russia is the Other, forever and 
fundamentally beyond the pale of the civilising culture of the West. They 
point to the ways in which, through the centuries of Tsarist autocracy, to 
Stalinism, to the failure of democratic institutions to take root since the end 
of the Cold War, Russia's elites have continued to wield political power that is 
a uniquely Slavic mix of charismatic leadership, ethnic nationalism, anti-
Western sentiments, and regional and international self-aggrandisement. 
These diehards also share more than a quantum of 'End of History' 
triumphalism towards the defeat of communism, as well as, more recently, a 
nostalgic reassertion of the old enmities of a bi-polar world. Here there lurks 
the implication that their perspectives may yet prove remarkably adaptable, 
revitalised in the strategic thinking and soft diplomacy of the West, and 
stimulated by a new Great Game focused primarily on energy security and the 
bloody eruptions across the Middle East and in Georgia and Ukraine. 
Moreover, from this perspective, there is little in Russia's current economic 
policies or geopolitical aspirations to inspire trust and confidence. Rather, as 
Roosevelt put it, we would be well served 'to tread softly and carry a big 
stick. ' " 
Said, Edward W, Representations of the Intellectual,'Vintage Books 1996, pi 11 
" Roosevelt, Theodore, Letter to Henry Sprague, January 26, 1990, Manuscript Division, American 
Treasures of the Library of Congress. vww.[oc.Bov/exhibits/treasures/trm139.htm[ 
For today's re-invented fellow travellers such views have long been part of 
the problem. For many in this grouping, such attitudes to a re-emergent 
Russia are often questionable, because they are so steeped in a shallow and 
retrogressive form of realpolitik. They argue that the years since the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989 should be seen to mark a final turning away from the 
preceding age of extremes^^towards a genuine toleration of the polyphony of 
voices that make up the worlds of East and West. Especially in the wake of 
the wars in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, the second Bush 
administration's neo-Liberalism Is seen as largely discredited as a thin excuse 
for American messianic militarism - otherwise ridiculed as Pox Americana.^^ In 
addition, the West's failed attempt to Implant free market capitalism in the 
new Russian Federation during the Yeltsin presidency has been dismissed as 
naive, doctrinaire and venal. British social theorist David Harvey, for 
example, argues that in this regard Western countries have much to answer 
for. As with all such projects across the globe, he writes, the significant 
beneficiaries of neo-Uberal economics were the very small number, around 
0.01 percent, who rapidly constituted an opportunistic power elite. These 
oligarchs prospered spectacularly by opting for a path of cooperation with the 
United States-controlled IMF and the World Bank. In particular, in the 
immediate post-Soviet years: 'The market shock therapy that was given to 
Russia after the collapse of the wall ended up with seven oligarchs controlling 
fifty percent of the economy.'^'' In other words, the opening up of Russia to 
the world economy was dominated by capitalist greed, with democracy 
promotion at best a low level secondary consideration. 
One point of reference for such accusations about the iniquities of 
unconstrained capitalism has been the resurgence of interest in the work of 
the Hungarian theorist, Karl Polanyi. Strongly critical of both Marxist 
economics and the Ideology of a self-adjusting market, Polanyl's The Great 
Hobsbawm, Eric, The Age of Extremes: The Short History of the Twentieth Century, 1914-1991, 
Vintage Books, New York, 1995 
Foster, John Bellamy & Chesney, Robert W. (Ed), Pox America: Exposing the American Empire,' 
Monthly Review Press 2004 
^ Lilley, Sacha, 'On NeoLiberalism: An Interview with David Harvey,' Monthly Review Magazine, 
19/06/2006, http://mr2ine.monthlyreview.org/2006/lilley190606.html 
Transformation, has been described as 'an indispensable guide in current 
debates about globalisation' and as having 'achieved the status of a canonical 
work for economic sociology and international political economy.' ^^Like many 
of his generation of European Jewish Intellectuals, Polanyi took refuge from 
German fascism, first in Britain and then in the United States. Writing in the 
early 1940s, he set himself the task of accounting for the collapse of the 
world economy that had precipitated the Great Depression a decade or so 
earlier. His answer was that it was the inevitable result of the contradictory, 
blind and soulless workings of the self-regulating market eulogised by 
economic neo-Liberalism.^^ The cataclysm was a century and a half in the 
making, harking back to the Enlightenment mercantilist debates of Adam 
Smith, Hume and Mandeville on the corrupting effects of untempered self-
interest and greed, and century concerns with the plight of the working man 
in the Dark Satanic mills of the industrial revolution. Almost from its 
inception, the free market was undermined by the necessary interventions of 
governments, labour unions and the churches to protect citizens from the 
system's worst excesses. 
As an anthropologist as well as a theorist of political economy, Polanyi argued 
against both Marxist and neo-liberal economic theories that humankind was 
not fundamentally motivated by material needs and wants, but by social and 
cultural ones. For Polanyi, this meant that the pursuit of a self-regulating 
economy was an 'entirely unnatural'^^ endeavour, the human cost of which 
was abhorrent and unsustainable. Moreover, it was supported by a bizarre 
and impossible creed, whose devotion to a Utopian notion of greed-driven 
teleology created ecological wastelands and 'bleak sloughs of misery' for the 
urbanised factory fodder.^® 'The mechanism which the motive of gain set in 
motion,' he wrote, ' was comparable in effectiveness only to the most violent 
Block, Fred, 'Karl Polanyi and the Writing of the Great Transformation,' Theory and Society, Vol 32 No 
3 2003 p275 
Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation, Rinehart 6 Company, Inc, New York, 1944, p29 
" Ibid. p249 
18 Ibid. p99 
outburst of religious fervour in history.'^' By the 1920s, it was also a doomed 
one, in the face of the breakdown of the West's shared neo-liberal certainties 
that a re-establishment of a stronger pre-1914 system would ensure a solid 
foundation for the re-charging of the global economy after the wreckage 
wrought by World War I. Currency crises and the fall of the gold standard 
initiated the final disintegration of the Concert of Powers European order that 
had been sustained by delusionary notions of an international self-adjusting 
market. As he writes: 
Nowhere has liberal philosophy failed so conspicuously, 
as in Its understanding of the problem of change...the 
common-sense attitude towards change was discarded in 
favour of a mystical readiness to accept the social 
consequences of economic improvement, whatever they 
may be.^° 
As the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) indicated, much of Polanyi's 
analysis provides an historical dimension to the ongoing credibility problems 
and grassroots protests about the internationalisation, or even regionalisation, 
of the narrow strictures of neo-Liberalism. In this contemporary context, for 
many scholars his work points to the urgent need for globalised economic 
policies that recognise there are very divergent kinds of market societies^^ 
manifest in radically different social and political contexts. In other words, 
his analysis challenges the economic essentialism inherent in the assumption 
of an autonomous, benignly rational, self-regulating, global marketplace. As 
Block writes, Polanyi's concept of an economy as always embedded in a 
particular country 'begins with the premise that any favourable economic 
dynamic has to be understood as flowing from the interaction among self-
interested agents, the actions of the state, and forms of social regulation.'" 
" Ibid, p 30 
Ibid, p 33 
21 Block, Fred, Op.Cit. p300 
" Ibid. p299 
Thus Polanyi's work has also informed contemporary attempts to formulate 
more expansive notions of economic Liberalism, in order to counter the ways 
the globalisation juggernaut has served to undermine a sense of national 
socio-economic security and stability. Given the country's experiences in the 
immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has certainly 
not been immune to the hope that the destructive economic impact of 
engagement with the globalised corporations and institutions of Western 
capitalism can be ameliorated. Under the successive Putin/Medvedev 
governments, the policy of 'Managed Democracy' has largely mirrored similar, 
often chaotic attempts by Western countries. These include the Third Way 
Centrist politics, notably articulated at the turn of the century by British 
scholar Anthony Giddens.^^ Its influence extended to the domestic socio-
economic policies of Australia's Hawke/Keating government, Tony Blair's New 
Labour in the UK, and Gerhard Schroeder's 'Neue Mitte' in Germany. The goal 
was to balance low-grade restraints on the wealth-generating private sector 
economy with the protection of the needs of family and other bonds of 
community that Polanyi argued were the bedrock of stable, enduring cultures. 
The problem has been that in none of the above countries has this Third Way 
been notably successful in circumscribing the morally anarchic pursuit of 
wealth to the point of global recession by an oligarchic power elite - an 
outcome that unfortunately in Polanyi's view was inevitable in the march of 
international capitalism. 
Still, Polanyi's work brings an economic dimension to the promotion of the 
more open-ended liberal pluralism inspired by the work of Isaiah Berlin. This 
philosophical perspective rejects the universalism of concepts such as the 
common good or the cosmopolitan delights of neo-Liberalism's economic 
panaceas. Typically though, Berlin adds a quasi-biblical resonance to Polanyi's 
insistence on the fundamental significance of cultural and economic diversity. 
'In the house of human history there are many mansions,' Berlin writesi^"* that 
is, there are many different ethnic and societal conceptions of objective ends 
" Giddens, Anthony, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics, Polity Press, 1998, pp71-72 
" Berlin, Isaiah, The Crooiied Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, Henry Hardy (Ed), 
Princeton University Press, 2013, p83 
and ultimate values. Against the deterministic beliefs of the romantics and 
fanatics, who he believed had been inspired by century German Idealism, 
Berlin argues that there is not one unified answer to humankind's problems. 
In reality many of the great political and legal concepts underpinning the 
progressivism inherent in post-Enlightenment debates are incommensurable. 
Consider, for example, the practical irreconcilability of justice and mercy, 
communitarianism and individualism, the universal protection of the world's 
citizens and the inviolability of nation states, and the legislative curtailment 
of human rights under the banner of the common good and the unfettered 
pursuit of liberty. 
Unlike Polanyi, however, Berlin arrives at a more optimistic conclusion. 
Drawing on the historicist ' new science' of the 18"^ century Italian 
philosopher, Giambattista Vico,^^ he argues that because history and society 
are made by human actions, they can be similarly unmade. For Berlin, this 
philosophical tradition implies that, from the heart of a sense of shared 
humanity, we have the potential to project ourselves into other socio-
economic worlds imaginatively and compassionately. On a pragmatic level, in 
international affairs this implies an informed, determined commitment to 
diplomatic and institutional engagement and consensus. At best, multilateral 
organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) or the Group of 20 (G20), can foster an inclusive acknowledgement of 
divergent or interrelated histories and traditions that might help to ensure 
post-Soviet Russia's gradual accommodation with the West, and vice versa. 
Here, as the modern fellow traveller might put it, the aim of liberal pluralist 
politics is not to make the world perfect, just better than it is. 
With regard to Russia, Polanyi argued the failure of the international market 
in 1929-30 tragically diverted the country towards the pursuit of self-
su f f i c iency through forced co l lec t i v i sa t ion and ' h i gh p res su re 
indust r ia l i sa t ion ' . S imi la r ly , the globalisation agendas and economic 
Vico, Giambattista, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, (1744) trans. Thomas G. Bergin and Max H. 
Fixch, Cornell UP, 1968 
Polanyi, Op. Cit. p247-48 
fundamentalism of the Washington Consensus in the 1990s have been accused 
of playing a significant role in the debacle of the Yeltsin years. Increasingly 
the reaction has been that in the last decade or so Russia has sought to 
negotiate a more sovereign path to social and economic salvation, while still 
remaining within the existing frameworks of international capitalism. One 
manifestation of this is Putin's preoccupation with re-institutionalising ties 
with former Soviet states 'as a buffer against global economic c r i s e s , I n 
particular, in a 2011 pre-presidential election speech aimed at rallying 
regional support 'from Lisbon to V l a d i v o s t o k , P u t i n conjured, and not for 
the first time, a grand vision for a Eurasian economic bloc: 
The combination of natural resources, capital and strong 
human potential will make the Eurasian Union 
competitive in the industrial and technological race and 
the race for investor money, new jobs and advanced 
production facilities. Along with other key players and 
regional Institutions such as the USA, China, and APEC, it 
will ensure the sustainability of global development.^' 
By implication, Putin is seeking to consolidate a Eurasian Union modelled, at 
least in the beginning, on the precursor to the EU, the EEC, which would 
counterbalance a volatile, American-dominated global market place. This 
would include regulatory uniformity across member countries and the 
reducing of border controls, tariffs and other trade barriers to foster the free 
movement of people and goods. Tacitly, for unsympathetic, Realist 
Russophobes, such a project bears more than a hint of the ultra-nationalist 
Neo-Eurasianism, which draws on traditions of Russian exceptionalism and 
imperialism. With his well-honed flair for the terse insult, Putin was quick to 
dismiss such criticism: 'Tackle rising inflation, state debt or at least obesity. 
" Adelaja, Tai, 'The Rise and Rise of Capitalism,' Special Report: 20 Years Since the Fall of the Soviet 
Union, Russia Profile, Issue 4 Volume VIII Fall/11, www.russiaprofile.org/medi/fite/79/15179.pdf 
accessed 27/10/2014 
2'Putin Speech: 'Anew integration project for Eurasia - the future is born,' October 10, 2011, 
www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-prime-minister-put1n-new-integration-project-eurasia-future-
making-izvestia-3- p 3 
" I b i d . p3 
Mind your own bu s i ne s s .Though generally sceptical of its viability given the 
strength of local netv^orks and nationalisms, as well as bureaucratic 
inefficiencies and corruption, fellow travelling sympathisers with the 
initiative are generally more hopeful that: 'Anything that makes Russia more 
open to people and commerce is positive and can only serve, in the long term, 
to weaken the foundations of its current hyper-centralised system. 
Such a view is endorsed by the maverick American liberal conservative, 
Francis Fukuyama. Sharing a panel with Putin in St Petersburg in 2007 on 
'Competitive Eurasia: Space for Trust'^Fukuyama challenged the Huntington 
thesis that Russia's Orthodox Christian religious traditions augur a clash of 
civilisations. Whatever one's cultural affinities, Fukuyama argued, regional 
integration through initiatives such as the Eurasian Union lead in time to a 
convergence between the West and the Rest through the formal legal and 
economic institutions that promote trust between strangers and thus shared 
global prosperity. For his critics who suggest such a perspective might be 
excessively sanguine, Fukuyama acknowledged that the path to universal 
liberal democratic capitalism may be a rocky one, with temporary setbacks 
including sectarian conflict, dead-ends and financial crises. Nevertheless, 
the dictates of economic rationality will prevail: 
while the state begins with coercion, the miracle of the 
modern state is its ability to solve the paradox of power 
- namely, that a state has to be strong enough to enforce 
laws and provide order, yet it must constrain its own 
exercise of power if there is to be long-run economic 
growth." 
Putin, Vladimir, Television Interview as quoted in Russia Profile article by Adelaja, Tai. 'The Unwilling 
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Fukuyama's critics also accuse him of blurring the distinction between a socio-
economic description of Russia's progressive path to modernity and the 
promotion of its desirability. The question here is at what point could it be 
said to have failed? Certainly the current Russian government and Fukuyama 
appear to be in agreement on one issue: it may yet be a long time in the 
making. Putin's pursuit of a vision for a unified Eurasian economic order 
began at least two decades ago and has advanced very little. 
In this context, it should be noted though that there are good reasons why 
'fellow traveller' has frequently been used as a pejorative term and disciples, 
such as Fukuyama, of progressive versions of history advancing towards new 
pinnacles of human technological and cultural achievement have been 
justifiably ridiculed in the past: ' I have seen the future and it works, 
American journalist and political philosopher Lincoln Steffens famously wrote 
to a friend after he had interviewed Lenin in St Petersburg in 1919. That he 
proved to be almost immediately and decisively wrong prompted one 
conservative wit to retort: ' I have seen the future and it is just like the 
present, only longer '." 
Traditionally fellow travellers have had an unfortunate tendency not to let the 
facts get in the way of their idealism. Significantly, though, in their heyday 
from the 1920s until Khrushchev's Secret Speech condemning Stalinism in 
1956, they often were not card-carrying members of Communist Parties in the 
West, nor were they necessarily any other kind of a strenuous political activist 
for the cause of the USSR. Rather many were touched by Utopianism, 
weaving abstract political dreams about the Soviet Union from the comfort of 
their book-lined studies. Alienated from their own societies, they often 
yearned for the exotic political enchantment of other peoples' revolutions, so 
long as they were happening on foreign shores. Meanwhile, they sometimes 
made reverential Potemkin tours to the Soviet Union and pronounced 
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plausibly deniable the reports of widespread starvation in Ukraine, of the 
massacres of the innocents in the gulags, and of Stalin's executioner's zeal 
during the Great Purge of the 1930s. 
Such posturing can be at least partially explained, but definitely not excused, 
by the temper of the times. As Brzezinski observed, from a leftist perspective 
the fellov^ traveller of the 1920s and '30s has been understood as neither 'an 
epicurean devotee of vicarious violence,' nor 'the person who drove Stalin's 
getaway car and then claimed innocence of the crimes.'^' Rather these 
'generous-minded progressives who had believed too long and fervently in the 
Soviet Un ion ' " were more likely to evoke a sense of pathos, even tragedy. As 
well, for much of the twentieth century and beyond, the Soviet Union has 
been so relentlessly vilified by its critics in the West that to embrace 
communism, or even the mildest form of socialism, was to sup with the devil. 
For those Western liberals confronted by the inflated ideological zeal of their 
Cold War opponents, the truth about the communist USSR had seemed hard to 
come by. Moreover, as the socialist George Orwell discovered, to accept the 
revelations of Stalin's Totalitarian savagery, or allegations about the 
uncompromisingly militant nature of Cold War communism, meant being 
stereotyped as a closet Right Wing recidivist, unable to distinguish what we 
would nowadays call spin-doctoring from veracious reportage. 
In spite of such ideologically-driven historical indictments, these days re-
invented fellow travellers arguably can claim a more laudable heritage, 
though a diffuse and aspirational one. 'Humankind,' observed the poet, T.S 
Eliot, 'cannot bear very much r e a l i t y . T o be human is to have an atavistic 
longing for the more-than-human. Fellow travellers have had much in 
common, Hollander argues, with the perennial political pilgrims of the post-
Enlightenment world. They were secularised truth- seekers, determined on 
more than the industrialised, bureaucratised societies of the modernising 
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West seemed capable of delivering. However fictional, the appeal of an 
idealised Soviet Union to the West's intelligentsia was sometinnes quasi-
religious, embodying 'the achievement of or striving for "wholeness," the 
sense of identity and community, meaning and purpose in life,'^'that had been 
lost to the nihilism of modernity. In contrast to a spiritually empty, 
consumerist, bourgeois world, Slavic communitarianism and the embrace of 
the socialist soul of Mother Russia ostensibly had much to commend it. 
More contentiously, Hollander argues that it is doubtful that what he 
describes as 'an amalgam of alienation and utopia-seeking peculiar to many 
Western intellectuals...has run its course.'"" Rather he sees their contribution 
to democratic societies as corrosive and aberrant, invoking the baleful 
spectre of the highly esteemed moral values allegedly inherent in the socio-
economic institutions of the West not surviving their estranged Utopianism.'' 
Added to this was what he saw as the international resurgence of a posturing, 
ignorant leftist movement, one that had been quick to forget the fifty million 
or more who had died in the ideological wars of the first half of the century. 
'Perhaps the most enduring message,' Hollander writes, '...has been that the 
political pursuit of Utopian social arrangements... is bound to produce a rich 
and devastating harvest of unintended consequences such as violence, 
repression, and mendaciousness, as well as untold material and psychic 
deprivations for the surviving victims of these experiments in social 
engineering."'^ Like Isaiah Berlin, Hollander warns that today's fellow 
travellers should pay more careful attention to the lessons of the not-very-
distant past. 
Hollander's work is almost exclusively concerned with the Utopianism of the 
Left, ignoring the history of the Right Wing free market Utopianism that so 
dismayed Polanyi and which continues to be strongly challenged in current 
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debate. Moreover, his analysis of the fellow travelling pilgrimages to the 
Soviet Union, China and Cuba was published more than thirty years ago in the 
wake of the 1968 Paris Commune and the murderous fanaticism of America's 
Weathermen and Europe's Red Brigades. With hindsight, these loosely aligned 
radical groups of the 1960s, whose political naivety Hollander scorned, are 
more appropriately characterised as a short-lived youth crusade protesting 
against 'the establishment' whatever its manifestations. By the mid-1970s 
they had largely dissipated into self-destructiveness or apolitical, middle class 
self-indulgence. Their notions of rebellion had veered between anarchic 
violence and a theatrical sense of Fun Power, such as the 1967 attempt by 
American anti-Vietnam War protesters to levitate the Pentagon. Other 
elements of a very broad movement included T-shirt sloganising, a Rousseau-
style romanticisation of the Third World, and a shifting adulation of 
charismatic leaders such Che Guevara, Chairman Mao or George Gurdjieff. As 
well, there was the widespread commitment to chemically-induced 
transcendentalism: or as the saying goes, 'if you can remember the sixties 
then you weren't there. Few of those under Hollander's ample umbrella of 
Left-Wingism were liberal-minded intellectuals for whom events in the 
Eastern bloc had become a touchstone in their quest for theoretical and 
experiential alternatives to the failures of their own societies. Indeed many 
of those who joined the protest movement during those years had a strident 
distrust of intellectualism, along with a desk calendar knowledge of Marxism 
and a firm belief that unreflective social activism should be centre stage. 
Though written in 1937, a decade before the mutation of East/West hostilities 
into a 'Cold War,' Orwell's characterisation of such activists is strongly 
evocative of the 1960s and 1970s: 
One sometimes gets the impression that the mere words 
'Socialism' and 'Communism' draw towards them with 
magnetic force every fruit-juice drinker, nudist, sandal-
« No-one seems to remember who said this first 
wearer, sex-maniac, Quaker, 'Nature Cure' quack, 
pacifist, and feminist in England.'" 
Writing In the early 1990s about her experiences of the stretch of years that 
saw Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalinism at the Twentieth Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, and the meteoric rise of the 
New Left, the novelist and member of the British Communist Party, Doris 
Lessing, reminds her readers that only with hindsight could they be described 
as an Orwellian 'lunacy...a paranoia essenced."*^ Her answer to the puzzle of 
how was it possible to be a fellow traveller during that time provides a radical 
contrast to Orwell's totalitarian nightmares. Rather Lessing conjures her 
engagement with a potent, diffuse, exhilarating chaos: 
a fever, an intoxication, every possible social idea up for 
grabs, from feminism to communal living, all based - and 
in areas that extended far beyond the Communist Party -
on a goody-and-baddy scenario: the Soviet Union was 
good, everyone else, bad."^ 
One of the earliest usages of the term, fellow traveller, was by Leon Trotsky In 
a long essay written in 1924 entitled 'The Literary Fellow Travellers of the 
Revolution'."^In it, he singled out as fellow travellers a post-October group of 
artists and intellectuals whose 'literary and spiritual front has been made by 
the Revolution, by that angle of it which caught them, and they have 
accepted the Revolution, each in his own way.' As a very Important cohort in 
Russian literature, he wrote, they were the creators of transitional work in 
the gap between a dying bourgeois world and one that will be utterly 
transformed. But ultimately these intellectuals were outsiders, unable to 
fully articulate the soul of this brave new revolution. 
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Among them, for example, was author Boris Pilnyak, whose zeal for the new 
world-in-the-making in Trotsky's view was constrained by an artistic sensibility 
that failed to look above the travails of everyday life. As Trotsky writes, 
though he was an excellent observer, Pilnyak was the kind of fellow traveller 
who could see 'only at what is under his feet, notice only obstacles, minuses, 
holes, torn boots, broken dishes."*® Here the driving power of an ethereal 
Marxism risked being lost to discord and confusion. As well, there were the 
poets, such as the peasant, Nikolai Kliuev, who 'promises paradise through the 
Revolution, but this paradise is only an exaggerated and embellished peasant 
kingdom, a wheat and honey paradise: a singing bird on the carved wing of 
the house and a sun shining in jasper and diamonds."" Such writers conjured 
only the past of medieval folktales and the 'Rus'. For Trotsky, they were 
blinkered by individualistic preoccupations that curtailed genuinely 
transformative cultural imaginings. 
As suggested above, fellow travellers in the West were often similarly limited, 
though their failure to imbibe the true spirit of the Revolution had much to do 
with their Eurocentric preoccupations with what they saw as the hollow 
liberal ideals of their own societies. By the 1930s, officially in the Soviet 
Union "there were no more Russian fellow travellers - only "non-Party 
Bolsheviks'".5°Sadly, both Pilnyak and Kliuev were executed by Stalin's 
minions in 1937-38. By contrast, in Europe and in the America of Joe 
McCarthy, intellectuals could simply renounce the political dabblings of their 
youth - as the work of Koestler or Andre Gide exemplified. Alternatively, one 
could look beyond the tragic brutalities of Soviet communism to other kinds of 
revolutions in Cuba, Portugal or parts of the Third World. 
As Lessing suggests, traditional fellow travellers in the West saw In Soviet 
communism the misguided hope of a future of real existing 'social justice and 
its many tangible components - material, economic, political, cultural and 
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organisational'^Hhat appeared to be denied to the less privileged citizens of 
democracies. This 'family of related notions '," Caute argues, which also 
includes terms such as progress, scientific rationality, peace, equality, the 
workers' state, often more closely typified fellow travelling than words such 
as revolution." Like their doomed Russian counterparts, the role of fellow 
travellers was to be commentators on the realities and potentials of radical 
progressive change. They saw themselves as having an ethical obligation to 
write 'a history of the present' in the hope of Illuminating a clear way 
forward out of the morass created by the failed promises of modernity. 
But, as British fellow traveller Stephen Spender wrote, 'The conflict of the 
liberal conscience of men of good will In the 1930s centred on the problem of 
ends and means'.^^ Or as Trotsky put it a decade earlier: 'As regards a "fellow 
traveller", the question always comes up - how far will he go?...The solution 
depends.-.mainly on the objective trend of t h i n g s . I n the context of Russia's 
revolutionary era, this meant articulating persuasive answers to the recurrent 
challenge that fellow travellers were merely over-eager apologists for 
Totalitarianism; or, since the end of the Cold War, that the liberal pluralist 
tolerance of a re-invented fellow traveller in reality has amounted to little 
beyond a dubious justification for the alleged rise of post-Soviet 
authoritarianism, one that has forgotten the lessons of Russia's history. 
Nevertheless, as such focal debates indicate, fellow travellers historically 
should not be so readily dismissed as the Soviet Union's or the Russian 
Federation's cheer-squad shouting with increasingly credulous optimism from 
the distant sidelines. Rather they have often assumed the mantle of a 
committed public intelligentsia of the liberal Left, which saw itself as 
providing a deeper, more complex voice, one that was striving to be 
independent of what they saw as the crude ideological arena of both domestic 
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and international power politics. To paraphrase the unrepentantly Marxist 
historian, Eric Hobsbawm, their role was underlined by the understanding 
'that human society is a successful structure because it is capable of change, 
and thus the present is not the point of ar r iva l .Moreover, they continued to 
believe there are few good reasons why it should be. It is this central 
element of the concept of fellow traveller that has been carried forward into 
their contemporary liberal pluralist perspectives on Russia. 
Ironically for a grouping that is frequently dismissed as naive and gullible, 
fellow travellers in the West accuse their opponents of a blind, 
unsubstantiated pessimism about humankind's capacity for self-improvement. 
Specifically they saw the end of the Cold War as a window of opportunity to 
genuinely reset East/West relations by drawing an economically bankrupt and 
ideologically-moribund Russia into the fold of the open societies of a 
globalised cosmopolitanism. As suggested above, the Russian reality under 
the Yeltsin government of the newly-created Russian Federation in the early 
1990s was the collapse of the ruble, deprivation and hardship for the mass of 
the people, and a failed putsch. 
Nevertheless, for contemporary re-invented fellow travellers, there are good 
reasons why it is too soon to pronounce final judgment on today's Russia. The 
post-Cold War enterprise has not so much failed in the face of Vladimir Putin's 
ascendency and the Western-oriented, opportunistic, kleptocratic mindset of 
many of those in the new power elite. On the one hand, they argue that the 
inadequately-regulated pursuit of wealth by oligarchic multi-national 
companies has long been an inherent feature of capitalism; on the other, that 
the Russian experience demands a more sophisticated recognition of the 
country's need to negotiate a singular path to prosperous modernization - but 
not necessarily towards Western-style modernity. The specific lesson of its 
dramatic stabilisation under the Putin government, and its implementation of 
policies of 'Managed Democracy' in reaction to the chaos of the Yeltsin era, is 
the need to revise interpretations of what is meant by democratisation. Like 
Polanyi's market economies, democracies are necessarily home-grown, 
Hobsbawm, Eric, The New Century, Abacus 2000, p6 
embedded organically in divergent cultural and historical contexts. Three 
hundred years or so of modern Western history suggest that they are also slow 
to develop, never top-down, and appear to constitute a broad church. 
Moreover, as the European Union's External Action Service Counsellor, Robert 
Cooper, observes, for former communist countries even the word, 
'democracy,' itself sometimes becomes problematic, adding, 'I personally like 
the Chinese government: it has done amazing things for its people. And it 
continues to transform the country. In the end the state will be transformed 
as a result of this activity.'" 
Thus what some commentators dismiss as a Russian catalogue of retrogressive 
steps during the last couple of decades or so into the mire of a new Cold War 
posturing, many of their more optimistic opponents understand as a 
transitional phase on the road to freedom. For sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf, 
for instance, this phase may require at the very minimum two or three 
generations and is predicated firstly on constitutional reforms, secondly on 
economic development, and thirdly on the establishment of the social 
foundations which transform the constitution and the economy from fair-
weather into all-weather institutions. Sixty years, he says, 'are barely enough 
to lay these foundations.' as Solzhenitsyn puts it more succinctly and 
poignantly: 'Putin inherited a ransacked and bewildered country, with a poor 
and demoralised people...The growth and development of an opposition, as 
well as the maturing of other democratic institutions will take time and 
e x p e r i e n c e . T h e hope for the re-invented fellow traveller is that, like 
China, Russia is just off the starting blocks on its own unique the path to 
legitimate, enduringly democratic government. 
Fundamentally, though, what emerges from the above cluster of intellectual 
argument and ideology integral to the conceptual framework of new Cold War 
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warrior and re-invented fellow traveller is on what basis can its contemporary 
relevance be justified? There are two responses to this. The first is that both 
concepts continue, explicitly and implicitly, to have a currency in analyses of 
Russia since the end of Soviet era. As Richard Sakwa complains, in the halls of 
academe '...any attempt at dispassionate analysis condemned one to the 
forlorn status of fellow-traveller.''" Among other issues, Sakwa's scholarship 
has been concerned with the plausibility of the term 'Russian Democracy' in 
the context of methods of governance of Vladimir Putin. A less forlorn usage 
can be found in a 2001 Stanford University press release on Michael McFaul's 
book, Russia's Unfinished Revolution, which describes him as 'a fellow-
traveller in this new Russian revolution.' McFaul has also been described as an 
influential contributor to the first-term Obama administration's 'reset' foreign 
policy of renewed engagement with Putin's Russian Federat ion. In May, 2011 
he was appointed United States Ambassador to Moscow, a posting that was 
terminated two years later amid considerable controversy about the depth 
and sensitivity of the diplomatic skills he displayed in fostering America's 
relationship with the country." 
The second response is that the conceptual framework generates arenas of 
debate about the various assumptions underpinning the received wisdom 
about the Putin government. As suggested above, central to these debates is 
the question of the continued meaningfulness of Kennan's Cold War 
observations that the Soviet Union's leadership was morally bankrupt, 
autocratic, militaristic and economically inept, with a foreign policy that was 
both xenophobic and expansionist. For the new Cold War warriors, like his 
Communist predecessors, Putin is simply not to be trusted. Nor Is he the kind 
of leader with whom the West can confidently do business or invite Into full-
scale membership of the West's premium security organization, NATO. 
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The overarching contention in the following chapters is that Kennan's 
judgments generally are more revealing of the strengths and limitations of 
contemporary doctrinaire Liberalism, and its associated sociological analyses 
and democratization studies, than about the realities of the new Russia. In 
using this approach, it is important to acknowledge the underlying influence 
of the Cambridge school of political theory. The conceptual framework of 
new Cold War warriors and re-invented fellow travellers draws on the notion 
from historian of ideas, J.G.A Pocock, that debate among society's 
intellectuals and commentators does not have an autonomous existence 
outside or above the social world. On the contrary, it is always variously 
enmeshed in the times in which it takes place. This Is not to say that its 
influence does not extend beyond when It is written, but rather that It is 
always important to take into account different historical contexts and the 
ways old concepts, such as 'Liberalism , or 'democracy' may be encrusted 
with new meanings that are in no way culturally or ideologically neutral. 
With regard to Putin's Russia, this approach points to the need to focus on 
what has changed since the implosion of communist rule, so that our 
understanding of these two decades does not emerge as a kind of immutable 
repetition of past assumptions. Instead, what is needed is a dynamic 
engagement with present events, one that is open-ended and philological In 
its careful attention to the words we use to describe this process. As Pocock 
said: 'The history of a concept is the history of its use; but there is typically 
tension between the user of a concept and the concept which may have been 
formed for other uses.'^^ Put another way, social changes do not follow an 
inscrutable course independent of our shifting conceptualisation of them. 
Consider, for example, the divergent, contextuallzed interpretations 
surrounding the meaning of an abstract concept, such as 'European 
nationalism.' These days it is a commonplace that in the eastern states of the 
former Yugoslavia and in Russia It involves a re-conjuring of barbaric ancient 
enmities and past glories, a kind of contemporary mythologlsing of a unique 
ethnic solidarity founded on a Schmittian notion of Us and Them. 
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Understanding such nationalism as a largely destructive, exclusionary 
manifestation of imagined community is believed to be integral to any 
analysis of regional power politics and fragmentation. By contrast, Western 
European nationalism is often assumed to be a more benign notion. Ideally, it 
is simply what enables a country's diverse citizens to assume they belong 
together, and thus helps to ensure the bonds of a secular modern state 
infused with civic virtue. For the most part, it is manifested as a banal, 
everyday expression of communalism, for example, through support for 
national sporting teams or cultural events. 
To contextualize in a similar way the current uses of the concepts of new Cold 
War warrior and re-invented fellow traveller, the following chapters are 
divided into five thematic arenas: the contribution of Anglo Russian 
philosopher Isaiah Berlin's liberal pluralism in promoting understanding of 
today's Russian Federation; evaluating the role of post-Soviet Russian liberal 
intellectuals in fostering the kind of civil society eulogised in Western political 
theory as prefiguring the institutionalisation of democratic governance; 
Eurocentrism in Western conceptualisations of democratisation and 
authoritarianism under the Putin government; Where East meets West? 
Russian conservatism and the notion of expansionist neo-Eurasian geopolitics; 
and finally the importance of the world of espionage and leaked covert 
intelligence in consolidating alleged facts and fictions about the Putin regime. 
By implication, the consideration of such themes does not constitute a 
systematic, tightly-structured series of studies. Instead the approach is 
eclectic and interdisciplinary, ranging across civilizational, sociological, 
biographical and geopolitical perspectives on today's Russia from a selection 
of influential intellectuals both within the country and transnationally. It also 
takes inspiration from the liberal pluralism of Isaiah Berlin, for whom the 
striving by scholars to press their understanding of human affairs into tidy 
boxes of ideologically-driven reflection and syllogistic reasoning is a nonsense. 
The aim is to encapsulate and challenge the focal claims and counterclaims of 
a number of especially contentious and divisive assertions about Putin's 
governance and foreign policy initiatives. 
As the views, for instance, of Isaac Deutscher suggest, to achieve more than 
this embodies a formidable, if not impossible, challenge. A sturdy Trotskyist, 
Deutscher particularly loathed George Orwell, with whom he worked briefly 
as a journalist in Germany in the mid-1940s^'' and whose books, especially 
1984, he thought were despicable. Deutscher summed up what he saw as the 
limitations of Orwell's cultural and political commentary in this back-
straightening way: 
To analyse a complicated social background, to try and 
unravel tangles of political motives, calculations, fears 
and suspicions, and to discern the compulsion of 
circumstance behind the actions was beyond him." 
Despite his purely aspirational standards of analysis, Deutscher's ridicule of 
Orwell does serve as an appropriate warning about jumping to glib 
conclusions. Consider, for example, a key accusation of Russophobic new Cold 
War warriors, the notion of gullibility, with its implication that today's fellow 
travellers share the shallow Pollyanna-style thinking of many of their 
forerunners. What does it mean to talk in terms of contextualising and 
analysing the debates centred on this notion, of elucidating the specific ways 
'ideas and social forces roll over in the mud of actuality together?'^^ One 
approach is to explore some of the prejudices that thread through today's re-
invention of Cold War Kremlinology, otherwise known as Putinology. As online 
commentator and Putin supporter Vitaly Tretyakov puts it, decoding the 
hidden or subtle meanings behind Putin's pronouncements has become a 
favourite obsession of foreign political commentators and journalists. 
Generally this involves a great deal of amateur psychology about Putin's 
personal life and ambitions, as well as his public utterances, for example on 
autocracy, geopolitics or the rule of law. For those new Cold War warriors 
Tretyakov believes are inclined to ill-informed, literal-minded interpretations, 
he offers some guidelines. In particular, he claims, Putin is heartily sick of 
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answering questions about whether there is democracy in his country. His 
answers, such as '...since the death of Mahatma Gandhi there has been no-one 
to talk to about democracy,' are clearly both scornful and ironic.^^ 
Tretyakov could well have added another aspect of a more malign Putinology 
manifest in misleading and out-of-context translations into English by 
commentators of key words in Putin's speeches. Consider, for example, an 
instance where what Putin actually said and what he is reported to have said 
are markedly different. His April 2005 Address to the Federal Assembly of 
the Russian Federation has been widely interpreted in the West as expressing 
Putin's neo-imperialist ambition to reinvent the great power status and 
spheres of external control of Russia's communist glory days. In reports from 
BBC and Australian correspondents and academic commentators, as well as in 
statements by US senators such as Senator John McCain, it has been accepted 
that Putin described the fall of the Soviet Union in superlative terms as 'the 
greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.' By contrast, in the Kremlin 
archives, the official English translation of his words is given as '...the collapse 
of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century.'^® That 
is, it was one of many disasters that arguably from a Russian perspective 
could include the murderous brutality of Stalinism denounced by Khrushchev 
in his 1956 Secret Speech; or the approximately 20 million dead in the Great 
Patriotic War. In defence of his insistence that Putin did not say 'there was no 
worse geopolitical disaster in the century,^' Armstrong refers to a very lucid 
explanation in a recent textbook on the intricacies of Russian grammar.^" 
With regard to the meaning of the word 'krupneyshey' (major), the book says: 
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To say an object possesses some quality 1n extraordinary 
degree, without comparing it to other objects, the 
Russian uses a special adjectival form ending -eyshiy (or -
ayshiy, after zh, ch, sh, shch)7^ 
Such an adjectival grammatical form, Armstrong points out, does not exist in 
English. 'Extremely great' has been suggested as a more appropriate 
translation, to convey this sense of the superlative degree.^^ 
On the issue of v^hat Putin might have intended by his use of the term 
'geopolitical,' Armstrong also insists that the Russian President was not 
indicating 'he wanted the empire back. ' " Indeed, against the sheer weight of 
Western-oriented commentary, the context of Putin's words in his annual 
speech suggests a catalogue of dire domestic challenges.^"' In the following 
paragraph from his Address, Putin provides a vivid description of 'the 
epidemic of d i s i n teg ra t i on that characterised the wretched years that saw 
the final socio-economic implosion of the Soviet Union: 
Individual savings were depreciated and old ideals 
destroyed. Many institutions were disbanded or 
reformed carelessly. Terrorist intervention damaged the 
country's integrity. Oligarchic groups...served their own 
corporate interests. Mass poverty began to be seen as 
the norm. And all this was happening against the 
backdrop of a dramatic economic downturn, unstable 
finances, and the paralysis of the social sphere.^^ 
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But these events, he adds with a politician's patriotic rallying cry, generated 
too 'the energy for self-preservation'^^ and 'the v^ill for a nev7 and free life' ' 
which has demanded of the Russian people that they find their own path to a 
viable democracy. Nowhere in the Address does Putin proffer an expansionist 
foreign policy rebuilt out of the teetering edifice of the Soviet Union as a 
vision for his country's future. 
Behind all this are serious questions about what kind of leadership Putin is 
assumed to embody and what this might imply about the new Russia. Is he an 
abstemious, clean-living, anti-materialist judo junkie with a shirtless mid-life 
crisis? And a notable contrast to his predecessor, the increasingly 
dysfunctional drunkard, Boris Yeltsin, who opened the door to a generation of 
billion dollar oligarchs? Is he a nationalistic, multi-lingual Intellectual from 
humble origins, who has steered his country from chaos to stability, not least 
by ensuring that the workers were actually paid? Or is he a Tsarist-style 
autocrat and anti-Western xenophobe, who has conducted brutal, self-
glorifying wars in the North Caucasus, Georgia and Ukraine? Or a politically-
agile pragmatist, an astute balancer of Russia's opportunistic and 
factlonalised power elite? Or a vain, power-hungry populist, raiding the 
national coffers, just like his select, revolving-door entourage of oligarchs? Or 
a KGB-trained ideologue, who does not shrink from the exile, imprisonment 
and murder of his opponents? Or, more realistically, some complex, shifting 
mix of some or all of the above? 
Nowhere is this resurgence of a confluence of Cold War presumptions more 
evident than In the intensification of the West's vilification of Putin. The 
following explores the reports and analysis of a series of events that, together 
with the Khodorkovsky trial, Russian military savagery in Chechnya, the Pussy 
Riot trials, and the country's Involvement in events In Ukraine, have marked 
this steep decline in the West's regard for Putin's leadership during the last 
two decades or so. In charting the certainties and known uncertainties 
surrounding the slow and very painful death in a London hospital in November, 
n Ibid. 
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2006 of the former KGB officer, Aleksandr Litvinenko, it concludes that much 
of public commentary is more indicative of anti-Russian/anti-Putin prejudice 
than of the existence of firm evidence of culpability. 
For a year or more afterwards, Litvinenko's murder v/as a consistent source of 
headlines in the Western media, with the reports characterised by a 
combination of horror at the manner of his dying and outrage at what seemed 
clearly to be a contemptuous violation of British sovereign law by Russian 
nationals. It has continued to be recurrently publicised, in radio and 
television documentaries, feature articles in tabloid and up-market 
broadsheets, and in books by commentators on Russia, as well as by 
Litvinenko's colleagues and close friends, and his wife, Marina. 
Within hours of his death, the British government confirmed that Litvinenko 
had been murdered using an exceedingly rare radioactive poison. Polonium 
210. Discovered in 1898 by Pierre and Marie Curie, it is found in sub-toxic 
levels in naturally-occurring substances such as pitchblende, or is a cancer-
inducing by-product of cigarettes manufactured from tobacco fertilised using 
phosphates. Poisoning by the chemical is not only untreatable and invariably 
fatal, but a microscopic amount in water or food will kill a healthy adult. 
Theoretically, one gram of the chemical could poison one hundred million 
people. Litvinenko's post-mortem indicated that he had ingested around five 
times the lethal dose which, during the following three weeks, spread 
systematically through his body destroying blood cells and vital organs 
including his kidneys, liver, spleen, lungs and intestines. According to British 
political philosopher John Gray's alarming description, Litvinenko's murder 
'suggests that nuclear terrorism may already be a reality.'^' 
Subsequent investigations by Scotland Yard also indicated that the murder was 
either a masterful piece of obfuscation or an amateur operation by a sinister 
bunch of blockheads who were intent upon vengeance for Litvinenko's 
betrayal of his compatriots and/or his motherland. For a start, the Polonium 
210 left a radioactive trail across London and on British Airways flights to 
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Moscow and Hamburg, Germany, that appeared to directly implicate the Duma 
politician and former Russian bodyguard Andrei Lugovoi. In hospital 
interviews, Litvinenko described his meeting with Lugovoi and his associate, 
former KGB officer Dmitri Kovtun, in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel 
opposite the American Embassy in London's Grosvenor Square. The hotel 
waiter recalled the unusually gluey yellow substance in Litvinenko's tea cup 
and police forensics confirmed traces of radioactive polonium 210 had been 
distributed around the area where he had been sitting. In a heart-wrenching 
public statement published within hours of his death, Litvinenko asserted he 
had absolutely no doubt it was President and former Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin who had ordered his assassination: 
...as I lie here I can distinctly hear the beatings of wings 
of the angel of death. You may succeed in silencing one 
man but the howl of protest from around the world will 
reverberate, Mr Putin, in your ears for the rest of your 
life. May God forgive you for what you have done, not 
only to me, but to beloved Russia and its people.®" 
Six months later, with the police investigation apparently satisfactorily 
completed, Britain's Director of Crown Prosecutions, Sir Ken Macdonald, 
charged Lugovoi with murder and called for his extradition from Russia to face 
the British courts. The Russian government refused the request. 
Much of the ongoing media speculation has focused on the motives for the 
murder. This has generated a bewildering array of possibilities, which over 
time has served to unravel an easy assumption of Lugovoi's guilt. 'What kind 
of idiot poisoner one would be, to act so primitively?' was Lugovoi's not-
entirely-unconvincing protestation of innocence.®^ More tenuously it seemed, 
he added that obviously he was being framed by Britain's foreign intelligence 
service, MI6, who had itself organised the killing with the help of the anti-
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Putin, exiled Russian tycoon, Boris Berezovsky. The real culprits were more 
than likely members of the Spanish arm of the Russian mafia, with whom 
Berezovsky has close links. Putin's supporters issued similarly paranoid-style 
denials, pointing out that, despite a reported thoroughgoing antipathy 
towards Litvinenko®^ the President would hardly benefit from the weeks of 
damaging international headlines during his former employee's agonizingly-
slow death, followed by years of recriminations, as well as a re-freezing of 
diplomatic relations between Moscow and London. As Putin aide Sergei 
Yastrzhembsky commented: '...in this case, I think that we are witnessing a 
well-rehearsed plan of the consistent discrediting of the Russian Federation 
and its chief." However he did not speculate on the reasons or the timing 
behind such a plan beyond the implication that the British government was up 
to its old Cold War tricks of disinformation and propagandising aimed at 
undermining the current regime. 
Yastrzhembsky's denial of any Russian government involvement in the death 
has been dismissed by Putin's opponents under the rubric: 'Well he would, 
wouldn't he?" ^ Still, the Wikileaks' publication in late 2010 of a United States 
diplomatic cable from their embassy in Paris to Washington's State 
Department appeared to lend support to the Russian denial. Dated 26 
December, 2006, the cable described a dinner conversation in a Paris 
restaurant a couple of weeks earlier between the American Ambassador for 
Counter-Terrorism, Henry Crumpton, and the Russian Special Presidential 
Representative, Anatoliy Safanov. The latter not only claimed that his 
country's government had no involvement in Litvinenko's murder, but also 
that 'Russian authorities in London had known about and followed individuals 
moving radioactive substances into the city but were told by the British they 
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were under control before the poisoning took p l a c e . T h e implication from 
this line of revelation appears to be that the British intelligence services were 
either incompetent or, for undisclosed operational reasons, chose not to warn 
Litvinenko that he was in danger. Equally it could be 'a clumsy attempt by 
Moscow to deflect accusations that its agents were involved in the 
assassination.'®^ 
Other Western commentators more sympathetic to today's Russia have 
suggested that Litvinenko was far from having been a morally exemplary 
whistle-blower whose links with the successor organisation to the KGB, the 
Federal Security Service (FSB), ensured he had exceptional knowledge of the 
dark side of Russian power. In this respect, they claimed, most of the Western 
media, including today's Russophobes, were the singularly gullible ones. 
According to journalist and author Chris Floyd the widespread, unfounded 
assumption was: 
The Cold war had come again, we were told: a bold 
dissident against the tyrannical Putin regime has been 
assassinated in the streets of London by the undead KGB 
wie ld ing s t range po i sons concocted in secret 
laboratories.®^ 
The contrary claim was that Litvinenko was probably an obsessive, embittered 
fantasist whose inside information may well have proved to be worthless. His 
accusations against Putin and his alleged cronies included 'every major crime 
of the century,'®® in particular that the Russian leader had been either 
complicit or personally involved in: drug trafficking in Afghanistan; the 1999 
Moscow apartment bombings; the 2002 Moscow theatre siege; the heart-
rending 2004 Beslan schoolhouse slaughter; the training of some of the world's 
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most bloody-minded terrorists including Carlos The Jackal' Ramirez and 
Osama bin Laden's replacement as al Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri; the 
2005-06 Danish cartoon controversy; the 2006 assassination of the Russian 
investigative journalist, Anna Politkovskaya; and finally that Putin was a 
knov/n paedophile. 
Moreover, Litvinenko's deathbed revelations had been carefully stage-
managed by Tim Bell, a public relations consultant employed by Boris 
Berezovsky. Otherwise known as Baron Bell of Belgravia, Bell was Margaret 
Thatcher's media strategy advisor, and had also worked for imprisoned 
Canadian media mogul Conrad Black, for Rupert Murdoch, and for the Bush 
administration's Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq after the American 
invasion.®' The speculation also included the suggestion that, for villainous 
and somewhat opaque reasons, Litvinenko himself had procured the Polonium 
210, which resulted in his accidental, self-inflicted, fatal poisoning. Certainly 
the subsequent forensic investigations by the Institute of Radiation Physics in 
Switzerland, which led to its strongly contested conclusion that polonium 210 
was also the direct cause of Yasser Arafat's allegedly mysterious death in 
2004, might suggest that the rare poison was widely available on the black 
market in Europe and the Middle East. 
So far, neither the British official police investigation nor the Swiss scientific 
analysis appear to have shed any light on the issues of from or by whom the 
poison had been bought. As a matter of fact, with regard to Litvinenko case, 
this view is shared by the Greater London Coroner's Office, which in August 
2012 announced an inquest would be held the following year.'° Almost two 
years later, whether coincidental or not, within a few days of the downing of 
Malaysian Airways flight MH17 in Eastern Ukraine, British Home Secretary 
Theresa May announced the judge-led inquest was to be converted into a 
public inquiry. Unlike the inquest, the inquiry would enable the investigation 
8' Ibid, pp 1-4 
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to be specifically directed at the culpability of the Russian government.' 
Significantly, whenever deemed necessary by the relevant government 
agencies, proceedings of the inquiry that considered 'sensitive material, 
including intelligence d o c u m e n t s , w o u l d be closed to the public. In other 
words, with regard to the most puzzling aspects of Litvinenko's death, neither 
the media nor the ordinary citizen may be necessarily any more enlightened 
by yet another government-endorsed legal investigation. 
Russophile William Dunkerley has gone further, indicting the Western media of 
having already clouded the issue by serving up a mash of unsubstantiated 
nonsense about Litvinenko, adding the case 'exemplifies the real process 
through which Putin is regularly slimed internationally.'" A Senior Fellow with 
the privately-funded American University in Moscow and self-styled media 
commentator on Russian affairs, Dunkerley claims to have been commissioned 
by the organisers of the 2007 World Congress in Moscow of the International 
Federation of Journalists to study media coverage of Litvinenko's poisoning. 
Five years later in November, 2011, he self-published The Phony Litvinenko 
Murder. The book claimed that many of the media stories and headlines 
published in the wake of the murder not only have 'no apparent basis in fact', 
but also 'a web of mysterious connections went largely uncommented upon in 
the p r e s s . P r e s u m a b l y these connections include Litvinenko's relationship 
with the Russian oligarch, Boris Berezovsky, MI6, and the Russian mafia. 
So what conclusions can be drawn by an earnest researcher, who could be said 
to walk an unsteady path between fortifying new Cold War prejudice against 
Russia and the benefit-of-the-doubtism of a re-invented fellow traveller? In 
sum, the following interpretation might constitute the best kind of fence-
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sitting approach: at this stage there is insufficient evidence for any fair-
minded court of public opinion to convict Lugovoi. Further inquiry is required, 
but unlikely to reveal much accessible information, in the areas of MI6's links 
with, and/or information about Lugovoi, Litvinenko, Berezovsky and his so-
called Mafia associates; or on Litvinenko's relationship v^ith employees of the 
former KGB and of the FSB. As well, more convincing empirical 
documentation is needed than the speculative reports in the Russian online 
newspaper, Gazeta.ru, that the Polonium 210 used in the poisoning was 
manufactured and stored in a facility close to Moscow before being 
transported to London.'^ Finally, for those outside the impenetrable 
shadowlands of British intelligence agencies, of apparently double-dealing 
Russian exiles, of the factional machinations of former Russian oligarchs and 
KGB employees,' 'and of pan-European Russian criminality, the motive for 
Litivinenko's murder remains uncertain and elusive. In other words, we might 
be well served to reserve judgment about who is guilty or innocent and be 
wary of whoever we dine with - at least in the world of spies and apparently 
unprincipled Russian exiles. 
At the heart of Russophobic interpretations of the Litvinenko case is the 
assumption that Putin would not shrink from covertly endorsing extra judicial 
killing, whether domestically or 'beyond the territory of the Russian 
Federation.''^ If in fact this were the case, most commentators of varied 
political affiliations share a common concern. As with the USSR during the 
Cold War and before, incontrovertible evidence of official involvement in such 
murders undermines the optimistic conviction that any time soon individual 
human rights and freedoms will be fully integrated into the social and legal 
fabric of the Russian Federation. It raises yet again, Kymlicka argues, the 
question of whether the model of liberal pluralism inspired by Isaiah Berlin 
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can really help to foster in Russia the growth of a stable, democratic system 
based on the rule of law'® 
For the new Cold War warriors the answer is 'obviously not:' Litvinenko's 
murder makes demonstrably clear such Western political ideals are proving 
irrelevant to the Putin regime. For the liberal-minded, sympathetic fellow 
travellers the answer to Kymlicka's question is 'maybe not:' the issues are 
shifting and shifty because Russia watching has so often been an ideologically-
charged and strategic guessing-game. Thus what distinguishes today's Cold 
War warriors from re-invented fellow travellers, at least on this affair of an 
alleged state-sponsored murder, is not simply the identification of an ethically 
and politically challenging series of events. Rather it is the readiness or 
reluctance with which each side decides who is or is not to be blamed. As for 
accusations of gullibility, in the search for convincing evidence of guilt beyond 
the probabilities and confusions, it seems possible that on this issue at least, 
both camps may be susceptible to misjudgment anchored in either 
presumption, prejudice or uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
COLD WAR LIBERALISM AND ITS LEGACY 
I do hate conscientious, coherent, high-minded torturers 
of human beings into neat and tidy shapes, very much 
indeed. 
Isaiah Berlin, Enlishtenins Letters 1946-1960 
There is abundant evidence that all social movements 
are to be explained by a variety of circumstances and 
that the ideological sources to v^hich they appeal, and to 
which they seek to remain faithful, are only one of the 
factors determining the form they assume and their 
patterns of thought and action. 
Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxist Thought, Vol 
1 
The chapter considers the suggestion proffered as a possibility by the 
American diplomat and influential public intellectual, George Kennan, and 
scorned by Moscov^-based Russia scholars and intellectuals, such as Lilia 
Shevtsova, Gleb Pavlovsky or Alexander Dugin, that the voices of Liberalism 
may yet be revitalized by an intelligentsia in today's Russia. So the liberal 
argument goes, the stronger the voices crying out for freedom, the more 
inevitable the development of the kind of civil society in which humanitarian 
and democratic values flourish. 
The first section primarily focuses on the influence of the historian of ideas, 
Isaiah Berlin. Inspired by his personal enchantment with what he believed 
was the rich scholarship in transcultural Anglo-Russian thought, Berlin was 
driven by a desire to promote a more robust, adaptive form of Liberalism. His 
hope was to advance beyond what has sometimes been seen as the self-
congratulatory traditional British varieties or the messianic neo-Liberalism of 
post-World War II America. Described by some as Liberalism's 'last cry,'^ his 
formulation of what he called liberal or value pluralism was anchored 
explicitly in the work of Russian thinkers of the century. Berlin saw himself 
and other international scholars as having a moral obligation to reclaim and 
re-evaluate this pre-revolutionary intellectual heritage.^ Fostering an 
awareness of its fertile seam of ideas had the potential, he believed, to 
enrich the sense of identity and cultural directions of new Russian generations 
beyond the 70 years of indoctrination under the former Soviet regime. It 
would also help to shape a modus operandi for cultivating a deeper, more 
tolerant, mutual understanding between the West and Russia. 
Out of the literary and philosophical ferment of Russia's century, Berlin 
believed there had developed 'a kind of distinctive brand of Liberalism, or of 
radical humanism ...quite different from anything that existed at that time, or 
later in the West.'^ At the heart of his Liberalism for the contemporary world 
was his deep-seated belief that the history and influence of this 'remarkable' 
"flowering of Russian culture should teach us that life's experiences and 
travails were perplexing, contradictory and eluded the comforts of 
transcendental certitudes about the future. As he put it in his frequently-
used misquote of Kant: 'Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight 
thing was ever made.' A more accurate translation from the German: 'Out of 
timber so crooked, as that from which man is made, nothing entirely straight 
can be built',^ conveys a somewhat less ambiguous emphasis on our inherent 
vulnerabilities and susceptibilities stemming from what Kennan called the 
weakness in our moral temperament.^ 
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In such a world, Berlin believed that protecting the Inviolability of each 
individual's liberty v^as an essential, universal virtue, to ensure humankind 
moved beyond the systematic extermination programs and ruinous total wars 
of the century. His views were strongly enmeshed in his rejection of what he 
perceived as the dangerous utopianism of an influential German metaphysics 
that had been dominated by Hegelianism. In recent times such a powerful 
current of thought, he believed, had helped to create a specifically European 
vein of psychopathology, in which living human beings had become necessary 
sacrifices on the altar of abstractions such as nation, church, party, class, 
progress, democracy, or the forces of history^ At the dark heart of this 
metaphysics was the yoke of historicist inevitability 'as an instrument of 
moral blackmail that was meant to compel acceptance of communist 
totalitarianism-forcing individuals to accept the unacceptable under the 
penalty of finding themselves in the "rubbish bin of history".'® 
A closely-related and sometimes malign influence in human affairs was what 
Berlin called monism. By way of explanation in a long essay on Tolstoy's 
wracked and tragically self-destructive vision of the world, Berlin drew from 
the fragments of ancient Greek poetry by Archilochus the line: 'The fox knows 
many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.' Used figuratively, he 
believed these words marked a deep chasm between writers, thinkers and 
possibly human beings in general. On one side, the foxes lead lives of 
scattered experiences and diffuse ideas, embracing the constantly shifting 
variety of phenomena, not because they incorporate moral or aesthetic 
principles or reassuring certainties, but simply 'for what they are in 
themselves...'.' For Berlin, the foxes sometimes represent the best of us, 
those alluring, larger-than-life characters, whose motto is carpe diem and 
whose response to life's riches and its exigencies is eclectic, maverick, and 
full of both a tireless curiosity and a creative resilience. Not surprisingly. 
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given such a glowing endorsement, Berlin's supporters have often described 
him as such a fox. 
On the other side of the great divide, the hedgehogs '...relate everything to a 
single central vision...one unchanging, all-embracing, sometimes self-
contradictory and incomplete, at times fanatical, unitary inner vision...'^" At 
worst, such monists are the shapers of nightmares, those Utopian dogmatists 
whose fantasies generated the inhumanity and cruelty of Nazism and 
Stalinism. 
Not surprisingly perhaps, Berlin has endured a thoroughgoing savaging from his 
critics, especially those on the Leftwing of British politics, including the 
historians of Soviet Union, E.H. Carr and Isaac Deutscher, or more recently 
Marxist Perry Anderson. Among the more venomous, for example, in this 
ongoing and often very public 'intellectual foxhunt '" is the tirade by the 
Welsh socialist politician and academic, Hywell Williams who described him as 
'an English liberal stooge, a cultural representative of a CIA world view and an 
early example of US celebrity v a l u e s . W i t h regard to his ruminations on 
Russia, Williams accused him of having the narrowly ideological and parochial 
view that the country was invented by its century intelligentsia and should be 
deemed a failure in the century 'for not achieving American-style 
L iberal ism.Moreover, Berlin's famous evocation of the intellectual world of 
these Russian thinkers amounted to 'a kind of classic FM version of the history 
of ideas - a seamless web of biographical essays of the Hke-minded which 
blurred rather than illuminated.'^'' 
Marxist scholar Perry Anderson is somewhat less vituperative, though his 
criticisms are similar to those of Williams. Anderson writes that although 
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Berlin is unrivalled in the depth and breadth of his literary scholarship, not 
least with regard to Russia, nevertheless 'he constructs and pursues very 
general notions, broad idees maitresses like monism or positive freedom, 
through swooping pedigrees down time.'^^Anderson also describes him as 'a 
wayward raconteur,'^^for whom the connections between concepts and 
consequences are 'not logical, but historical and psychological.'^^The 
implication is that Berlin should more appropriately be described as an 
eclectic literary and cultural critic, especially of century Russia, rather than 
either a philosopher or a historian of ideas of any substance or originality. 
And while he may have engendered a renewed focus on the history of ideas in 
British and American academia, he was more the fox than the hedgehog on 
matters of methodological rigor or scholarly consistency. Anderson argues that 
it was primarily the Cambridge school of intellectual history, forged by 
Quentin Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock from the 1970s, that sought to provide a 
more systematic conceptual depth to generalizations about the patterns of 
history. These include Berlin's assertions about the ongoing dominance of a 
cluster of allegedly dangerous ideas, shaped by the Counter Enlightenment 
and both enthusiastically embraced and persuasively undermined, at least at 
a theoretical level, by certain liberal-minded members of the Russian 
intelligentsia, foremost among them being Alexander Herzen. The primary aim 
of the new generation of Cambridge scholars was to elucidate the extent to 
which such ideas were circumscribed by contingencies. Interpreting their 
shifting meaning and relevance from one era to the next required 'detailed 
analysis of a corpus of work, and its setting in (especially) the discourses and 
(optimally) the practices of the age....' 
Arguably, such a methodology could be seen to challenge any easy assessment 
of the importance of the work of particular Russian thinkers of a century and 
a half ago for resurrecting what Berlin believed was potentially a path to a 
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more realistic and humane form of Liberalism, especially during the final 
years of the Soviet Era and its aftermath. The difficulty here is whether 
Berlin is little other than an advocate and publicist for liberal pluralism and 
his so-called philosophising a kind of extended polemic which, amid a 
profusion of other considerations, extols its alleged unique Russian-inspired 
aspects. Central to these criticisms are the debates surrounding his 
understanding of the political and cultural role of Liberalism in Russian 
society, in particular his shaky optimism about the conceptual relevance of 
the term to the post-Cold War generations. 
Arguably too Berlin's claims about Herzen's inspirational contribution to his 
formulation of a unique kind of Liberalism are possibly inflated. As suggested 
above, Berlin's writings are also strongly influenced by Kant's Christian ethics, 
as well as by his exploration of the works of 18'^ century cultural philosopher 
Giambattista Vico and those of the singularly unpleasant Savoyard arch-
conservative and proto-fascist, Joseph de Maistre. In other areas, for example 
with regard to his passionate rejection of Benthamite Utilitarianism, Berlin 
does make passing reference to Herzen's 'denunciation of general moral 
rules,'^'which he says in one of his letters is encapsulated in this neo-Kantian 
rubric: 'The truly free man creates his own morality.'^" But, as part of his 
contentious assertions concerning the nature and limits of individual freedom 
and the relationship between Realism and morality, Berlin also utilises the 
universalist ideas of Russian thinkers other than Herzen, including the 
determined "outsiderism" of Turgenev or Dostoevsky's articulation of the 
torturer's dilemma in his novel. The Brothers Karamazov. Here it should be 
emphasized that these debates have long been a focal preoccupation within 
the common tradition of Western political philosophy, from the pre-Socratic 
dialogues of the Sophist Protagoras whose oft-cited maxim was 'Of all things, 
man is the measure...',^^ to Hume's rejection of the rationality of ethical 
judgments, to Berlin's influential twentieth century fellow Oxonians, A.J Ayer 
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and J.L Austin. In this context, it is by no means clear that Berlin's Russian 
thinkers, in particular Herzen, were as arrestingly original as he claims. In a 
powerfully literary way, this diverse group of liberals, anarchists, 
reactionaries, Russian Orthodox conservatives and exiles from tsarism emerge 
from Berlin's accounts as simply participants in a stream of thought that for a 
couple of thousand years or more has been integral to the pan-European 
cross-fertilisation of ideas. Perhaps Berlin's primary importance has been to 
remind new generations of intellectuals and analysts, from both East and 
West, of those Russian voices that might merit inclusion in any properly 
comprehensive intellectual history. 
The second section considers whether these arenas of contention are seen to 
be very meaningful to contemporary perceptions of the dynamics of elite 
power in Putin's Russia, especially with regard to the composition and 
strength of the Opposition Movement; or whether they have been dismissed 
by today's commentariat as part of the fond imaginings of an Oxford don 
ensconced in the halls of academe and shuffling through the irrelevant liberal 
pluralist dreams of some members of the intelligentsia of Old Russia. 
Section One: 
Certainly Berlin provides a notable starting point in any account of the 
vicissitudes of Russia's liberal intelligentsia. Born in Riga, Latvia, in 1909 to an 
affluent Russian-Jewish family, who were descended on his father's side from 
rabbis and scholars, Berlin spent much of his early childhood in St Petersburg. 
As an eight-year-old boy, he watched from an apartment window the tumult 
on the streets during the October 1917 revolution. It was a stark memory of 
the power of the mob, one that is said to have influenced his later reflections 
on the links between intellectual fanaticism and the rise of totalitarianism.^ 
Being both Jewish and wealthy members of the middle-class, the family fled 
an uncertain future in Russia in 1921. Apart from his employment with the 
British diplomatic service from 1940 till 1946 in Washington and then Moscow, 
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for the rest of his life Berlin lived in Britain, becoming one of the country's 
most prominent public intellectuals. 
An accomplished Russian speaker and translator, Berlin grew up steeped in the 
literary and philosophical ideas of Russia's cultural elite, especially such 
celebrated figures of the nineteenth century as Vissarion Belinsky, Ivan 
Turgenev, Pavel Annenkov, Nikolai Chernyshevsky, the radical anarchist, 
Mikhail Bakunin, and, above all, the writer and journalist, Alexander Herzen. 
During his more than forty years at the University of Oxford, Berlin lectured 
frequently on what he believed was this largely forgotten Russian 
intelligentsia who had grappled with the pivotal Enlightenment ideas about 
the meaning of liberty, traditional religion and personal and political morality. 
Berlin sought to nurture a scholarly interest in this small isolated group, 
because he believed their lives had borne witness to the destructive allure of 
ideas, in particular 'the intellectual and moral attractions of what he called 
the great despotic visions of the right and left.'^^ As Walicki writes, Berlin saw 
intellectual history not simply as a counter to such illusory metaphysical 
yearnings, but much more significantly 'as the self-awareness of a pluralistic 
society, a common bond between people striving for mutual understanding 
despite differences in value systems.'^'•There is little doubt his influence was 
to prove considerable. From the second half of the twentieth century, his 
former students and regular correspondents were some of the most eminent 
scholars of Russian history and philosophy, including Martin Malia, Aileen Kelly, 
Evgenii Lampert, S.V. Utechin, as well as Walicki." 
Among Berlin's circle of admiring academic friends and colleagues was also 
the American diplomat and public intellectual, George Kennan, who in 1958 
spent two years as a visiting professor at Oxford. During his time there, the 
two men's twice weekly lectures had been held consecutively, attracting a 
crush of people that left standing room only. Kennan's letter, written on his 
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return to America, makes clear that he believed Berlin's world view was 
nothing short of inspirational: 
You have unquestionably the greatest critical mind of this 
generation - warmed with a charity that might be the 
envy of 99 out of 100 Christians. You have taught 
numbers of us to find meaning where we would never 
ourselves have found it...'^' 
Berlin shared with Kennan a love of the great classics of Russian literature. He 
saw these pre-revolutionary intellectuals and artists as a unique generation of 
passionate, sometimes tormented souls for whom, more than anyone else he 
encountered in his lengthy career, the unexamined life was not worth living. 
During the century, they were an increasingly educated stratum of Russian 
society, but one that remained largely marginalized by birth from progression 
through the military and bureaucratic ranks of Tsarist society. Denied a 
political voice, they sought solace in the intellectual struggle to clarify a 
singular Russian understanding of the intense Western cultural debates 
surrounding German Romanticism, revolutionary idealism and liberal 
reformism. Though of aristocratic background, Alexander Herzen was one of 
them. Looking back across his long years in exile in his autobiographical 
writings, A y^ Past and Thoushts, he movingly describes his circle of friends as 
a youth crusade of disempowered outsiders: 
The Russia of the future existed exclusively among a few 
boys, hardly more than children, so insignificant that 
there was room for them between the soles of the 
aristocracy and the ground.^^ 
Across the decades that followed the failure across Europe of the revolutions 
of 1848 and which were marked by the final corrosion of the legitimacy of 
Russian imperial power, many of them faced imprisonment or internal and 
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external exile for their crimes and misdemeanors under the virulent program 
of Tsarist repression. 
In part, Berlin understood such men as a familiar and very influential 
prototype for 'one of the characteristic figures in the Russian social novel. 
Like Pierre Bezukhov in Tolstoy's War and Peace, Levin In Anna Karenina, and 
later perhaps Boris Pasternak's Dr Zhivaso, these 'superfluous men'^' were 
perplexed Idealists, touchingly naive, pure-hearted 'champions of persecuted 
humanity, the saints and martyrs in the cause of the humiliated and the 
defeated...'^" Inspired by Turgenev's 1850 novella, Diary of a Superfluous Man, 
Berlin also describes them as those who the bullies and victors dismiss as 
'feeble flotsam... historical dust, lishnye lyudi, those who have missed the bus 
of history. 
For much of his life among the declining membership of 'the old diaspora of 
Russian civil society in e x i l e , B e r l i n was beguiled by this group. As he 
repeatedly acknowledged, they were not only the inspiration for his 
commitment to a 'stoical and tragic ' " liberal pluralism, but also embodied a 
kind of intellectual and temperamental homecoming. Berlin's series of essays 
on Russian thought, Anderson said, 'gives touching testimony on every page to 
this engagement with his culture of origin.'^'' in a letter to Edmund Wilson, 
full of unreserved praise for his essay in the New Yorker on Pasternak's novel, 
Dr Zhivago, Berlin wrote that Wilson's rare understanding that the book 
represented a great act of faith in art and the human spirit moved him to 
tears, 'living, as I mostly do in the pre-1917 w o r l d . A t Pasternak's request. 
28 Berlin, Russian Thinkers, Op.Git. p172 
" Turgenev, Ivan, 'Diary of a Superfluous Man and Other Stories,' Project Gutenberg http:// 
archive.org/detaiLs/thediarvofasuper09615gut 
Berlin, Russian Thinl<ers, Op.Cit. p172 
Berlin, Enlightenins Letters, 1946-1960, Op.Cit. pp219-220 
32 Malia, Martin, Russia Under Western Eyes From The Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1999, p367 
" Gray, John, Isaiah Berlin, London 1995, pi 
"Anderson, Op.Cit. p237 
35 Berlin, Enlishtening Letters 1946-1960, Op.Cit. pp667-668 
Berlin had helped to smuggle the manuscript out of Russia after it was refused 
publication by the Soviet authorities. 
This mix of cultural enchantment and nostalgia is epitomised in the obituary 
that Berlin wrote in 1978 for his close friend, Nicolas Nabokov, 'one of the last 
and most attractive representatives of the pre-Revolutionary Russian liberal 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a . A first cousin of novelist Vladimir Nabokov, a composer, 
luminary of the Russian emigre community in Berlin and Paris, and Secretary-
General of the covertly CIA-funded Congress for Cultural Freedom, Nicolas 
was described by Berlin as: 'Large-hearted, affectionate, honourable, gifted 
with sharp moral and political insight, and a well-developed sense of the 
ridiculous, an irresistible source of torrential wit and fancy, immensely 
sociable...'^^ In an amusing inclusion to the biographical glossary in the second 
volume of Berlin's collected letters, it is also noted that although Nicolas 
married five times, 'all five wives attended his funeral. 
Among the circle of century political and cultural exiles from tsarist Russia, 
Berlin singled out political dissident and journalist Alexander Herzen as having 
had the most profound impact on his own work. 'I keep on reading and re-
reading Herzen,' he wrote to the Trotsky scholar, Elena Levin, 'who seems to 
me to have been right about almost everything...'^'Berlin described himself as 
'utterly devoted to Herzen's memory...[as] one of the greatest as well as the 
nicest and noblest men in the century."*® 
For Berlin, Herzen was the archetypal fox. He admired his spirited intellectual 
independence, his refusal to be whole-heartedly committed to any political 
doctrine, whether of a revolutionary, democratic or traditionalist variety. 
Berlin also characterised him with unstinting praise as vehemently politically 
engaged, a satirical, exceptionally imaginative social observer and, inevitably 
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perhaps, an uncompromising outsider. For Berlin too, Herzen's self-
designated role as a kind of loyal opposition to the creeds of his time 
embodied above all his compassionate and egalitarian moral sensibility. 
Human beings were complex and vulnerable and should not be forced into the 
ideological straightjackets that those 'serious-minded and pedantic saviours 
of mank ind , both rad ica l and conse rva t i ve , v^ere perpetua l l y 
manufacturing. 
Four interlocking features of Berlin's liberal pluralism could be said to have 
been influenced by Herzen's writing. The first was their mutual acceptance 
that individuals across the variety of classes and countries have all kinds of 
radically divergent values and viewpoints. Neither Berlin nor Herzen saw this 
as implying an embrace of cultural relativism, that absurd position 
'encapsulate[d] in the slogan "Liberalism for the liberals, cannibalism for the 
cannibals.""'^Implicit here is their rejection of the rationalist proposition that 
all meaning and moral value is no more than a subjective reflection on 
events, because paradoxically if this were so, then this assertion itself is self-
contradictory and therefore has no value or meaning. By contrast, the two 
men's endorsement of a multifaceted, pluralist perspective aptly reflected 
what they believed was a morally-sound assessment of the shifting, scrambled 
and contradictory nature of our day-to-day experiences, the realities of which 
defy metaphysical explanation. In answer to the question of whether history 
had a plan, Berlin affirmed Herzen's response in his political testament. From 
the Other Shore: 'There are no timetables, no cosmic patterns, there is only 
the "fire of life", passion, will, improvisation, sometimes roads exist, 
sometimes not; where there is no road "genius will blast a path.""'^ In other 
words, for both men the meaning of the fulfilled, ethical life was in the living 
of it. 
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Interestingly, though there is no direct reference to it in Berlin's work, Herzen 
has been interpreted as 'the founding father and most exemplary 
exponenf'^of a 'third way' between positivist and Idealist philosophical 
traditions. This doctrine has been described by the Russian historian of ideas 
and Herzen scholar, Ivanov-Razumnik as 'immanent subjectivism' which he 
believed gave meaning to our lives by pronouncing humankind to be 'the one 
subjective goal of development.' Our aim and challenge, he wrote, is to 
achieve 'the fullness of being,' which was comprised of 'elements of reality,' 
such as 'reality of sense,' reality of beauty,' reality of justice,' and 'reality of 
t r u t h ' . T h i s subjectivism, Ivanov-Razumnik said: 
is neither a method or means to an end, it is a kind of 
sociological mindset, in fact, not only sociological, but 
epistemological, psychological and ethical...[that is] 
charged with vitality and giving to both an individual and 
humanity as a whole new subjectively-oriented meaning 
of life."'^ 
Thus, according to Ivanov-Razumnik, as a philosophical and moral stance, 
Herzen understood his life as such a self-creation. In other words, the 
starting point for his immanent subjectivism is his uncompromising 
endorsement of an expansive form of liberal individualism. He believed this 
meant he should continually strive to live in such ways that he would become 
an exemplary realization of humanity's finest aspirations. Here it is possible 
to speculate that there is much that might have appealed to Berlin in Ivanov-
Razumnik's explication of Herzen's anti-Hegelian immanent subjectivism, with 
its inclusion of psychological, aesthetic and ethical dimensions of human 
cognition. Such a view certainly resonates with his own characterisation of 
the Russian intelligentsia's high-minded quest for intellectual and moral 
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clarity, especially with regard to what he believed were Herzen's exceptional 
personal qualities . 
The second central influence on Berlin of Herzen's work was the latter's 
insistence that for the most part we should strive to tolerate and 
accommodate cultural differences, maintaining the kindness to strangers that 
stems from an acknowledgement of the very human commonality of our needs 
and wants, for such things as boots and bread, shelter or meaningful work. 
Above all, this liberal or value pluralism entailed maintaining a constant 
vigilance against the political theologians and well-intentioned but 
delusionary ideologues who preach 'that vast suffering in the present must be 
undergone for the sake of some ineffable felicity in the future""^ It also 
involved an acceptance that not all conflicting values are able to be 
reconciled, nor complex problems solved. In face of the chaos of life, there is 
a need for consensus, compromise and an imaginative empathy in human 
affairs. 
The third influence of Herzen's work was his firm belief in the precept 
fundamental to all forms of Liberalism that the freedom of each individual is 
more precious than the imposition of a collective pursuit of grand and elusive 
visions of a better world to come. As Herzen repeatedly emphasized, we have 
no way of knowing whether the latter are merely empty dreams, though if our 
reflections on the past are any guide, this seems to be very frequently the 
case. Berlin cites approvingly Herzen's account of his conversation in London 
in the early 1850s with the French Utopian socialist, Louis Blanc. It began 
with Blanc's observation 'that human life was a great social duty, that man 
must always sacrifice himself to society: 
'Why?' I asked suddenly. 
'How do you mean "why?" 'said Louis Blanc, 'but surely 
the whole purpose and mission of man is the well-being 
of society?" 
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'But it will never be attained if everyone makes 
sacrifices and nobody enjoys himself.' 
'You are playing with words. 
'The muddle-headedness of a barbarian,' I replied, 
laughing."' 
The fourth area of Herzen's influence was in what Berlin saw as his prescience 
about an approaching cataclysm, born of these radical Utopian ideas, and in 
which 'the destruction of individual freedom'^" was 'highly probable, unless 
averted by deliberate human e f f o r t . A s Harris writes, Berlin despaired of 
the seeming reality that, in the wake of the human tragedy of 'Stalinism, 
Nazism and the escalating Cold War...it is Herzen's totalitarian opponents both 
of the Right and of the Left that have won. ' " Implicit in this view is the 
aversion to historical determinism that Berlin shared with Herzen, evident in 
this tacit assertion that to be human is to have an inviolable right and a duty 
to resist the tyranny of others. 
Nevertheless, despite such urgings, it remains unclear how, or the extent to 
which, each of us can choose to rise above the imposed constraints of 
circumstance, to divert the history of wars and revolutions through the 
infinitesimals of our personal actions." For both Berlin and Herzen it remains 
fundamentally important that we are encouraged to do so, so that their 
writings often appear to be a kind of rallying cry to present and future 
generations to resist totalitarian ideas and ideologues wherever they are 
encountered. Whether we are able to do so successfully and decisively at any 
particular time remains a complex, unanswered question. 
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Berlin was also emphatic that Herzen was 'the most realistic, sensitive... and 
convincing witness to the social life and social issues of his own time.'^'' From 
the mid-nineteenth century he lived in London where he established and 
funded the Russian Free Press. In 1857 he launched Kolokol, (The Bell), in 
which he provided widely-read, critical commentaries on specific events in 
Russia. These articles have been characterized as consisting primarily of 
'accusatory documents' about his country's 'unrelieved political, cultural and 
moral darkness, with shocking revelations of systematic injustice, cruelty, 
oppression, and continuous abuses and misgovernment...'" Initially at least his 
work is said to have played 'a major part in animating the radical movement 
among the Russian intelligentsia.'^' 
Still, as Berlin acknowledges, over time Herzen was to prove increasingly 
marginal and ineffective against the rising political tides of his era. By the 
late 1860s all his publications, including Kolokol and the ongoing chapters of 
his multi-volume autobiography, My Past and Thoughts, had come 'to an 
indeterminate and melancholy end . ' " He died in Paris in 1870. In common 
with Orwell, increasingly his role had been to attack from the sidelines all 
forms of doctrinaire politics, with little concern for alienating his 
contemporaries or wider public opinion. It seems the result was that he 
became almost uniformly unpopular across the spectrum from traditionalists 
to radicals. As Parthe writes, the conservatives 'found him despicable, 
liberals...thought him immoderate, and the radical intelligentsia ...called him 
naive. 
Significantly, Herzen has also been described as an aristocratic agrarian 
socialist. He has been seen as an early advocate for a uniquely Russian proto-
socialism, an interpretation of his views that perhaps serves to explain his 
popularity with subsequent generations of the Russian intelligentsia, including 
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Lenin. In common with Tolstoy, though, he has also been dismissed as having 
an overly-romantic, sentimental regard for the Russian peasant village 
commune. Certainly, socialism v^as an aspect of his personal philosophy, in 
which Berlin displayed only a passing interest. For Berlin, Herzen's temporary 
embrace of socialist ideas is best understood as the 'cultural despair' of a 
tired and disillusioned young man. Here Berlin quotes approvingly the 'sober 
realism'5' of Turgenev's characterization of his friend's politics as 'a pathetic 
fantasy,'^® of someone for whom in 1849 'the decaying corpse'^^ of Europe 
had abruptly ceased to be an ideal model for Russia: 
...with his old ideals, social justice, equality, liberal 
democracy, impotent before the forces of reaction in the 
West, he must find himself a new idol to worship: against 
the golden calf of acquisitive capitalism, he set up 'the 
sheepskin coat' ...of the Russian peasant." 
Turgenev's tough-minded response to Herzen was that socialism offered no 
prospect of 'some coming Russian Messiah...least of all for the Russian 
peasant who is, in embryo, the worst conservative, and cares nothing for 
liberal ideas. '"Nor it seems were Herzen's socialist views to have much 
practical significance in his homeland during the final decades of the 
nineteenth century. In the context of Tsar Alexander M's move towards reform 
with the abolition of serfdom in 1861, the focus of intellectual debate within 
Russia and among the emigre community has been described as shifting to the 
practical economic challenges of agricultural modernization.''' This too, 
Kolakowski argues, is part of the explanation of why, beginning in the 1860s, 
Herzen's star 'began to fade. ' " 
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Nevertheless, Herzen's anti-autocratic defence of the rights of the common 
man has meant that, especially in later times and contexts, he has been 
variously 'invoked as a pioneer'^^ not only by liberal pluralists such as Berlin, 
but by both Marxists and populists. The claims of the latter two groups about 
Herzen's political legacy, Kolakov/ski argues, are misleading. Of his immediate 
contemporaries, the Russian revolutionaries v^ho had fled into exile, Herzen 
wrote with dismissive scorn that they 'throw themselves into the stream with 
a handbook on swimming. ' " And given his background as a wealthy aristocrat, 
'free from material cares and living in the comfort of Western capitals',^ 
Herzen's socialism has been traduced as an entirely theoretical desire to 
extend his values and advantages to everybody.^' As Parthe writes, he saw 'no 
great virtue in real or assumed poverty,'^" took pleasure in 'good wine, 
expensive cigars, and French s n u f f , a n d he believed his wealth gave him 
'the freedom to accomplish his political goals. ' " Ironically, in view of his 
dealings to secure his substantial family fortune with the nineteenth century 
House of Rothschild and his close friendship with the banker James de 
Rothschild, foremost amongst his aims was to oppose what he repeatedly 
denounced as the barren, competitive spirit of capitalism, which destroyed 
'the spontaneous solidarity of all human beings. 
This scepticism about the genuinely populist roots of Herzen's agrarian 
socialism is echoed in Lenin's scathing account of what he described as the 
'spiritual shipwreck' initially embodied in his youthful ideas. Writing in 1912 
on the 100''^ anniversary of Herzen's birth, predictably perhaps Lenin claimed 
that they contained 'not a grain of socialism,' but only 'bourgeois illusions', 
composed of 'sentimental phrases, benevolent visions, which were the 
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expression at that time of the revolutionary character of the bourgeois 
democrats....'^'' It was only in the 1860s, Lenin insisted, that Herzen learned 
the lessons of 1848 about the impossibility of a fair deal for the masses in any 
trade-off between Russia's servile liberals and tsarism's butchers and 
hangmen. Among the regime's so-called henchmen were the soldiers of the 
Russian Imperial army, whose massacre of 50 Polish peasants in Bezdna in 1861 
Herzen had very publicly condemned. He had thus 'raised aloft the banner of 
Revolution,' Lenin conceded,^^ against the liberal elite whom Herzen himself 
described in Kolokol as 'the wretches, weed-like people, jellyfish, who say 
we must not reprove the gang of robbers and scoundrels that [sic] is governing 
us.^'For Lenin, this meant he was a man whose more mature political 
consciousness demonstrated that he had successfully overcome his soft-
headed, class-ridden, liberal democratic tendencies. Moreover, Lenin said, his 
'selfless devotlon'^^on behalf of the Russian proletariat had not been wasted, 
'even if long decades divide the sowing from the harvest.'^® 
Still, despite the strong rhetoric, Lenin's attempt to commemorate Herzen as 
an accredited member of the revolutionaries' Hall of Fame, seems to be more 
a matter of timely Bolshevik propaganda than an accurate analysis of his 
philosophy. Throughout much of his later writing, Kolakowski points out, 
Herzen made emphatically clear his dislike of the European radicals, for 'their 
primitivism and contempt for the non-utilitarian values of art and education, 
their dogmatism, intolerance, and cult of revolutionary apocalypse...'" There 
is no evidence these perspectives changed in the decade or so before his 
death in 1870, and it seems highly likely he would have held the same critical 
views of the Lenin's Bolshevism. 
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Similarly, the strong stance against religion that Herzen had in connnnon with 
Berlin also does not appear to suggest that he was in any way an enthusiast 
for Marxist philosophy. Nor does his rejection of the sublime Hegelian 
teleology that was an integral feature of his self-education as a young man, 
and which he replaced with a passionate commitment to scientific 
m a t e r i a l i s m . I n his later years as an exile in London and Paris, Herzen's 
most trenchant criticisms were directed at what he saw as extremism on all 
sides of politics. It was a stance which Berlin eulogized as reflecting Herzen's 
admirable determination to turn in the light the terrifying possibilities 
unleashed by the conflicts between the need for revolutionary change and the 
price in individual suffering that would be paid for it. Of his autobiography, 
Aly Past and Thoughts, Berlin writes that it was Herzen's 
greatest title to immortality...his political and social 
views were arrestingly original, if only because he was 
among the very few thinkers of his time who in principle 
rejected all general solutions, and grasped, as very few 
thinkers have ever done, the crucial distinction between 
words that are about words, and words that are about 
persons and things in the real world.®' 
Whatever his propensity for hyperbole, in Berlin's literary and philosophical 
portrait Herzen emerges not so much as arrestingly original, but as 
extraordinarily difficult to categorise. His caustic approach to Russia's 
nineteenth century liberals as generally venal and cowardly, together with his 
similar contempt for revolutionary ideologues, conservative monarchists, 
crypto-fascists, and for the anarchism of his old friend and countryman, 
Mikhail Bakunin, has the malodour of pluralist intolerance, a case perhaps of a 
propagandistic tendency to serve up the worst possible insults for what he 
believed were the best possible reasons. One of the significant questions here 
is the extent to which his condemnation of Russia's liberals in particular has 
echoed across 150 years, for example, in Lenin's work, or during the 
8" Ibid. 
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Khrushchev thaw in the 1950s following the death of Stalin, or during the 
Yeltsin presidency after the fall of the Soviet regime, or in analyses of the 
contemporary opposition movement. Inseparable from this question are the 
debates surrounding what it means to talk of an exceptional Russian liberal 
intelligentsia, an issue which is further developed in Chapter Three. 
In any event, for Berlin at least, Herzen had much to teach subsequent 
generations both in Russia and the West. As suggested above, fundamentally 
Berlin believed Herzen was central to an alternative vision of Russia's 
intellectual heritage which 'in revolutionary Leninist doctrine and Stalin's 
autocratic rule...' had been 'stifled to a trembling silence...'®^ Here Berlin was 
not only seeking to rekindle a radically different philosophical tradition for a 
post-World War II intelligentsia in Russia, but at the same time to challenge 
the 'totalitarian image'®^ of the country that had become increasingly 
dominant in the West during the Cold War and its aftermath. In other words, 
Berlin was barkening back to a humane, liberal stream of thought, by 
deliberately conjuring Herzen as 'something of a poster boy, the standard 
bearer of a rich and variegated Russian legacy that was being smothered both 
in ideological and concrete terms.'®" 
Not surprisingly perhaps, Herzen emerges as closely resembling Berlin's 
doppelgaenger (or vice versa). Both men could be characterized as foxes, 
with a passionate intellectuality and a formidable immersion in a pan-
European literary and philosophical canon that was strongly inclusive of 
Russian as well as Western thought. They both wrote tracts that were 
poetical, witty, polemical and deceptively accessible. They were both 
outsiders in their adopted British culture, with a similarly powerful sense of 
moral obligation to project their ideas back to the land of their birth® 
through an open conversation with their country's intellectuals that was full 
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of 'facts, and tears, and theory.'®^ Independently wealthy and privileged, 
neither man was a direct-action politician, a joiner in the protest rallies on 
the streets of London, Paris or Berlin. Above all, they appeared to hold in 
common a belief in the power of high culture to foster new social directions, 
underpinned by the conviction that once the world of ideas had been 
refashioned by resolute, determined individuals, reality cannot hold out for 
long. As Berlin writes: 
But whatever may be thought about the part played by 
thought in affecting human lives...the chief importance of 
these [Russian] thinkers, historically speaking, lies in the 
fact that they set in train ideas destined to have 
cataclysmic effects not merely In Russia itself, but far 
beyond her borders.®^ 
Thus the intellectual challenge in understanding such an elitist conviction is 
how to reconcile this shared commitment of Berlin and Herzen to liberal 
pluralist individualism with their apparent belief in the notion of Zeitgiest, 
that is, in the demonstrable power of the dominant ideas of an era to 
determine cultural and political directions, however strongly the renegades 
and heretics may rail against them. Certainly neither Herzen nor Berlin 
appeared to think that this seeming dilemma could be readily explained as a 
straightforward interactive relationship between discarnate abstractions and 
human activities, as if the progress of history were composed of a conspiracy 
of disembodied Eureka moments in which, for reasons that are never 
immediately apparent, big ideas such as freedom or individualism or 
revolution or democracy become the focus of the applied politics of a 
particular generational time and tide. As suggested above, implicit here is 
that neither man accepted any taint of a deterministic Hegelian 
transcendentalism, more specifically the assertion in Hegel's philosophy of 
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history that '...no man can overleap his own time, for the spirit of his time is 
also his own spirit. 
Implicit too is their dismissal of the Hegelian notion that human consciousness 
and the external world were somehow two faces of the same ethereal, unified 
world. In his Collected Letters, for example, Berlin repeatedly laments the 
modish preoccupation of his academic colleagues with what he deemed to be 
Hegel's impenetrable ravings. Writing in 1958 to the historian of American 
philosophical thought, Morton White, Berlin described Hegel as 'all theology 
and cosmic feeling,'®' adding that: 
it seems absolute gibberish to me. How can it not have 
done so to everyone else? I simply cannot tune in. All I 
hear is atmospherics.'" 
Equally, for Herzen the outcome of his youthful wrestle with Hegelianism was 
also his later rejection of the concept of a Weltgeist (World Spirit) with its 
guarantees of an optimistic teleological dimension to the march of history, 
whatever the horrendous exigencies of life in his beloved Russia under 
tsarism. 
In common with Herzen, Berlin clearly saw his ideas as anchored in the 
philosophical and historical legacies of a post-Enlightenment world. As noted 
above, he was a member of the generations from Eastern and Central Europe 
who fled the Bolsheviks and the rise of Stalin in the 1920s and, a little more 
than a decade later. Hitler's Germany. For many of these refugees, their self-
imposed challenge was to try to make some sense of what they saw as the 
reversion to barbarism across the blood-stained terrains of Old Europe, that 
for instance had been prefigured in Herzen's writing. According to Russian 
poet and Nobel laureate Joseph Brodsky, these Cold War intellectuals were 
driven by heartfelt reasons, beyond tales of vainglory and villainy, for 
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scrutinising our history of thought. 'Given the fruit this century came to 
bear...,' Brodsky wrote in his tribute to Isaiah Berlin in the early 1990s, 'These 
reasons are revulsion and fear.''^ 
It was in this context that Berlin sought to re-conjure Herzen as a pioneer of 
an exceptional form of Liberalism to stand against the dangerous monism of 
the hedgehogs. Nevertheless, outside Berlin's preoccupation with nineteenth 
century Russian thinkers and cultured, highly-politicised emigres, whose lives 
had been damaged by the savagery of the twentieth century's eruption of 
oppression and war, other eminent scholars of the era were exploring a similar 
terrain. Like Berlin, their central concerns were with the consequences of 
what they believed became degraded, ideologically-distorted interpretations 
of Marxism, Enlightenment Idealism and Progressivism. These scholars 
included the fiercely anti-Hegelian LSE Professor, Karl Popper, as well as the 
interdisciplinary, neo-Marxist Frankfurt School's Max Horkheimer, Theodor 
Adorno and cultural theorist and proponent of Judaic mysticism, Walter 
Benjamin. Herzen's and Berlin's anti-Romanticism, anti-progressivist views 
were certainly given strong endorsement by these non-Russian scholars. 
Established during the upheavals of the Weimar years in Germany, the 
Frankfurt School, in particular, sought to account for the rise in Russia and 
Germany of what was deemed to be a radically new and extreme form of 
despotism which became known as totalitarianism. 
In common with Berlin and Herzen's critiques, much of this scholarship looked 
back to the ferment of ideas stimulated by Hegelianism, especially as it 
threaded through the debates in nineteenth century German metaphysics and 
the myriad ways it was considered to have forged the subsequent turmoil of 
reform and revolution. For many of these thinkers the answer to the 
century's descent onto barbarism lay in the dehumanizing, technocratic 
notion of human perfectibility that they saw as characterising the rise of 
capitalism and modernity. Of German-Jewish descent, Walter Benjamin, for 
instance, shared Berlin's abhorrence of Nazism and his philosophy of history 
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had much in common with Herzen's view that belief in historical progress was 
a manipulative delusion. In Benjamin's poetical evocation of the Angel of 
History inspired by the Paul Klee drawing, Angelus Novus, the angel stands 
with outspread wings buffeted by the violence of a storm blowing from 
Paradise: 
The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make 
whole what has been smashed....(But) the storm 
irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back 
is turned, while...ruin upon ruin...piled before him grows 
skyward. This storm is what we call progress.''^ 
Still, although like many of his academic contemporaries, Berlin was 
preoccupied with the fate of the wretched suffering humanity that was 
emblematic of the first half of Europe's century, there appears to be no 
evidence that he had much interest in the neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt 
School. At least there is no direct mention of their work in his philosophical 
writings, nor in the more than eight hundred pages of correspondence with 
friends and colleagues in his post-World War II volume of collected letters. 
Perhaps an exception could be made with regard to his several paragraphs 
scorning the typical Central European use of the 'foggy obfuscating woolly 
old-fashioned''^ concept of alienation in a doomed attempt to amalgamate 
the work of Marx and Freud. The term was 'not so much metaphysical as 
historical and theological,' Berlin wrote, '""and could only be at all helpful 'if 
cleaned up.' '^ Moreover, the use of such an empirically nebulous, 'genuinely 
obscure notion,''^he adds, to support some Idealist 'in the worst sense''^ re-
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interpretation of their work would have these two 'very iconoclastic and 
tough-minded''® men turning over in their graves. 
Nor in general terms does Berlin have much good to say of that monstrous 
traitor to our civilization," Marx, or about the 'psychological rot'^°° of the 
author of Civilization and its Discontents, Freud. Certainly he did not endorse 
what he saw as their contribution to post-modernist nihilism or their derisive 
accounts of modern materialist man, at least in his more bourgeois 
manifestations. Instead he turned to Herzen, whose writings were yet to be 
fully included in the canon of European thinkers, in a bid to erect what he 
believed was a decent, commonsensical form of Liberalism that was 'an 
attractive vision of life, and one not tied to a quasi-religious belief in 
p r o g r e s s . H e believed it was also one that not only had 'strong roots in the 
past,'^°^ but also offered hope for a reinvented Russia. 
Much of the criticism of Berlin's liberal pluralism has focused on two areas of 
contention. The first centres on accusations that it amounts to little more 
than the academically sheltered posturing of an intransigent Cold War warrior 
with a love of old Russia and a loathing for the Soviet regime. The second 
questions what it has been argued turned out to be his unjustified aspiration 
for a role for the Russian liberal intelligentsia in the country's future after the 
fall of the Soviet regime. As indicated above, this second theme is the subject 
of Chapter Two's exploration of intellectuals and the Putin regime. 
The following focuses exclusively on what has been disparaged as Berlin's 
'Cold War Liberalism'i°^ through the lens of his long association with George 
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Kennan. As outlined in the introduction, Kennan was the primary contributor 
to the formulation of the Containment Doctrine in US foreign policy in the 
wake of World War II. To Kennan, the doctrine's foundations were centrally 
determined by his embrace of Berlin's liberal pluralism. What could equally 
serve as a paraphrase of the political philosophy of either Berlin or his 
historical shadow, Herzen, can be found, for example, in the work of Kennan's 
official biographer. Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis. Drawing on one of 
his many interviews during their almost 30 years of friendship, Gaddis 
summarized Kennan's liberal internationalism as based on the view that the 
great enemy in this age's struggle to secure freedom for all the world's 
peoples was 'abstraction, which promised perfection while denying the 
imperfections of human nature.'^® Without enlightened global norms born of 
soft diplomacy and toleration, Kennan explained, the result would be 'the 
polar night of icy darkness,' which earlier had been evoked by the sociologist. 
Max Weber, 
...an international Antarctica, in which there would be no 
germs because there would be no growth, in which there 
would be no sickness because there would be no people, 
in which all would be silence and peace because there 
was no 
The relationship between Berlin and Kennan was formed during World War II in 
Washington's elite circles of government, and subsequently in Moscow where 
both men held diplomatic postings in 1945. Perhaps its most significant 
moment came with their interchange of letters in the early 1950s. Berlin's 
reply has been reprinted repeatedly and provides one of his most succinct 
accounts of the social and philosophical issues with which he wrestled. 
By his own admission, it was almost nine months before he was able to 
respond to Kennan's letter of May 1950, which had expressed his anguish over 
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what he had seen of the savagery of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union and 
Fascist Germany. Kennan poignantly described the brittle optimism that made 
him determined to cling to the 'supreme make-believe'^°® that 'in the long 
run each man can be taught to rise above h i m s e l f . r e f u s e to manipulate 
and exploit the points of weakness in others, Kennan wrote, to always 
acknowledge the ultimate dignity of every human being, was a measure of the 
success of civilization. Without this indispensable appeal to reasonable, 
compassionate processes, humankind shames himself as well as others: 
I really believe that this thing that the totalitarians have 
done - this taking advantage of the helpless corner of 
man's psychic structure - is the original sin. It is this 
knowledge which men were not supposed to develop and 
exploit...which Milton really had in mind as his reason for 
the fall of man...."o 
Berlin, garrulous and sociable, the Paganini of the lecture hall,"Ued a busy 
life of travel, teaching at Oxford and maintaining a voluminous 
correspondence with many of the notable artistic and political figures of his 
day. But he also described himself as deeply unsettled by Kennan's letter, 
because he saw it as directly confronting the core of his entire moral beliefs. 
How was he to answer Kennan's troubled conclusion that ethics seemed to 
amount to little more than a blind faith in our capacity for good against the 
odds? 'I began many letters,' Berlin finally replied, 'but each seemed trivial, 
and what Russians called suetlivo - full of hurrying sentences, scattered and 
moving in all directions at once.'"^ 
In the event, Berlin's response to Kennan extended to almost eight densely-
written pages, ranging across a history of ethics from Judaic traditions to 
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Christianity, Islam and secular humanism which he saw as interwoven by the 
bedrock biblical belief in the Golden Rule that we should do unto others as we 
would have them do unto us. But he came back frequently to its formulation 
in Kantian ethics which he believed had shaped our moral understanding since 
the beginning of the nineteenth century. For Berlin, Kant's categorical 
imperative was based on the comforting certainty that we have an inherent 
capacity to apply our reason to ensure that we treat humanity '...never merely 
as means to an end, but always at the same time as an end,'"^This implied 
that even in the most constrained circumstances 'every human being is 
assumed to have the capacity to choose what to do, and what to be...'^ 
Dostoevsky's fictional character, Ivan Karamazov, 'speaks for us all, ' "^ Berlin 
wrote, when he rejects 'the worlds upon worlds of happiness which may be 
bought at the price of the torture to death of one innocent child...'^ 
Moreover, this universal moral understanding constituted a foundation for the 
optimism about our potential for self-transcendence that Kennan feared was a 
form of self-deception. 
The problem here is that Berlin's claim that we all share a humane conviction 
that the sacrifice of even a single child constitutes too high a cost for a 
delusionary Utopian 'Kingdom Come' is unsupported by history, myth or 
anthropology. Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son, Isaac, in blind 
obedience to God's will is one of the horror stories of the Old Testament. 
Though rare, it is nevertheless the case that from ancient times, to the pre-
Columbian Incas of Peru, to contemporary Uganda, there have existed 
cultures that have not shrunk from the ritual murder of children in the hope 
of some ineffable benefit. By implication, Berlin's reply to Kennan is more 
morally exhortatory than either factual or philosophically persuasive, a case 
of if only wishing made it so that appears to have much in common with 
Kennan's striving for a stoical optimism. 
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Or does it? Despite the long history of cruelty and barbarism in pan-European 
culture, Berlin held fiercely to the view that there existed underlying 
traditions passed down the centuries, in which the ethical rejection of such 
savagery was clearly anchored In the natural human sympathies of reasonable 
people. The question here is the extent to which Berlin's sanguine, 
minimalist value pluralism rested in his own liberal temperament and in his 
adopted British culture, especially at Oxford UniversityJ^^ Although he sought 
to establish that this liberal pluralist tradition included Russia, he obviously 
did not believe that this meant human beings could be relied upon to behave 
compassionately, whatever the contingencies. As Lee Hong-koo argues, the 
issue thus becomes how to derive practical policy recommendations from 
Berlin's pluralism to encourage the diffusion of such liberal values to countries 
where it might be considered notably absent."® In such radically different 
cultures, forging a liberal consensus may prove elusive. For example, as Chow 
Chung Po argues, contemporary Chinese anti-liberals, who became well-
versed in Berlin's Liberalism after the end of the Cold War, have suggested 
pragmatically that if value pluralism provides no clear common guidelines for 
us to adjudicate between incommensurate values, 'then maybe some 
individuals are in a better position to make choices for others in the event of 
conflicts between legitimate values. ' " ' In reality, given Berlin's milieu was 
the elite world of 'Oxbridge', of Europe's wealthy upper classes, of successful 
Intellectuals and artists, as well as leading politicians and businessmen, this 
may have been a view with which paradoxically he necessarily always 
disagreed. 
Preyed upon by his occasional descent into black depressions, especially about 
seemingly empty concepts such as the progress of civilisation, Kennan held 
more pessimistic and much less consistent sentiments. For instance, in his 
account of the dispatches to the American government from the US minister 
to the St Petersburg court of Nicholas I in 1850, which he claimed had been 
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found in a pile of r u b b i s h , K e n n a n concluded despairingly that not much in 
Russia was likely to change. 'Bolshevism,' he wrote, 'with its hullabaloo about 
revolution,' was not 'a turning point in history, but...only another milepost in 
Russia's "wasteful, painful progress from an obscure origin to an obscure 
destiny."'i2i 
In Berlin's later interviews with Kennan's biographer, Gaddis, as well as in his 
private prescriptions of his own encounters with Kennan, he concurs with the 
view that much of what the man saw and felt were circumscribed by his 
unfortunate habits of mind. Kennan's narrow, humourless pietism, Berlin said, 
condemned him to an obsessive pursuit of the moral high-ground, 
encapsulated in the notion of principle above pragmatism. With his gossipy 
fondness for psychologising about his acquaintances, Berlin also characterized 
Kennan as a divided soul. On the one hand, he was the highly-professional 
geostrategic Realist of America's Cold War, at times wonderfully comical to 
observe, with his a 'grey fanatical passionate Presbyterian appearance,'^" so 
that for Berlin his company was like being: 
in the presence of a dedicated preacher, in front of 
whom one can't tell off-color jokes. You can't enjoy 
yourself too openly. No boisterous laughter permitted. To 
some extent he casts a lampshade over the room. Bright 
lights have to be dimmed a little. ^^ 
On the other hand, Berlin described him as 'in the e m p y r e a n , a visionary, 
with a mystic's ethereal attunement to discordances in the material and 
emotional world around him. Kennan's diary notes, for instance, describe his 
visit to St Petersburg in 1945, to a city where there has 'by some strange quirk 
of fate - a previous life perhaps? - been deposited a portion of my own 
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capacity to feel and love, a portion - in other words - of my own life.'^^^ His 
intimate, acutely empathic, filmic descriptions of the city lay claim to 
spectral memories of Russia's turbulent past: 
...of the crowd making across the square towards the 
Winter Palace on the night the place was stormed...of the 
unhealthy days of Leningrad's spring thaws...of the 
cellar apartments,... full of dampness, cabbage smells 
and rats...the people cutting up fallen horses in the dark, 
snow-blown streets during the (German) siege. 
At times such vivid imaginings appeared to result in a kind of fragility, what 
from Berlin's perspective was an over-active, self-imposed moral anguish. As 
he recalled in later years, Kennan 'loved the R u s s i a n s , a n d was 'appalled 
by evil';^^® he was also volatile, easily wounded and unsulted to the slavery 
that marked success in government service: 'He doesn't bend...,' Berlin 
observed, 'He breaks.'^"The implication here is of a man burdened by the 
unstable combination of staunchly ethical professional earnestness and an 
intense poetical sensibility. 
At least this is the portrait of Kennan that is amplified in Gaddis's very 
detailed biography from which Berlin's descriptions are drawn. In a more 
endearing anecdote, Gaddis describes Kennan the Compassionate Cultural 
Evangelist on a stopover during a series of flights from Siberia to Moscow in 
1945 reading Tolstoy aloud in his fluent, elegant Russian^^" to an audience of 
his fellow passengers. Among them was an illiterate elderly woman with 
whom he shared his lunch and whose reflections on life displayed 'all the 
pungency and charm of the mental world of those who had never known the 
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printed word.'^^^ Reflecting on his two week journey east across the expanses 
of the steppes, Kennan ennphatically and somewhat chimerically distinguished 
the 'unparalleled ruthlessness and jealousy'^^^of the government from the 
many ordinary Russians he encountered, who were much deserving of 
America's sympathies. In his experience here was 'a talented, responsive 
people, capable of absorbing and enriching all forms of human experience,'^ 
emerging from the horrors of the war 'profoundly confident that they are 
destined to play a progressive and beneficial role in the affairs of the world, 
and eager to begin to do so.'^^'* His conclusion, which subsequently 
characterized all his observations about East-West relations during the 
Communist era, as well as during its aftermath under the Yeltsin and Putin 
presidencies, was that the 'wise American' would leave the country to find its 
own path to the future 'unencumbered by foreign sentimentality as by foreign 
a n t a g o n i s m . I t is a perspective that not only reflects the influence of 
Berlin's liberal pluralism, but has also been instrumental in the attitudes to 
foreign policy of prominent Western intellectuals, including Henry Kissinger 
and his cohorts of the like-minded at the US Council on Foreign Relations. 
Tacitly, Berlin's judgment of Kennan, as well as in his extended literary 
portrait of Herzen, reflected his fascination with contradictions of character. 
He believed that, like Kennan, Herzen too embodied this 'curious combination 
of idealism and s c e p t i c i s m , t h a t is, the insistence that our finest ideals can 
be achieved, while at the same time acknowledging the futility of such a 
conviction, given it frequently proves to be inconsistent with our experience 
that less honourable paths are taken or our choices ill-informed. In a private 
conversation with Walicki at Oxford in 1960, Berlin agreed that 'Turgenev's 
"hamletism" was '...an essential constituent of the outlook ...which he called 
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"value pluralism".'^" Again here he is implicitly evoking the fundamental 
distinction betv^een two kinds of humanity, this time as it is articulated in 
Turgenev's essay 'Hamlet and Don Quixote,'^^^On the one hand, there are the 
'fox-like' superfluous men, those liberal-minded Russian Hamlets whose 
capacity for effective action is questionable. On the other hand, there are 
the hedgehog-like monist Don Quixotes, the dogmatic, one-dimensional men 
'capable of action thanks to...simple uncritical belief. 
For Berlin, the consolations of philosophy lay in the enormous, never-ending 
joy of exploring such ideas about the puzzles of human nature and the world. 
It was probably his great good fortune that most of the time he could do so 
from the comfort of an armchair in his rooms at Oxford University. Still, like 
Kennan, Berlin claimed to see himself as besieged and sometimes challenged 
by his 'empathetic understanding of the e n e m y . T h e result was that amid 
events that seemed to demand hard-nosed political engagement, his hesitancy 
suggested little more than the worldly articulation of a clear, unequivocally 
liberal path forward was a never-ending, provisional work-in-progress. But 
unlike Kennan, Berlin was more able to intellectualise such dilemmas as 
fundamental to the human condition and so minimize the torment of having 
to make impossible, blind choices about what practically we should do next. 
Nevertheless, this 'hamletism' helps to explain one of the focal limitations of 
Berlin's liberal pluralism which, for instance, did much to undermine its 
potential appeal to post-Cold War Chinese intellectuals. Specifically it was 
this inability to always reconcile, either practically or in the abstract, the 
demands of political immediacies with conflicting, allegedly universal 
precepts. For those of us with sufficient agility to conceptualise potential 
points of moral inconsistency out of the tangles of contingencies, Berlin's 
answer to the engendered contradictions seemed to be 'do the very best you 
can in an imperfect world.' After all, whether our actions result in tragedy or 
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in farce is a matter over which we have almost no control. Examples here 
might include whether, and in what specific circumstances, might it be 
possible to be at the same time both fair and generous, sympathetic and 
truthful, or empathic and resolute. Arguably though, it should be noted that 
Hamlet's tragedy was not centrally his inability to negotiate a way forward 
out of such polarized ethical challenges, but his descent into an existential 
nightmare in which morality itself seemed to have lost all meaning. At least 
in the accounts of Gaddis and Berlin, this was a dark undertow In human 
understanding that Kennan was not always able to resist. 
As Brodsky suggests, what may be above all important about liberal pluralism 
is not so much the song, but its exemplary singer. Other peoples' lives were 
Berlin's forte^"^ and his philosophy never aspired to be a roadmap for 
intellectual or moral problem-solving. Rather it insisted on a humane 
personal world view that was 'older and more generous than what it 
observes.''' '^ In his carefully-worded, poetical tribute, Brodsky evokes Berlin's 
captivating, energetic immersion in 'the life of the mind,'^''^ alert to the 
currents of ideas that deceive and brutalise us, and fox-like in his evasion of 
the iron cages of Rationalist systems of thought. For Brodsky, he was: 
...neither a philosopher nor an historian of ideas, not 
literary critic or social Utopian, but an autonomous mind 
in the grip of an outward gravity, whose pull extends its 
perspective on this life insofar as this mind cares to send 
back signal.'I'"' 
Moreover, Brodsky adds, Berlin goes beyond Herzen's struggle to re-invent the 
mental climate of Russia and takes on 'the entire world's weather,' and 'short 




of being able to alter it, he still helps one endure it...One cloud less - if only a 
cloud in one's mind - is improvement enough...' 
The possibility that Berlin was an exceptional human being whose feet were 
firmly planted in the mess of human actuality while his mind soared 
effortlessly towards the higher reaches of our understanding, seemed to be no 
guarantee he had all the angles covered. His eclectic and reductionist 
debunking of any taint of totalitarian thinking in what he saw as the legacy of 
monism in counter-Enlightenment metaphysics, and his insistence on the 
wayward, unpredictable, inconsistent nature of our experiences points to 
other difficulties in his liberal pluralism. As Caute writes: 
He is always commanding the intellectual battlements of 
a besieged and imminently beleaguered city. Few have 
propounded the uncertainty principle in more certain 
tones. Few have advanced the virtues of...pluralism in 
more positive terms. Few have been more dogmatic 
about the perils of dogmatism. No one has more clearly 
insisted that historical outcomes are inevitably not 
inevitable. 
In other words, Berlin was perhaps one of those rare individuals for whom the 
certainty of uncertainty appeared to arouse only passing moments of the 
private anguish of a Hamlet. Rather throughout all his writing, his world view 
was underpinned by his notion of a flexible, secular humanism. In common 
with Herzen, he admitted to having no interest in religious issues, even those 
with which his beloved nineteenth century Russian thinkers had grappled. For 
example, in reviewing Walicki's exceptional accounts of the lives and thought 
of these intellectuals, Berlin insisted somewhat sardonically that 'he had "no 
understanding" of the "mystical t h e o l o g y ' " o f the Russian philosopher, 
Vladimir Solovyev and thought irrelevant to include 'monadological 
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spiritualists like Kozlov, Bobrov, Askoldov or Lopatin,'^''®for whom he had a 
'visible distaste.'^""The inveterate human yearning for a transcendent 
dimension and meaning to life thus has no place in the earthly realm of 
Berlin's liberal pluralism. The problem here is that theology, whether of a 
Christian or more modern, focally-political kind, has not proved to be so 
easily dismissed by lofty, dismissive assertions, such as: 
I don't think that the nature of human beings is a 
mystery, if by mystery is meant something that in 
principle is not discoverable...if one works hard enough 
and long enough and is endowed with sufficient natural 
gifts.150 
For many of us, at worst there is a kind of elitist, reductionist banality in 
these claims. As Brodsky counters, Berlin's version of Liberalism often 
amounts to yet another potential ideological straightjacket, in which short 
shrift is given 'to the notion that man can be driven as much by his appetite 
for the infinite as by n e c e s s i t y . T h e r e is always the spectre of a Stalinist 
leveling of the 'spiritual tenor ' ' " from which emerges 'solo performances' in 
art, music and poetry and whose absence 'may easily make the finest social 
tapestry fade. ' ' " 
In addition, liberal pluralism's paradoxical assertion of both the need for a 
tolerant acknowledgement of cultural diversity and the moral universalism of 
Kant's categorical imperative has proved equally problematic. This is 
particularly evident, for instance, in the intensification after 9/11 of 
America's post- Cold War global project of making the world safe for 
democracies, especially with regard to those countries, such as Russia or 
" 8 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
150 Berlin, Enlightenins Letters 1946-1969, Op.Cit. p180 
'51 Brodsky, Op.Cit. p207 
'52 Ibid. 
'53 Ibid. 
across the Middle East, which have been categorized by the West as 
irredeemably authoritarian or only partially democratic. As might be 
suggested by the last decade's Global War on Terror with its widespread resort 
to rendition by American and European intelligence agencies, the alleged 
export of Liberalism has not precluded a ready demarcation between the West 
and the Rest. The effect has been a blurring of the boundaries between 
pluralist concepts of tolerance and intolerance, raising the perennial question 
about how far we should go in protecting individuals from the potential 
iniquities of societies with value systems radically different from our own? 
Similarly, with regard to the heirs of the Cold War warrior generation of CIA 
operatives and MI6 spymasters, it continues to be morally abhorrent the 
extent to which barbaric methods such as water-boarding are justified as a 
defence of tolerance. 
Perhaps in their reactions to these considerations lie the important 
differences between the approaches of Kennan and Berlin to the challenges of 
cultural and ideological diversity. Against the currents of US foreign policy 
towards Russia during the Cold War and afterwards, Kennan consistently 
counseled military and diplomatic restraint in the hope his country would be 
perceived as a paradigmatic democracy. Despite his fine, principled ideals, 
the reality was the recurrent personal misery engendered by a lifetime of 
witnessing much of his policy advice go unheeded. If Berlin's exceptional 
talent was for identifying philosophical and moral dilemmas under the banner 
of liberal pluralism, then Kennan's experience appeared to confirm that such 
an informed and imaginative approach was unlikely to be necessarily either 
influential or helpful when it Involved pressing matters of foreign affairs and 
global security. Nor it seems would it prove to be notably effective in 
nurturing policy directions in the longer term. 
Consider, for example, Kennan's denouncement of the 1998 NATO commitment 
to further enlargement into Eastern Europe, as a 'strategic blunder of 
potentially epic proportions.Predictably, at least in Kennan's view. It is an 
issue that has remained a deep-seated grievance for the Putin regime. At the 
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age of 94, in an interview with the New York Times following the US Senate's 
ratification of the expansion, Kennan railed against the superficiality, 
ignorance and parochialism of the decision: 
I was particularly bothered by the references (in the 
Senate debate) to Russia as a country dying to attack to 
Western Europe. Don't people understand? Our 
differences in the Cold War were with the Soviet regime. 
And now we are turning our backs on the very people 
who mounted the greatest bloodless revolution in history 
to remove that r e g i m e . ^ ^ s 
Perhaps more in sorrow than in anger, Kennan concluded at the end of the 
interview: 'This has been my life, and it pains me to see it so screwed up at 
the end.'^5<' 
By contrast, temperamentally and philosophically, Berlin was far from ever 
being a demoralized foreign policy pundit, descending into a dark night of the 
soul as he struggled through the thickets of ongoing Cold War prejudices and 
foreign policy idiocies towards Russia. For instance, in contrast to Kennan's 
misery over the futility of his life's work, Berlin's private letters from Paris in 
1947 during the protracted drafting and redrafting of America's momentous 
Marshall Plan for the socio-economic reconstruction of postwar Europe seem 
egocentric and self-congratulatory in a satirically self-deprecatory way. He 
had been 'bullied' out of Oxford into joining the UK delegation by the Provost 
of Queen's College, Berlin wrote, In order to work 'the special Oxford black 
magic'.^^^ His task was to transform an overview of the deadlocked 
conference 'into deathless academic p r o s e : ' ^ ^ s 
I felt I was being summoned by God. I could not refuse, 
though I knew it was mistake. When the prophet Jonah 
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was summoned by God, he refused. Everybody realized 
In a day or two I was hopeless. 
Bored, enervated by a severe Paris heat wave, and surrounded by dull people, 
Berlin extricated himself from the fray after three weeks and headed to Italy 
for a holiday with friends.^^"In the meantime, Kennan had provided an up-to-
date policy briefing on the US position to the UK representatives and was 
writing a comprehensive report to the US State department 'suggesting 
practical approaches to resolving the deadlock.'^^^ 
After the Cold War: 
How then to make sense of accusations that both Kennan and Berlin were 
liberal stooges, locked in the Cold War's ideological rigidities of friend and 
communist foe? The short answer is that they were not, if packaged into such 
a characterization is the dogmatic, one-dimensional, militant Russophobia of 
esp ionage consp i rac ies , accusat ions of intractable Tsar ist-style 
authoritarianism and geopolitical hysteria about post-Soviet neo-imperialist 
spheres of influence. Admittedly, like many former Cold War liberals of our 
time, both men had been outspoken in their condemnation of the Soviet era 
as anathema to all that was worth protecting in the unsteady emergence of 
the century's liberal democracies. But it should be emphasized that neither 
man endorsed war, whether hot or cold, as a solution to the complexities of 
Soviet and post-Soviet international relations. 
Three significant reference points emerge from Kennan's and Berlin's embrace 
of liberal pluralism as a humane way forward in East-West relations in the 
wake of the Cold War. The first is that for both men any conflict with Russia 
should be primarily a culture war, a battle of ideas in the arenas of soft 
diplomacy, in which victory would mean that the allure of Western liberal 
democracy was shown to be beyond contention. Unfortunately, as evident in 
the ongoing disputes surrounding the global exportability of American-style 
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economic neo-Liberalism, this has yet to happen in Russia, if indeed it ever 
will. Secondly, despite Berlin's extensive attempt to bring to the fore v^hat he 
believed v^as an exceptional pre-Bolshevik Russian liberal tradition, changing 
times and circumstances mean there is no certainty it will be focally relevant 
to the contemporary commentaries on the Putin generations. Thirdly, this 
overriding concept of the tyranny of contingency elucidated by the Cambridge 
School, suggests that none of the ongoing Cold War assumptions about the 
legacy of autocracy, anti-Westernism, or Slavic nationalism In contemporary 
Russia, may be either necessary or sufficient determinants of the course of 
events. 
On the one hand, the dynamics of shifting cultural, political and economic 
complexities inevitably qualify any analysis of the conceptual continuities 
between today's Russia and its past. On the other, there is the issue of how to 
quantify, or even to give an adequate account of, the historical ingredients in 
the mixing pot of Putin's so-called authoritarian regime. Consider, for 
example, the commonplace that Russia's post-communist power vacuum + 
resource wealth beyond the wildest dreams + an opportunistic, greedy elite = 
all the corruptions of absolute power. Beyond the tabloid and twitter catch 
phrases about the iniquities of Putin the Neo-Autocrat and his cronies, what 
exactly might be the contribution of the country's four centuries of despotism 
to that equation? In this context, what appears to be important about liberal 
pluralism is that it is an invitation to an open-ended project, in which there is 
no finality of understanding, just a scale of plausible opinion from more to 
less well-informed, which at best keeps a sceptical eye on the received 
wisdom. 
Perhaps the last word on the ways liberal pluralism could be said to span the 
divisions implied by the terms of Cold War warrior and re-invented fellow-
traveller should go to Kennan. In 1995, ten years before his death at the age 
of 101, his biographer, Gaddis, asked him to write his own obituary. Kennan's 
response was the following account of himself, which in many ways might 
serve equally as Berlin's liberal pluralist's creed that individual liberty should 
be accepted as fundamental to our understanding of humankind: 
First of alL..I am independent, and have always kept my 
independence. I've always revolted against trying to say 
things as a member of a collective group, simply because 
it's what others said. I don't belong to any organization 
where I feel that I have to say things they decide they 
want sa id . ' ' " 
Conclusion: 
As part of a lengthy, wide-ranging conversation in 2012 between the historian 
of modern Eastern and Central Europe, Timothy Snyder and the late Tony 
Judt, the latter described Berlin as one of the most important Influences on 
his conceptualization of what it means to be a scholar of history and 
p o l i t i c s . I n a kind of contextualisation of his road to Berllnian liberal 
pluralism in the 1980s, Judt begins with his intuitive rejection of 
Thatcherism's alleged 'impeccable''^" logic that as a result of the cumulative 
legacy of war and decolonisation, Britain could no longer sustain its levels of 
social expenditure. As Judt puts it, his opposition to the corrosion of his 
country's social democratic policies under the banner of free-marketeering 
developed not only as a reaction to its high costs in terms of lost 
opportunities and misery for the mass of people. More fundamentally, his 
condemnation of what he came to believe were Thatcher's ill-informed 
economic and political fantasies rested on his realization that the 
Conservative government's assertion of a guiding logic 'was probably a 
mistake... [that] all political theories were by their very nature partial and 
incomplete accounts of the complexities of the human condition ... and the 
better for it (my i t a l i c s ) . y k g his conceptualization of liberty, this last 
statement could also serve as a mantra for Berlin's philosophical views. 
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As for the question from China's anti-liberals about the practicality of liberal 
pluralism, not least for providing a comprehensive, coherent, prognostic 
narrative about Putin's Russia, Judt refers us to the potentially useful 
contribution of the professional historian, or perhaps of the like-minded 
contemporary commentator who rejects glib, emotive generalities. Consider, 
for instance, Fukuyama's claim that the fall of Soviet communism represented 
the triumph of Liberalism at the end of history; or alternatively a situation 
where 'some fool declares that Saddam Hussein is Hitler i n c a r n a t e ; o r , for 
that matter, that Putin has re-invented himself as a century tsar. For Judt, 
the point of his life's work was 'to enter the fray and complicate such simple 
r u b b i s h . H i s aim was to ensure a clearer, more credible and dispassionate 
account of the drift of events, as part of an ongoing civic conversation. 
Meanwhile, in accordance with his acknowledged intellectual allegiance to 
Berlin's liberal pluralist philosophy, Judt insists that: 'An accurate mess is far 





LIBERAL INTELLECTUALS AND LOST CAUSES 
The Russian Mind 
Willful and avid mind, 
The Russian mind is dangerous as flame: 
So unrestrainable, so clear 
A happy and a gloomy mind. 
Like the steady hand of a compass 
It sees the pole through swells and fog; 
It leads the timid will 
From distracted dreams to life 
Like an eagle gazing though the mist 
To survey the valley's dust 
It soberly contemplates the earth 
Floating 1n mystic night. 
Vyacheslav Ivanovich Ivanov 
The following seeks to substantiate the threads of argument raised in the last 
chapter about what has been understood by the concept of the liberal 
intelligentsia in post-communist Russia. Its focus is on the ways Berlin's 
traditionalist interpretation of its role as a moral storm gauge for the 
country's culture and politics has been accepted or rejected by today's 
commentariat. The first section provides a compressed account of the 
conceptualization of those Berlin eulogized as a unique coterie of Russian 
intellectuals whose legacy he hoped had the potential to be rekindled down 
the generations. In particular, it explores the issues surrounding how to define 
the intelligentsia, its historical role and its alleged influence on events within 
today's Russia. 
The second section looks more closely at the implications of this 
understanding for Liberalism in Putin's Russia, as it is frequently assumed in 
the West to be manifested in the post-Soviet opposition movement. Using 
the perspectives of prominent intellectual and political commentator Gleb 
Pavlovsky as a point of reference, it considers the claims that the 
intelligentsia is now largely composed of a marginal stratum of people in 
Russia, its membership corroded by Stalin's gulags, by exile and subjugation 
under the Soviet regime and finally, forty years later v^ith the fall of 
communism, by its own self-protective political naivety. 
Section One: 
As Berlin insisted repeatedly in his private letters and in his writings on 
Russian thinkers, the emergence of the intelligentsia should be understood as 
a prodigious occurrence. With his usual effusiveness about Russian thought in 
the nineteenth century, he describes the word as having been invented in the 
1860s or 1870s to designate what he believes was a unique and seminal 
philosophical response to an intensely tyrannical and tumultuous period of 
Tsarist rule. His account of the birth of this intelligentsia in the wake of the 
failed Decembrist revolt in 1825 is steeped in a poignant evocation of a past 
time when the passionate romance with intellectual abstractions could break 
hearts and ruin young lives. 
In a tacit reference to the influence of its ideas on the coming revolutionary 
era, he claims the group was 'like many precursors of an event...usually more 
fascinating than the men of action...'^ Much of his writing on the topic takes 
inspiration from the reflections of Herzen and Pavel Annenkov, both of whom 
were closely associated with the emergence of the intelligentsia and, amongst 
other things, were chroniclers of the thoughts and misfortunes of its 
members. As Berlin writes: 
...both these connoisseurs of human beings, in later 
years, confessed that never in their lives, had they again 
found anywhere a society so civilized and gay and free, 
so enlightened, spontaneous and agreeable so sincere, so 
intelligent, so gifted and attractive in every way.^ 
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Berlin also claims 'the phenomenon itself, with its historical and literary 
revolutionary consequences, is...the largest single Russian contribution to 
social change in the w o r l d . T h e s e are very large claims. Berlin's twenty-
five pages on the phenomenon in his Russian Thinkers, provides a highly 
generalized characterization of how and why this social cluster came into 
existence and allegedly exerted such an inordinate influence on the 
ideological foundations of subsequent political events. According to his dense, 
compassionate analysis, initially during 'a remarkable decade"'beginning 
around the 1830s the intelligentsia was a small circle of young men, many of 
them declasse, who were bonded by their vehement anti-Tsarism. In large 
measure their philosophical views had been inspired by their experiences of 
life in the West, but also by the murderous brutality of the reaction of Tsar 
Nicholas I to the Decembrists. 
Though estranged from the masses by their intellectual interests and literary 
vocations as translators, civic-minded poets, journalists and political 
pamphleteers, they nevertheless shared 'a profound moral concern for 
s o c i e t y . A s Berlin puts it, they 'quite consciously used literature,'' both 
fiction and non-fiction, to express their relentless, radical protest against 'a 
status quo which was regarded as in constant danger of becoming ossified, a 
block to human thought and human progress.'^ For many of them, their 
country's backwardness in comparison to the rest of Europe had become a 
matter of national shame. Central to this 'moral uneasiness'® was the vast 
illiterate population of the abused, exploited, wretched peasantry whose 
squalid living conditions had advanced little since feudal times. 
Though only very broadly in agreement with each other on more abstruse 
philosophical challenges, they nonetheless shared an underlying dedication to 
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the pursuit of lucidity through the unfettered cultivation of the life of the 
mind. Berlin argues that in reality their aspirations were undermined and 
distorted by the high degree of censorship of both domestic and foreign 
publications in Tsarist Russia. As well, they were circumscribed by a narrowly-
focused Western education that was marked by the profound distrust of 
French ideas by the regime's elite in the wake of the 1789 revolution in 
France. In practical terms this meant that this emergent intelligentsia was 
nurtured within a cultural milieu in which their country was 'virtually an 
intellectual dependency of German academic thought... [so that] scarcely one 
single political and social idea to be found in Russia in the nineteenth century 
was born on native soil.' 'As suggested in Chapter One, especially during the 
first half of the century, this entailed a fervent, though officially 
circumscribed engagement with Hegel and his legacy, one that was stripped of 
much of the energetic clash and collision of ideas that since the Renaissance 
and before had ranged across Europe 'in a vast variety of patterns...in which 
no one idea or opinion could hold for long undisputed supremacy...'^" 
It was only towards the second half of the nineteenth century, mostly as 
exiles in Paris, London or Vienna, that the surviving members of the 
intelligentsia had a more considered and worldly engagement with French or 
British thinkers, such as The Philosophes, or the French positivists, Comte, 
Fourier, and Saint-Simon, or the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill and Jeremy 
Bentham. Significantly, according to Berlin's account, amongst this early 
nineteenth century cohort, there was only a passing interest in the work of 
Marx. As British playwright Tom Stoppard puts it, Herzen, for instance, 
appears to have despised Marx because of his inflated, abstract rhetoric and 
intellectual ferocity; and apparently these were sentiments that Marx 
reciprocated." Stoppard's trilogy on Russia's radical intelligentsia. The Coast 
of Utopia, draws heavily on Herzen's autobiographical writings, as well as on 
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Berlin's work. Its third part, Sa/vage, is devoted to a portrayal of Herzen, in 
particular his anti-Marxist aversion to historical determinism. With a poetic 
resonance v^orthy of Herzen's own polemical writings, Stoppard's character 
declares: 
History knocks at a thousand gates at every moment and 
the gatekeeper is chance. We shout into the mist for this 
one or that one to be opened for us, but through every 
gate there are a thousand more...'^ 
At the same time, Berlin also insists that the German metaphysical writers 
such as Hegel, should be rightly said to have liberated his cohort of youthful 
nineteenth century intelligentsia from both the ultra conservative dogmatisms 
of the Russian Orthodox Church and from 'the dry formulae of the eighteenth 
century rationalists, which had been...discredited by the failure of the French 
R e v o l u t i o n . O n e manifestation of this new freedom was an embrace of 
Romanticism which he claims found particularly fertile ground amongst these 
politically disempowered, persecuted intellectuals. 
At the centre of the loose cluster of ideas that constituted the Romantic 
Movement was the highly subjectivist Hegelian notion of innerlichkeit 
(inwardness). According to this psychological mindset, the meaning and 
purpose of an individual's life can only be fully-realised through his/her 
essentialist spiritual attunement to the eschatological march of history 
towards liberty and en l i ghtenment .Each man's duty, Berlin writes, was 
believed to be 'to penetrate the soul of the world...to grasp the hidden, 
"inner" plan of the universe, to understand his own place in it, and to act 
a c c o r d i n g l y . | n other words, the Russians' enchantment with the German 
Romantics was primarily a secularized^^'internalisation of ancient religiosity, as 
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encapsulated for instance in St Augustine's enjoinder to the Christian faithful: 
'Seek not abroad, turn back into thyself, in the inner man dwells the 
truth.^Moreover, in a language that is deliberately biblical in its resonances, 
Berlin describes the burden of the Romantic, pseudo-religious revelation of a 
benign and ethical higher reality, as binding this dedicated group to a belief in 
their mission to help their oppressed brothers similarly 'to see the light. 
Increasingly too, from the early century onwards, the intelligentsia came to 
see Mother Russia as a more appropriate candidate for the forging of a new 
world by the creative, beneficent cosmos.^' Like Germany, theirs was a young 
nation, energetic and untainted by the decaying, materialist West. But it was 
more so, that is more barbaric, uneducated and politically and economically 
backward and, ironically perhaps, therefore endowed with 'an even more 
powerful hope.'^° As Berlin argues, stimulated by the derivative philosophising 
of this new generation of thinkers, Romanticism became linked with cultural 
nationalism in Russian society. This meant, he writes, that the notion 
suffused through the communities of intellectuals that if each individual 
fulfilled his[sic] unique calling, 'as history surely intended them to do, the 
future of Russia might yet be as glorious as her past had been empty and 
dark. 
Interestingly, in this context Bauman offers a similar focus to Berlin's in 
answer to the question of how exactly to understand the concept of this 
century Russian intelligentsia. But his interpretation is considerably less 
sympathetic and forgiving of what Berlin often saw as their well-intentioned 
though misguided philosophising. Bauman argues that the creation of this 
intelligentsia is best described as the result of the anthropological notion of 
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'stimulus diffusion,' from the more highly developed West to the non-
industrialised countries of Europe's East. He describes this diffusion as: 
a process in which an idea of a "superior" social form 
travels on its own, unaccompanied by the socio-economic 
conditions which gave it birth, having thus acquired the 
status of Utopia - of a dream to be reforged into reality 
by conscious human effort.^^ 
Like Berlin, he argues that the term intelligentsia thus referred to those 
aspirationally high-minded intellectuals who carried the West's notions of 
superior social forms into Russia and theorized about the advantages and 
pitfalls of seeking to nurture them in alien soil. It should be noted, though, 
that given the term 'intelligentsia' was not in common usage until after 1860, 
in Berlin's anachronistic use of the word in Russian Thinkers it is synonymous 
with the pre-1948 social stratum which was composed of his so-called 
radicals, as well as those few Intellectuals in subsequent generations whom 
he identified as having been inspired by them. Similarly, in Bauman's analysis 
of the usage, 'intelligentsia' and 'intellectuals' both refer to Berlin's Janus-
faced century men of ideas. That Is, the terms refer to those Russian 
thinkers who had looked critically outwards through the rosy lens of an 
Idealist belief in Enlightenment progress at the world transformations taking 
place outside their country; and Inwards, Into themselves, with an Intense, 
self-regarding, pious conviction of their role as moral pioneers - a role which 
they came to believe had been demanded of them by these processes of 
modernization and modernity From either perspective, their self-importance 
and their postulates for the future, Bauman argues, had always been and 
would continue to be delusionary. With obeisance to Hegel, he reminds us of 
the apothegm that the owl of Minerva spreads its wings at dusk: 
Intellectuals came to see themselves as Intellectuals (as 
distinct from just being journalists, novelists, poets, or 
university professors) only at the twilight of the century. 
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when their unity of function (if it ever existed) was but a 
memory; perhaps a dream. ^^  
In other words, Bauman suggests that the combination of rapid social change 
and the infusion of Marxist thought from the West amongst a new generation 
of intellectuals, meant that by the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, 
the numbers and mythical status of Berlin's classical Russian intelligentsia 
were already in decline. 
The social role of the Intelligentsia: 
In a letter of encouragement, written in 1958 to the Harvard scholar of the 
Soviet Union, Richard Pipes, in response to his 'excellent idea for a book on 
the Russian intel l igentsia,Berl in raised two key questions which he believed 
should 'be v e n t i l a t e d . T h e first asked what the concept involved, in the 
sense of which specific philosophers constituted the Intelligentsia and what 
did it mean to subsequent generations? The second was whether the usage of 
the term 'is co-terminous with liberals In general or has a special meaning in 
countries like Russia...etc?' ^^  
Pipes had asked Berlin whether he might consider contributing to his book, as 
well as for some suggestions about which Russian Intellectuals might qualify 
for inclusion in the country's intelligentsia. Pleading he was 'overloaded 
with commitments, Berlin refused Pipes' first request. But his letter of reply 
did contain a couple of scattered names as strong claimants to the title of an 
intelligent, with a special mention of 'only say Turgenev among the great 
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writers'^® to be admitted into the ranks, and Tolstoy, Chekhov and Dostoevsky 
as clearly 'not intelligentsia.'" Nor did Pasternak quite make it onto the right 
side of the divide. As Berlin v^rote, he was 'too odd, too religious, too remote 
from the ideals of scientific enlightenment, political democracy etc.etc. 
Admittedly the letter appears rushed and typically a riff crammed with 
tangentially coherent words and ideas and a somewhat frustrating use of 
'etc.' But Berlin does assert his own very abbreviated answer to at least one 
of the questions he put to Pipes. 'The real members of the intelligentsia,' he 
said, '...are the high-minded, liberal, anti-clerical, pro-Western, constantly 
indignant, old-fashioned r a d i c a l s . T h e y began as a specifically Russian 
pre-1948 phenomenon, which was composed of those few exceptional men 
whose cultural and moral preoccupations were carried forward by certain of 
their countrymen throughout most of the century. That is, to Berlin at least, 
they formed part of a cross-generational coterie which was broadly liberal, 
definitely non-Marxist, and which was certainly not synonymous with civil 
society or with a rising middle class. Nor was this intelligentsia, Bauman too 
suggests, simply made up of artists, writers, literary critics, academics, well-
educated scientists, engineers or medical practitioners, though they could be 
found within all these professions. Like Bauman, elsewhere in an essay on the 
power of ideas, Berlin characterizes members of this group according to their 
conviction they had taken up residence on a uniquely scholarly and ethical 
high ground: 
The concept of the intelligentsia must not be confused 
with the notion of intellectuals. Its members thought of 
themselves as being a dedicated order... devoted to the 
spreading of a specific attitude to life, something like a 
gospel." 
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In common with his explication of the virtues of hberal plurahsm outlined in 
Chapter One, Berlin's portrayal of the intelligentsia thus also strongly relies 
on his fondness for speculative psychotogising. As he himself puts it, quoting 
German poet Karl Wolfskehl, 'people are my landscape.'" Throughout his 
account in Russian Thinkers he imaginatively conjures v^hat he sees as very 
special, larger-than-life characters as the exemplars of the mindset of these 
intellectuals. Notably only four such men, Turgenev, Bakunin, Belinsky and 
Herzen are specifically mentioned as the intelligentsia's 'true original 
founders. 
Admittedly such an approach is not so very different from the kind of familiar 
scholarly endeavour that seeks to embed biography v/ithin cultural and 
philosophical trends to produce an Inductive and sometimes richly 
impressionistic effect. But the problem remains how exactly then to 
distinguish, across the ensuing two hundred years or so from the second 
quarter of the century, a bona fide member of the intelligentsia from an 
individual Russian scholar or artist? As Bauman puts it, explaining in a general 
way the meaning of the word is an issue separate from identifying which 
actual individuals might qualify for inclusion. In other words, asking the 
question, 'Who were the Russian intelligentsia?' he argues, is an inquiry about 
'a role, a function, a systemic l o c a t i o n . T h e question 'Who were its 
members?'^^ is a highly contested area about 'personal qualities that permit 
(or entitle) their bearer to perform such a role or occupy such a position.'^ 
The distinction is important to considerations about whether Its historical role 
has continued into today's Russia. 
In more recent times, the search for a credible answer to the second question 
might suggest the need for some kind of more directed profiling of the 
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clustering of cognitive and affective personality traits among those who could 
novy be broadly termed 'a public intellectual.' This might include an 
assessment of a Russian intellectual's oppositional political views, dedication 
to the cause of the dehumanised and dispossessed, penchant for bookish 
proselytizing, overall individualistic and independent ethical stance, and 
personal commitment to wrestling with the abstruse heights/depths of moral 
and metaphysical philosophy. For those who appear to be Romanticism's 
devotees, this list might also include underlying patriotism inspired by 
century German organic nationalists such as Herder or Fichte, as well as a 
measure of the intellectual gravitas with which they were committed to 
catching the tide of history to the furthest shore of a new Russia. Perhaps, as 
Bauman concludes, such a definitive answer might prove to be elusive, if not 
'virtually impossible.'^® 
Alternatively, Pipes suggests more soberly the trope 'a critically thinking 
personality,'^' which has often served as a generalisable means of identifying 
a member of the Intelligentsia. Perhaps deliberately, it is one though that 
appears to evade the issue of whether his political stance is as a liberal 
pluralist, a liberal conservative, a Socialist, a Leftwing or Centrist liberal, a 
Utopian liberal, or as some other form of liberal with adjectives. Bauman 
adds to this the more tendentious suggestion that membership was in the end 
a matter of self-definition. As he writes, for the intelligentsia, the ongoing 
squabbles about what kind of elite, dedicated, secular order a Russian 
intellectual saw himself as joining, as well as who else was or was not 
deserving of the status, was the core of his self-construction. 'Indeed, as 
Valery paraphrased Descartes,' Bauman said, 'they complain; therefore they 
exist.'^"In his letter to Pipes concerning the issue, Berlin also offers the more 
informal, irreverent opinion that: 'No doubt they were often quite foolish, 
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pompous, madly irritating, etc., and generated a quite phenomenal quantity 
of platitudes..."'^ 
Not surprisingly, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Berlin's portrayal of 
them as a kind of small, ethical, scholarly brotherhood appears to be 
magisterially unspecific. By his own admission he was an historian of the 
currents of thought that flowed into century Russia from the West, rather 
than of the miscellany of events that could be or have been documented as 
providing contexts to these ideas. As suggested in Chapter One, the result is 
that he often appears to have had somewhat too fleeting an engagement 
with contingency, that is, with unraveling the contextualized meaning of the 
words used to explain the tangles of chance, circumstance and human actions 
that are integral to any credible explanation of the complexities of the past 
and the present. To paraphrase Lenin, the challenge is not only to elucidate 
the ways the objective world is understood to be reflected in our 
consciousness, but also how our consciousness deliberately or unwittingly 
creates that world. 
More specifically, Berlin's zone of engagement with the influence of what he 
believed was an exceptionally significant social group points towards the need 
for a more forensic scrutiny of the relationship between its members' 
thoughts and either their own actions or their influence on the deeds of 
others. In other words, there is a need to trace the links between what he 
believed to be the intelligentsia's dedication to powerful and dangerous ideas 
and their effect on the real human struggles to gain and maintain political 
power in pre-revolutionary Russia and afterwards. Without this stronger 
substantiation, our understanding of the role of this group is inherently vague, 
obscured within the unexplained dynamics of philosophical reflection in 
interaction with socio-economic conditions, political opportunism, power 
mongering amongst elite groups and realpolitik. In Russian Thinkers, Berlin 
emerges as primarily focused on providing a retrospective on how certain 
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members of the Russian intelligentsia had devoted themselves unsparingly to 
a mutual dialogue about their interpretations of Hegelian Idealism, 
Romanticism, Populism, Socialism and Materialism in the wake of the 
Enlightenment. What also emerges in his work is that these were 
predominantly theoretical debates about the question of what was to be done 
for their country's oppressed people. Despite their literary talents and 
sometimes fierce political commentaries, this approach creates the 
impression that they were simply up the back of the grandstand booing the 
failing home team, consoled by thoughts of next season's certain victory. 
Moreover, as Caute scornfully suggests, in Berlin's account 'books become as 
potent as rays of the sun;"'^and those of his followers who replicate his 
interpretative abstractions risk spinning 'into orbit above actual history 
without ever touching down."''* As he puts it: 
The British cabinet in 1914 had not been reading Maistre 
or Nietzsche before pressing its young men into 
slaughter more extensive than the one generated by the 
monist-utopian mind of L e n i n . 
Berlin's reply to sceptics, such as Caute, who deride his assumption that 
philosophy is centrally what drives human behavior, seems to be that it is not 
really such a difficult issue to grasp. The connection is rather obvious, he 
tacitly insists, manifest in the ways we experience and interpret the world. 
Apprehending this connection is a matter of deeper insight and scholarly 
sophistication. The general ideas, for example of Tolstoy or Marx, he says, 'do 
have great influence,' though in the case of Russia in cataclysmic ways its 
century thinkers had not necessarily anticipated: 
Without the kind of out of outlook of which...the Hegelian 
philosophy, then so prevalent, was both the cause and 
the symptom, a great deal of what happened might. 
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perhaps, either not have happened, or else have 
happened differently."^ 
Still, there may be somev^hat more down-to-earth, circumstantial reasons for 
Berlin's characterization of the birth of the Russian intelligentsia first and 
foremost through the lens of culture and philosophy. In common v/ith his re-
invention of Herzen's liberal pluralism and disenchantment with political 
dogmas, Berlin's explicit aim is to re-claim for posterity what he lamented 
was an almost-forgotten world of pre-Soviet Russian thought, not least 
amongst Western scholars. Though he only indirectly acknowledges it, his 
literary approach can be vindicated perhaps by the realities of the successive 
Tsarist and Soviet regimes, in which members of the group are said to have 
been relentlessly excluded to the point of negation from the world of 
effective direct action politics. The implication here is that the 
intelligentsia's role as the 'spiritual leadership of the nation,...the guardian 
and the censor of its values,''*^ ipso facto was also symptomatic of their self-
protective, disempowered retreat from a direct public language of power 
politics. 
Paradoxically, as Berlin repeatedly insists, their obliquely subversive, high-
minded ideas about historical progress, Russian Socialism, or the liberation of 
the impoverished masses, are said to have been re-interpreted and 
implemented by later generations. Most immediately and conspicuously, for 
Trotsky, Lenin or Stalin, they appeared to have epitomized a clarion call to 
bring to fruition the previous century's abstracted programmes for their 
country's road to a socialist modernity. If so, perhaps Berlin is right to accuse 
the old radical intelligentsia, with the exception perhaps of Herzen or 
Turgenev, of helping to conjure out of the brutal, intractable mess of 
Tsardom's realities what turned out to be impossible tragic futures. As Herzen 
warned, the Implication is that in the world of transcendentally good ideas 
about the creation of a perfect society, the Russian intelligentsia should have 
been more careful what they wished for. 
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At least, this seems to be a plausible view. Consider in this context, for 
example, Berlin's liberal endorsement of Constant's distinction between 
positive and negative liberty. In common with his French predecessor, he 
argues that in contemporary liberal societies these two concepts of freedom 
should balance and circumscribe each other. In particular, the normative and 
legal endorsement of negative liberty should ensure that every individual has 
the opportunity to pursue both publicly and privately what are in fact blind 
choices about a desirable path to his/her future. The only constraint should 
be the non-Interference In others' expressions of the same freedom. For 
Berlin, this form of liberty is thus the fundamental condition of human life, 
one that makes possible all other activities, such as love or friendship or 
political engagement. It also entails the freedom to do nothing, to sit on the 
back-step and watch the grass grow, ignoring the Intrusions of positive liberty 
in the form of the demands of friends, colleagues or, more especially, the 
dictates of Big Brother the State. As suggested above, the Tsarist regime's 
failure to accept that negative liberty is inherent to what It means to be 
human was strongly manifested in the outbreaks of savagery with which it 
sought to relegate the critical intelligentsia to the sidelines of Immediate 
pre-revolutionary politics and policies. For Berlin, this Implied the dominance 
of a collectivist concept of positive liberty that across subsequent events 
effectively stifled the flowering of the fundamental condition of negative 
liberty. He believed that sadly this dominance was also carried forward into 
Stalinism as an undiluted current of malevolence. 
The pressing question, though, for the future of the ascribed role of the 
intelligentsia in Russian society is whether or to what extent Berlin's notion of 
negative freedom should be always be understood as an inherently fragile. 
Impermanent human condition? Is it the case, as Arendt argues, that it can be 
totally destroyed in totalitarianism societies in ways that deprive us of all 
sense of humanity?""® To his more optimistic liberal critics, Berlin's mistake is 
in assuming that negative liberty Is a 'condition.' Instead It should be 
understood as one dimension of a shifting dynamic with positive liberty, which 
"8 Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism., Harcourt Inc, 1968 
requires a liberal-minded vigilance to moderate extremes in either direction. 
As Crick puts it in his comical poem, Freedom as Politics, which satirises 
Berlin's two concepts of liberty, for liberals freedom can never be a passive 
condition of being, that is, merely a kind of platform from which takes flight a 
variety of desirable human behaviours. Rather it is only ever meaningful as 
the exercise of a continuous plebiscite through pro-active, creative, and 
sometimes courageous, political and social choices: 
Liberty is surely not just taking care 
But taking care to get somewhere... 
Is shaping, through some mutual pact 
Some hand-made thing which once we lacked. 
Freedom is not just avoidance of the State 
Like some computerized blind date, 
Nor just an angry affirmation of 'my will'. 
It's more like doing something meant to fill 
The social gap between the loneliness of I 
And groups of demonstrators in full cry....49 
Which brings us back to the question of how then to credibly interpret the 
predominantly philosophical and ethical impact of Berlin's liberal 
intelligentsia on historical events in Russia across more than a century and a 
half? In terms perhaps of the ideological comforts of a kind of powder keg 
theory of change, where the more obviously deep-seated the despotism, the 
more inevitable the explosion of liberty? That is, for instance, without a 
thorough-going, institutionalised commitment by the regime to Berlin's 
universalist concepts of liberal freedom. Tsar Alexander M's piecemeal 
reforms, such as the partial emancipation of the Russian peasantry in 1861, 
did little to avert the storm on the hor i zon.The underlying reminder here is 
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the Tocquevillean precept that: 'The most dangerous moment for a bad 
government is when it begins to reform. 
Still, despite this sweep of interpretation, whatever aspects of these 
intellectuals' radical dreams might be deemed to have been Influential in the 
longer term, a revolutionary outcome only appears to have been inevitable 
with hindsight. Equally, in accordance with the illusory nature of 
retrospective determinism, the diffusive power of their ideas could be 
dismissed as partly incidental and certainly distorted. That Is, the implication 
is in choosing between the domination of pre-conceived, deliberative, 
programmatic human behavior, ad hocery, or the haphazard march of folly and 
fanaticism as ways of understanding the past, the primacy of the first option 
is often the least persuasive. For Instance, as Pipes argues, the loss of 
freedom under the importation into Russia of what he calls Western 
totalitarianism was unexpected, sudden and complete."It did not, he 
emphasizes, evolve 'organically from Russia's development In the century, 
from the era of the classical Russian intelligentsia. 
Nikolai Chernyshevsky: A Case Study 
In common with Berlin's approach in Russian Thinkers, Kolakowski appears 
less exercised by seemingly futile efforts to elucidate an encompassing, pan-
historical conceptualization of the Russian intelligentsia than in encapsulating 
the evolving styles of thought in which members of this intellectual stratum 
actually argued with each other. Like Berlin, he too describes the 
intelligentsia's shift during the later century away from Hegelian 
metaphysics to a devotion to materialism. As Berlin writes, the latter had 
become more appealing than 'the noble flights of the romantic idealists of the 
1840s'5'' to the tough-minded, angry, young radicals who had grown up during 
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'the dead years after 1849. ' " Combined with the preoccupation with 
populism pervasive amongst Russian thinkers after 1870, this shift also 
provided a kind of limited intellectual harbinger of, as well as a local context 
to, the fierce polemics about marxist doctrine that began towards the turn of 
the century. And like Pipes's claims outlined above, Kolakowski too conveys 
the sense that these debates were in no way a clear and necessary 
determinant of Russia's ideological directions. Instead he describes the 
interweaving of ideas that appear to overlap and resonate with each other. At 
the same time he stresses that, in contrast to the later Leninist or Trotskyist 
revolutionaries, many in the radical intelligentsia drew back from Marxism. 
Or they used it very selectively in their discussions about what they saw as 
the unique challenges for their country's development.^^ 
Consider, for example, Kolakowski's account of the work of one of the 
century's most high-profile claimants to membership of the radical 
intelligentsia, Nikolai Chernyshevsky. A liberal socialist, Chernyshevsky has 
been labeled an exceptionally influential ideologue, though as much for his 
charismatic personality, as for his provocative writings. In the 1860s his 
prison-cell advocacy of the overthrow of Tsardom by force is said to have 
inspired the more violent form of narodnichestvo (Russian populism), whose 
campaign of terror culminated in the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. As 
a liberal as well as a populist, he was a proponent of the human rights and the 
spiritual and material wellbeing of the individual against the intrusion of State 
power,"as well as of universal education and the emancipation of the 
peasant s .These inter-related views, Kolakowski writes, stemmed from his 
stance in the Russophile debates on whether Russia could mitigate the dark, 
exploitative nature of European-style industrialisation. If properly managed, 
Chernyshevsky insisted, the transition to capitalism was in no way 
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incompatible with homegrown Socialism. Rather by spreading more widely 
the communality of rural life, his country could : 
enjoy industrial progress and Liberalism without 
extinguishing the communist flame that burnt on in the 
'obshchina' [commune], and that the horrors of capitalist 
development could be avoided.^' 
Significantly, both Berlin and Kolakowski argue that there is no indication in 
Chenyshevsky's populism of his having been influenced by Marxism. For 
instance, there is no known evidence, Berlin writes, that his assertion that 
'the State is always the instrument of the dominant class, and cannot... 
embark on those necessary reforms, the success of which would end its own 
domination...'^°was in any way derived from the writings of Marx. 
in the early 1860s, while he was imprisoned for his outspoken views in St 
Petersburg's Peter and Paul Fortress, Chernyshevsky wrote the novel, whose 
historically resonant title was What is to be Done? Berlin characterises the 
work as 'a social Utopia' populated by the ' "new men" of the free, morally 
pure, cooperative socialist commonwealth of the f u t u r e . . D e s p i t e also 
being described as 'didactic, pedantic and boring'"and its 'harsh, flat, dull, 
humourless, grating sentences ...grotesque as a work of art,'^2it nonetheless 
has been credited with having had an extraordinary effect on public opinion in 
Russia in the later decades of the century.^'' Berlin argues that as the son of 
the provincial lower classes and therefore regarded as untainted by 
aristocratic self-indulgence or aestheticism, Chernyshevsky became the 
prototype of radical heroism and martrydom amongst the country's rebellious 
youth. He was much emulated for: 
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...his self-discipline, his dedication to the material and 
moral good of his fellow men, ...his self-effacing 
personality, the tireless, passionate, devoted, minute 
industry, the hatred of style...[and] indifference to the 
claims of private life.'^ 
As Kolakowski suggests less charitably, he is best characterized as a grim 
fanatic, who totally lacked any sense of humour. He adds that his personal 
style had a powerful effect on Lenin, who was not only one of his strongest 
admirers, but was 'an ideal specimen of the type Chernyshevsky portrayed... 
an intellectual...[for whom]any discussion which cannot be made to serve the 
revolution was idle chatter.'^'Lenin's own monograph. What Is To Be Done? is 
said to have been inspired by Chernyshevsky's novel of the same name.'^ So 
too was a scathing nonfiction work by Tolstoy published in 1886, whose title 
has been variously translated from Russian as What Is To Be Done? or 
alternatively as What Then Shall We do?, allegedly In deference to its 
deliberate biblical connotation, from Luke 3:10-14 where the crowds ask this 
question of Jesus Christ. In the book and in his letters to friends, Tolstoy 
railed against what he saw as Chernyshevsky's shallow, irreligious sloganising, 
his fundamental misunderstanding of peasant life, as well as the undeserved 
popularity of 'that bedbug-smelling gentleman.'^® He is said to have despised 
him for 'his dreary provincialism', 'his intolerance', and 'his maddening self-
assurance.'^' 
Berlin dismisses Chernyshevsky's liberal socialism as ultimately 'vague or 
inconsistent, and often both'.^" He claims that he preached an 
unsophisticated utilitarianism, and a theoretically confused populism, which 
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failed to adequately address the critical question of who would plan and 
control the transition to capitalism. ^^But Berlin does also judge him to have 
been a kind, sincere man, full of disarming moral charm, who 'at his worst-
was never impatient, or arrogant or inhumane...',^^ and who was repeatedly 
warning his readers that the good of the peasants did not mean 'to ram "our" 
remedies down "their" throats. 
After spending most of the last three decades of his life in prison and in exile 
in Siberia, Chernyshevsky died in the city of Saratov on the Volga River in 
1889. At least according to Berlin's portrait of him, it seems unlikely that he 
would have reciprocated Lenin's admiration for him. 
The Legacy of the Russian intelh'gentsia: 
As it happened, by the 1920s those who remained of Berlin's century's radical 
liberal intelligentsia were not to be tolerated by the new Bolshevik regime. 
Trotsky and Lenin, for example, were in the vanguard of a line of intellectuals 
across the decades of the twentieth century to write its obituary. In a 
pamphlet in the St Petersburg Review, written in 1910 in response to a 
lengthy opinion piece by social democrat Max Adler in the Wiener Arbeiter-
Zeitung, Trotsky had already condemned them as 'a corporation of priests of 
culture'^'' who were neither welcome in, nor relevant to, any socialist agenda. 
In 1917, Lenin reportedly was expressing the more savage view that their soft-
headed politics and venality meant that they had sold out to the bourgeoisie 
and that they were therefore enemies of the Bolshevik Revolution, deserving 
to be exterminated: 
No mercy for the enemies of the people...War to the 
death against the rich and their hangers-on, the 
Ibid. 
« Ibid. 
" Ibid. p264 
'•'Trotsky, Leon, The Inteltisentsia and Socialism, New York Publications, London 1965, p5 
bourgeois intellectuaL..the spawn of capitalism, the 
offspring of aristocratic and bourgeois society..." 
By contrast, in his discussion of the fate of Isaiah Berlin's radical 
intelligentsia. Pipes laments not only their fragmentation and decline, but 
that of what he celebrates as the whole, broad, splendid, cultured class in 
pre-Revolutionary Russia.^^ Unlike Berlin, he distinguishes two kinds of 
intelligentsia. Though he characterises both groupings as Westernisers, 
according to his terminology the 'philosophical' intelligentsia was composed 
of the narrowly philosophical, moderately left-of-centre liberals whose 
literary talents and missionary zeal are eulogised in Russian Thinkers. The 
'cultural' intelligentsia was a more diffuse, sociologically amorphous 
phenomenon, the political views of whose members were 'just as compatible 
with conservative as with liberal and radical a t t i t ude s .The latter's lifestyle 
often reflected the comfortable affluence of European secular society. In 
what was still a predominantly agricultural society In Russia, food and 
servants were inexpensive, which Pipes concludes somewhat airily 'provided 
an excellent environment for cultural and intellectual dilettantism in the best 
sense of the word.'^® 
As was the case, for example, with Herzen but certainly not with 
Chernyshevsky, membership of the two groups sometimes overlapped, 
particularly amongst those aristocrats with philosophical and vocational 
interests in common with the radical sons of the non-gentrified, white collar 
professions. More frequently they remained divided by class background and 
status. Here Pipes appears to be reflecting Lenin's analysis of the hierarchical 
social strata which had nurtured the intelligentsia, but obviously not his 
horrific prescriptions. 
" Lenin, Collected Works, Op.Cit. Vol 26, pp404-415 
™ Pipes. Op.Cit. pp50-54 
" Ibid. p47 
78 Ibid. p50 
In common with Bauman, Pipes also argues that both the philosophical and 
the cultural intelligentsia were in a terminal state of crisis a decade or more 
before Lenin's ideological damnation of them. Beginning in the final years of 
the century and continuing until the first decades of the Stalinist era, he 
writes, the combination of persecution, mass education and an increasingly 
'intense and ruthless industrialization ...knocked out the very social 
foundations from under it.'^' In its place emerged the salaried ranks of a 
technical and administrative semi-intelligentsia, whom Pipes describes as 
lacking the breadth of knowledge, spirit and intellectual sophistication of its 
forbears.®" 
With his reverence for traditional liberal arts education and his seeming 
nostalgia for the lost world of genteel conversation over a generous lunch in 
the manicured gardens of a dacha, Pipes' perspective appears both poignant 
and unapologetically elitist. In Bauman's less sentimental view, those fin de 
siecle members of the intelligentsia who chose not to linger on the margins of 
European society as a revered but declining coterie, transformed themselves 
into 'the trainers.' That is, they became the producers and purveyors of 
culture as a means of ensuring social order through indoctrination, of 
transforming social domination into a cultural hegemony. It is perspective 
that is redolent of the Gramscian notion that modernity is primarily a process 
of turning human beings into uncritical non-thinking personalities. 
Pipes' hopeful counterview is that the concept of the Soviet cultural 
intelligentsia after 1917 should be understood as 'inherently vague and 
evolving'.®^ Given the opacity of the communist regime, about which he was 
writing at the time, he suggests we should suspend judgment on the issue of 
its historical continuity. There may yet prove to be sound reasons, he says, 
why the spirit of critical opposition it embodied will not be so readily 
extinguished in the longer term. Paradoxically, he argues, even under the 
despotism of subsequent Soviet regimes, the classical heritage of Russia's 
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'single greatest glory',®^ its nineteenth century literature, permeated society. 
For Pipes, a rich and compassionate humanitarianism that enthralled the 
reader in worlds of understanding beyond Soviet communism was embodied in 
this literature. He points out that even during the Stalinist era, the works of 
Pushkin, Herzen, Chernyshevsky, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, and Chekhov were 
distributed in 'astronomical n u m b e r s . H e believes the result may be that its 
legacy will continue to endure through a process of cultural syncretism: 
The hold this culture exercises on Russians is so strong 
that through it a class which is historically dead acquires, 
posthumously, ever new heirs and successors. In 
particular, a fraction of the technical and administrative 
semi-intelligentsia of the second and third generation ... 
may be expected to model itself on it.®'' 
Nonetheless, Pipes's edited collection of essays on the intelligentsia was 
published in 1961 on the eve of Brezhnev's rise to power. The fall of 
Khrushchev was followed by the dismantling of many of his government's 
liberalizing reforms, which arguably had provided a brief springtime for those 
members of the cultured and semi-cultured strata who had survived Stalinism. 
The next section looks at the claims that the Brezhnev era's cultural and 
economic stagnation, exacerbated by his government's renewed repression of 
dissident artists and intellectuals, ensured the Russian intelligentsia's final 
obituary can now be written. 
The End of the Intelligentsia? 
This section begins with an exploration of the views of the contemporary 
Russian political analyst, Gleb Pavlovsky, whose life and times have spanned 
the implosion of communist society and the determined, though initially 
chaotic, struggle to reconstitute the New Russia under Yeltsin and then Putin. 
In particular, it explores Pavlovsky's historical ruminations about what he sees 
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as the cumulative ineffectiveness and ideological disarray that is a nnark of 
liberal intellectuals in post-Soviet Russia. In Pavlovsky's scathing judgment, 
Pipes's cultured intelligentsia are now 'a forgotten people,' largely irrelevant 
to the political demands of a modern, quasi-democratic society. 
It should be stressed though that this detailed focus on Pavlovsky's 
commentary on the fate of the so-called intelligentsia in his country during 
the last few decades is not meant to be interpreted as providing a definitive 
history. As it happens, much of what he says appears to be highly contested 
amongst intellectuals in Moscow and St Petersburg. As a result, his denial of 
the current conceptual validity of the term intelligentsia can be interpreted 
as an intensely ideologically-charged feature of wider debates about the 
perennial Russian question of 'What Is To Be Done? These debates, which span 
the political spectrum from the Left to the Right, are the subject of the next 
chapter. 
In ways that reflect Ivanov-Razumnik's interpretation of Herzen's 
autobiographical My Life and Times as an immanent subjectivist expression of 
the striving to pursue an engaged and exemplary life, Pavlovsky's highly 
articulate, opinionated descriptions of his own experiences and aspirations 
provide a significant portal through which to negotiate the murky terrain of 
contemporary Russian politics. Like Herzen too, humility has not been a 
notable feature of his self-definition. Nor have his innumerable critics been 
particularly consistent in assessing the contribution of his liberal-oriented 
intellectuality or committed political stances. Over time Pavlovsky has been 
variously portrayed as a liberal sell-out, an ultra-conservative, a pragmatist, a 
nihilist, a reformist, and a decadent opportunist. The underlying assumption 
in much of the commentary has been that the extent to which the voice of 
Liberalism is deemed to have been lost or gained in the Russian arena is 
inseparable from a shifting consensus about who is believed to have been 
either marginalized or the most skilled in the cynical, self-serving craft of 
elite politics. 
From his student days during the slow decay of communist rule, Pavlovsky's 
influential analyses and interviews indicate that he has sought with 
considerable success to position himself as a high-flying participant in the 
post-Soviet arena. By his own admission he has never aspired to be 'an 
impartial o b s e r v e r . T h e s e days, it seems, he has not only become a 
historian of the drifts of political ideas during his own life and times, but 
above all, of what he sees as the struggle within Russia to articulate a 
discourse that credibly charts the political landscape of Putin's world. The 
section begins with an account of his widespread denigration, both within 
Russia and in the West. 
A Case Study of Liberalism Lost? 
In part at least, much of the analysis of the alleged fortunes of the voices of 
Russia's intelligentsia since the end of the Cold War could be said to be 
typified by the characterisations of Pavlovsky as the Kremlin's longstanding, 
morally bankrupt 'political technologist.' In common with former British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair's communications strategist, Alasdair Campbell, or Bush 
Junior's master of 'junkyard dog politics,' Karl Rove, Pavlovsky's singular 
talents are said to have been shameless spin-doctoring, bogus polling, black 
PR, and running dirty tricks election campaigns. Moreover, his catchphrase, 
'the politics of no alternatives' has been seen as a calculated smokescreen for 
what is in reality an endorsement of Putin-style authoritarianism. 
Indeed, Pavlovsky's scurrilous reputation appears at times to have outstripped 
his so-called dirty deeds. In late 2004, for Instance, he was deployed by the 
Kremlin to Ukraine during the election campaign there, to provide strategic 
support to the pro-Russian presidential candidate, Viktor Yanukovych. Though 
the evidence is shaky and the criminal investigation by Ukrainian prosecutors 
has proved to be prolonged and Inconclusive, he was accused of ordering the 
dioxin poisoning of opposition, anti-Russia candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, 
which left his face badly disfigured. The allegation was based on a supposed 
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tapped telephone conversation, aired in 2005 on Kiev's Channel 5 television 
and v^hose authenticity has never been publicly substantiated. Not 
surprisingly perhaps, Pavlovsky has always strenuously denied the accusation 
as an absurd lie, claiming that initially 'I took it as a joke.'®^ He added that 
even as a joke, it was 'a bit vulgar for my taste',^'reminding him of the public 
panic created by Orson Welles' halloween radio episode of H.G. Wells' sci-fi 
novel, War of the Worlds, which simulated a news bulletin announcing a 
Martian invasion. 
Together with a handful of men who have been said to constitute the inner 
sanctum of the post-Soviet regime, he has also acquired the sobriquet of 'The 
Gray Cardinal,' with its implication of secretive and sinister manipulation of 
power. In the Western commentaries, it appears to be a popular nickname for 
Putin's high-flying supporters and is suggestive perhaps of Kennan's 
characterization in his 1946 Long Telegram to the US State Department of the 
unscrupulous, fearful, grovelling functionaries who he believed had buttressed 
the Stalin regime. According to media reports and analyses over recent years, 
the recipients include the oligarch Boris Berezovsky who fled to London in 
2000 following an acrimonious falling out with Putin and allegedly killed 
himself 13 years later; and Igor Sechin, who is said to be the leader of the 
Kremlin faction comprised of former intelligence agents (the siloviki) and is 
the current president of the gigantic, state-controlled oil company, Rosneft. 
Reputedly very close to Putin, Sechin's other russophobic epithets are 'Darth 
Vader' and 'the scariest man on earth.'®® 
Also on the list of Gray Cardinals are the expatriate multi-billionaire Sergei 
Pugachov, who allegedly funded the siloviki faction and is currently under 
investigation for corruption after fleeing Russia owing the government one 
billion dollars; Vladislav Surkov, said to be one of the Putin government's 
leading ideologues and the so-called 'puppetmaster' of managed or sovereign 
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democracy. Surkov's personal philosophy has been characterised as post-
modernist nihilism and his special talent as convincing Russians black means 
white.®' In addition, there is the former KGB officer, Yevgeny Shkolov, 
appointed in late 2012 to investigate illegal financial transactions by Russian 
officials. Described by the Kremlin as part of a post 2012 presidential 
election, anti-corruption initiative by Putin, his appointment was interpreted 
by some commentators as meaning the compilation of kompromat 
(compromising evidence) as an allegedly well-tried tactic amongst Russian 
intelligence operatives for controlling the country's businessmen, bureaucrats 
and politicians. 
Whether accurate or not, much in the above job descriptions and character 
assassinations are based on hearsay, emerging from the underbelly of Moscow-
based political gossip and repeated without much substantiation, especially in 
online blogs and journals such as La Russophobe or Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty's The Power Vertical. But even among this allegedly invidious list, 
Pavlovsky appears to be a more confusing figure. Born in 1951 in Odessa, he 
was a teenager during the Brezhnev era of economic and ideological 
stagnation which has been seen as culminating in the demise of the Soviet 
Union. As a young student dissident in Moscow in 1982, according to his 
somewhat obscure self-description, 'a Zen Marxist,' ' 'he was arrested for 
distributing samizdat copies of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelaso. 
Confronted with the likelihood of a long prison sentence, he has admitted to 
having collaborated with the authorities,'^ but 'during the trial backtracked 
on his testimony.'" In any event, he received a softer sentence of internal 
exile to the Komi Republic, approximately 1600 kilometers north-west of 
Moscow. Far from enduring a life of imprisonment with hard labour in sub-
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Arctic temperatures, he was employed there as a stoker and house 
painten^'^Three years later he returned to the capital just as perestroika 
under the newly-elected Secretary-General of the Communist Party, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, was gathering momentum. By September 1986 he had become 
what he describes as 'politically active,' helping to found the first legal 
'Social Initiatives Club' with the aim of critically engaging with the emerging 
ferment of ideas and ideologies. 
From this time, he also became a prominent, though factious, member of the 
dissident movement,'^ as evident, for example, in his establishment of the 
independent Post-Factum news agency in 1989. Until its demise in 1994, the 
agency disseminated its low-key coverage of Kremlin politics and assorted 
events across Russia to a limited array of domestic outlets, as well as to the 
Los Angeles Times on America's West Coast. During this time Pavlovsky also 
worked as editor-in-chief of Vek XX I Mir (Twentieth Century and the World) 
magazine, described as 'one of the most interesting publications of the 
perestroika era.' '^ In 1995 he established the think-tank. The Foundation for 
Effective Politics, for which he continues perhaps to be best known outside 
Russia. Under the aegis of the foundation, he is credited with having 
developed a successful new 'political language''^ through motifs, such as 
'stability', 'the Putin majority' or 'the politics of no alternatives' that are 
said to have been an influential determinant of the direction of post-Soviet 
politics. In particular, this 'informational support''® is said to have played a 
focal role in the campaign strategies behind Yeltsin's re-election in 1996, 
Putin's victories in 2000 and 2004, and Mevedev's ascendency to the 
presidency in 2008. 
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In other ways too Pavlovsky was an early exponent of what he behaved was a 
need to cultivate a 'political language,' that would bring meaning to the 
ideological void in post-Soviet society, especially through the opening up of 
social media. In 1997, for example, he helped to create one of Russia oldest 
online websites, Russkii Zhurnal (Russian Journal). Featuring literary and 
cultural commentary, the journal gathers expert scholarly analysis on national 
affairs and provides a link to an archive of reviews of high-profile books in 
Italian, English and Russian on political philosophy, religion, history and 
sociology, many of them from the West's most prestigious academic 
publishers. 
Throughout the last two decades, he is said to have helped to build an 
internet media conglomerate, which included the Russia-based websites, 
Lenta.ru, Vesti.ru and Strana.ru.'' Initially these were low budget sites that 
covered events in Russia and internationally, mainly through news aggregation 
by editorial teams of reports from Reuters, the BBC and domestic news 
agencies such as Ria Novosti, Itar-Tass or Interfax. In the early 2000s both 
Vesti.ru and Strana.ru were sold to the government-controlled. All Russia 
State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK). Strana-ru 
continues as an innocuous e-zine with a particular focus on feel-good 
travellers' tales from remote and colourful places in the Russian Federation. 
In 2014, Vesti.ru was providing a tabloid-style daily news round-up derived 
from its link to the television channel, Rossiya 24. Lenta.ru, which is 
currently owned by Russia's third largest internet and search engine company. 
Rambler Media Group, has become a popular online Russian/English 
newspaper and continues its mix of international and local coverage, for 
example, with a headline story about the birth of a baby boy to the Duke and 
Duchess of Cambridge, with other stories about the fortunes of Russia's 
national football team, and the release of a man briefly detained during a 
street protest in support of dissident Alexei Navalny.'°° In short, the news 
site mirrors the proliferation of similar sites in the West. By implication, 
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whatever Pavlovsky's lamentations about the absence of a constructive 
intellectual debate about his country's political directions, the result of his 
initiatives seems to have been to facilitate the creation of a mainstream 
monopolistic media, for which the ideological ruminations of the dissident 
movement and the post-communist role of the liberal intelligentsia have 
become largely incidental issues. These days, his most provocative 
commentary can be found in conversations with friends and acquaintances on 
blogsites such as Facebook. 
To many of his critics, especially those among the sympathizers with the post-
Cold War Opposition Movement, Pavlovsky simply remains a would-be liberal 
with a shady past who finally lost all morality in the service of the 
government of crooks and the thieves^°^ in the Kremlin. In their eyes, his 
'greatest sin was to support a regime controlled by former enemy-spooks.'^ 
Moreover, others among the ranks of his critics, such as the Russian liberal 
thinker, Lilia Shevtsova, from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
in Moscow, have suggested his inflated self-regard and simple-minded 
nationalist sentiments often resulted in pronouncements defending the 
current domestic and foreign policies of his beloved Russia that she claims 
were l u d i c r o u s . I n particular, she points to a collection of essays entitled 
What does Russia Think? which was compiled from a 2009 conference 
sponsored by the European Council on Foreign Relations. In the Afterword, 
Pavlovsky describes 'the reality of global Russia'^"'' in terms of its central 
contribution to international security through its containment of Islamist 
terrorism in Chechnya, thus preventing it 'from turning into a global force like 
Al Qaeda.'^''^ As well, it has promoted global peace and security by helping 
'other new nations in Eastern Europe create identities of their 
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own.'^°^Shevtsova's scornful response is that this latter view would probably 
come as a surprise to many Eastern Europeans 
More interestingly, in this context, Pavlovsky gives a provocative account of 
the dilemmas confronting what he sees as Russia's adherence to a high-
minded internationalist stance on foreign policy. Consider, for example, his 
claim that his country plays a leading role in the security of Eurasia. In 
contrast to the hypocrisy of the US or the ED, for Pavlovsky this demonstrates 
a genuine Russian commitment to a cosmopolitan liberal legal order. 'In the 
words of Boris Mezhuyev,' he writes, '"Pity the Hobbes who does not dream of 
becoming Kant!'"'"® Instead the reality is the determined, uncompromising 
hegemony of the US. Unlike Russia, he says, the American-dominated Western 
powers are driven by little beyond crude self-interest in a continuing Great 
Game in which: 
Russia is expected to play the role of a global caryatid 
that always provides external support but is never 
invited inside the building...from an American point of 
view, the new Russia is either still the former Soviet 
Union or else an inchoate state a blank spot on the map 
somehow supplied with strategic armaments and 
sovereignty for no good reason.^"' 
And the Western responses to such views? For a start, there has been a 
familiar insistence of the credibility gap between Russia's declared intentions 
and its actions. Apart from the crises in Syria and Ukraine, an example is the 
unresolved trilateral hostility involving Abkhazia, Georgia and the Putin 
regime in the wake of the 2008 regional war which included the Russian 
invasion of Georgia. In its report almost half a decade after the cessation of 
the fighting, the International Crisis Group (ICG) has appealed for constructive 
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diplomacy to help ensure stronger initiatives to address the misery that has 
been the consequence of more than 20 years of regional warfare. In 
diplomat-speak these include dealing with 'basic security-related and 
humanitarian issues;'""confidence building and violence prevention measures; 
and the alleviation of the plight of more than 280000 Georgian Internally 
displaced persons.(IDPs)"^ The ICG report concluded that 'Russia's lack of 
implementation of the EU-brokered 2008 ceasefire agreement...remain(s) of 
fundamental importance,'"^as an obstacle to providing aid to the region's 
various ethnic minorities. 
In sum, at least on this issue, perhaps even the most sympathetic fellow 
travellers might find it difficult to unravel the enigma of Pavlovsky's notion of 
Russia's ethical cosmopolitanism, an issue that will be explored In the final 
chapter. Still, especially since its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan there has been 
an increasingly pervasive sense among the West's liberals that any accusation 
of sanctimoniousness in American foreign policy might often be justified. In 
defence of Pavlovsky's views, the unheeded warning by Russia's security 
services, some months before the 2013 Boston marathon bombings, of a likely 
terrorist threat to America from a group of Chechens evokes a sense that the 
Kremlin's motivation might perhaps have been more humane than self-
interested. As Hill argues, since his first term as president in 2000 and the 
events of 9/11, Putin has consistently maintained that coordinating anti-
terrorism measures, especially in Chechnya 'was his central idea for Russian-
US cooperation'."^ 
Nevertheless, as Hill also points out, the FBI's failure to take heed of the 
intelligence gathered by the Russians in Chechnya as part of their continuing 
surveillance operations there simply demonstrates that It is extremely 
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unlikely that the two countries can find way to work together beyond the 
occasional limited counter-terrorism measures. This is despite the reality that 
geopolitical self-interest and realpolitik has meant a somewhat unsteady 
commitment to ethical cosmopolitanism on both sides. More specifically, 
there has been little distinguish the methods used in dealing with terrorist 
suspects whether in the North Caucasus, in Iraq, or in Afghanistan. From a 
Russian perspective. Hill points out: 
They have conducted targeted assassinations, we have 
conducted assassinations. They have used car bombs and 
missiles, we use unmanned drones. We accuse them of 
abuses. They accuse us of the same abuses. 
By implication, according to Hill at least, in critical matters of foreign policy 
not much appears to have changed in US-Russia relations since the end of the 
Cold War. For the new Cold War warriors, the answer to Pavlovsky's assertion 
that his country's place is firmly on the moral high ground in matters of 
international law is most often the straightforward counterclaim that moral 
hypocrisy is the traditional bailiwick of the Russians. 'Throw in Putin's KGB 
background,' Kotkin writes, 'and all the lingering emotions and politics of the 
Cold War, and Russia's ostensible singularity becomes m a g n i f i e d . A n d 
whatever Pavlovsky's public statements to the contrary, the Putin regime is at 
heart suspicious and scornful of the West, especially of the US; as well as 
expansionist in its determination to re-consolidate its traditional spheres of 
influence, not least in North Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East; as 
well as self-aggrandizing in Its sense of entitlement as a major participant In 
international affairs. As an exponent of the Realist school of international 
relations, Bobo Lo claims, 'Putin's vision of Russia as a re-emerging global 
power means that the US ...will remain the primary reference point of Russian 
foreign policy. This bias reflects a strategic culture rooted in hard power and 
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geopolitical priorities.'"^ Interestingly, if the reference to Putin in the above 
is excluded, Lo's connmentary could have been v^ritten almost anytime during 
the last 70 years. This theme too v^ill be considered in more detail in the last 
chapter, especially with regard to Russia's role in the Syria's civil v/ar and its 
cosmopolitan, conciliatory initiative to abolish the use of chemical weapons in 
that country. 
As many of Pavlovsky's critics have argued, it should come as no surprise that 
he has been demonized as an integral part of what they believe are the 
hubristic geopolitics and corruption of post-communist Russian elites. Among 
such critics is the small cohort of intellectuals, artists, philosophers and 
writers from an 'anti-liberal, communist and internationalist"^ collective 
called by the resonant historical title, Chto Delat/What is to be done? During 
the last decade, its collaborative works have been exhibited across Western 
Europe, in London and in Australia. Like the liberal Shevtsova, the collective 
has singled out Pavlovsky as a target of its derision, though in language that is 
considerably more castigating. It accuses him of having become from 1996 
'the principal beneficiary of the Kremlin's ideological commissions', who not 
only 'doesn't believe a word he utters,' but also promotes 'extreme anti-
westernism and the Putin personality cult.'"® It also claims that, as well as 
being a professional liar and somewhat of a fanatic, 'he has now settled on an 
ultra-rightest version of nationalist and imperialist conservatism.'" ' 
In an open letter to the French communist, Alain Badiou, published in its 
online newspaper in 2008, the collective made a successful appeal to a fellow 
member of 'the great contemporary liberation m o v e m e n t . T h e y had asked 
Badiou to reject Pavlovsky's invitation to visit Russia, on the grounds he has 
become 'a frank collaborationist and a businessman trading in propaganda. 
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exploiting the impoverished social and economic status of Russian 
intellectuals and thus turning them into cynical servants of p o w e r . I n other 
v/ords, whatever Pavlovsky's pretensions about creating a new language of 
politics, he should be dismissed as a post-Soviet opportunist, rather than 
considered to be either a credible political theorist or an intellectual of any 
depth of understanding. 
Formed in 2003 in the city of the first workers' soviets in 1917, St Petersburg, 
the Chto Delat Collective self-consciously derived its name from the iconic 
writings of Chernyshevsky and Lenin of a century or so ago, discussed in the 
last chapter. The group describes itself in language deliberately reminiscent 
of those more revolutionary times as: 'a self organizing platform for cultural 
workers intent on politicizing their "knowledge production"....^^^ As a 
platform, the core collective has a flexible, project-oriented membership of 
fewer than a dozen, while also describing itself optimistically as part of a 
growing global network that. Inside Russia at least, currently includes the 
Forward Socialist Movement, the Pyotr Alexeev Resistance Movement, and the 
Moscow-based Institute for Collective Action, headed by the vocal French 
sociologist, Carine Clement. However, despite its heart-felt, neo-Marxist 
aspirations, it is not clear Chto Delat will continue its collaborative political 
and artistic endeavours to elucidate the images and Inner landscapes that it 
believes define contemporary Russia. In May 2013, the group appears to have 
shared the fate of many earlier socialist collectives, especially in the West, 
with the announcement of the termination of its blog site due to 
'irreconcilable differences between the editorial staff of Chtodelat News and 
the Chto Delat work group. 
Ironically, after almost two decades as a controversial, self-designated policy 
advisor to the Kremlin, Pavlovsky appears to have shared an analogous fate. 
In April, 2011 the Putin government appeared to have decided that he was 
one of Isaiah Berlin's 'feeble flotsam' who had not so much missed 'the bus of 
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history' as deserving to be figuratively thrown under it. His special, semi-
official, high-status access to the regime's elite insiders was withdrawn, 
reportedly because of his vocal support for Medvedev as the preferred 
candidate in the March 2012 presidential election. His political agitations on 
this issue had allegedly included a reference to Putin as 'deadwood.'^ 
Elsewhere Pavlovsky has obliquely suggested that a quote from a member of 
the century Russian intelligentsia and Herzen associate, Vissarion Belinsky, 
provides a more appropriate explanation of the reasons for his dismissal: 
'Unfortunately for oneself, one's too smart, too gifted, knew too much and 
could not hide one's s u p e r i o r i t y . I n December 2011, he published a caustic 
satire of Putinology with the mockingly self-congratulatory title of The Genius 
of Power! A Dictionary of the Kremlin's Abstractions. 
Despite the scorn of his critics, since Pavolvsky's ejection from the corridors 
of power in 2011, he has gradually emerged as a considerably less diabolical 
character. Instead, in media and academic analyses, which are frequently 
written by members of the same group of Russia commentators, he has begun 
to appear more acceptable as a politically committed but now marginal public 
intellectual. Though a patriot, he is now seen as accessibly trans-cultural in 
his articulation of his country's perspectives. His own writings are 
embellished with references to literary and popular culture from both his 
homeland and from the West. These have included, for example, what he 
describes as the irrelevant, 'ancient writings' of Dostoevsky in The Brothers 
Karamazov on the cultural mystery exemplified by Russia; or the suite of 
poems attempting to decipher the Russian soul by the early century fellow 
traveller, Austrian poet Rainer Maria Rilke; or the main currents in Western 
political theory, especially the works of Kant; or the legacy of century 
Russian legal philosophy; or more prosaically a radio production by Orson 
Welles. 
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In interviews and in his online journals, he has continued in his self-styled role 
as an energetic and occasionally satirical commentator on the daily clamour 
of his country's politics, not least as a provider of catchy one-liners for 
foreign journalists from the major British and American broadsheets, such as 
The New York Times, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. He has become 
a regular contributor to the Russia coverage by the American global news 
agency, Bloombers News, whose online reports include a puffbox citing 
Pavlovsky. Like his predecessor, Herzen, his public face increasingly appears 
to be as part sceptic and part idealist, on the one hand conjuring a cynical, 
scathing disenchantment with the post-Soviet turn of events, while at the 
same appearing to hold to the tacit belief that circumstances are fluid, 
transitional and open to change, if approached appropriately. It is a mindset 
he no doubt shares with the majority of true believers in the transformative 
power of political systems, whether of the Right or the Left, anywhere in the 
world. 
So How Exactly to Characterize Pavlovsky's Political Persuasions? 
As the conclusions drawn so far in this chapter and in the last one about the 
importance of contextual iz ing abstract ions such as democracy, 
authoritarianism or even the concept of the intelligentsia in contemporary 
Russia might suggest, the challenge in answering the above question is how to 
negotiate the foggy terrain of terminology. As a reflection of current 
circumstances in Russia, what might Pavlovsky's alleged liberal conservatism 
really imply? Or his dismissal of the Intelligentsia as moral egoists? Or his 
apparent despair of liberals generally? Or his relentless condemnation of Putin 
in the aftermath of the 2012 Presidential election? Or his suspicions about 
the political meanlngfulness of the dissident protest movement? 
One of his most comprehensive interviews was carried out by the European 
Council on Foreign Relations' Ivan Krastev and his colleague, Tatiana 
Zhurzhenko, just before his fall from grace under the Putin regime. In it, 
Pavlovsky describes his own path to effective politics, richly embedding it in 
what he believes are the terminal failures and timidity of the last remnants of 
Russia's intelligentsia. In the 1960s its members were those survivors of 
Stalinism who have been described somewhat inaccurately as Zhivago's 
children ^^'and whom Pavlovsky now rejects as insignificant. Contrary to 
Pipes' wishful thinking, he says, their education in Russia's high culture has 
not ensured they have had much influence in their country's future. 
Pavlovsky's primary focus is on their role across the years from the end of the 
Khrushchev thaw in what he sees as the intensified hollowing out of the world 
of effective politics that reached its nadir during the debacle of Yeltsin's rule 
in the early 1990s. In translation at least, his extended interview resonates 
with what poet Kirill Medvedev characterizes as a kind of confessional post-
post-modernist new sincerity, which he claims is currently fashionable in 
Moscow's intellectual circles and which appeals 'to biographical experience as 
a zone of authenticity.'^" 
Pavlovsky's account begins with his embittered obituary to the intelligentsia. 
As a member of the generation that reached maturity in the 1960s and 1970s 
during the period of liberalization that was an integral feature of 
Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation, Pavlovsky believes he witnessed directly both 
the destruction from above and the complicit self-destruction of this 
traditionally revered, cultured sector of society. At the same time he stresses 
that overwhelmingly its members were never liberals in any Berlinian sense of 
an unequivocal pluralist embrace of the negative liberty of the individual and 
an abiding distrust of collectivist dreams. Rather as Pipes has argued, they 
emerged from a professional stratum of highly-educated, privileged 
intellectuals, doctors, academics, writers and scientists, whom Pavlovsky 
describes as 'the Stalinist Soviet man liberated of S t a l i n . H e also 
characterizes them as a kind of 'in-between generation who often believed in 
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the potential of Khrushchev's 'Soviet power "with a human face.'"^^' That is, 
in general they were pacifist, idealistic, liberal-minded socialists : 
People toughened by Stalin's industrial ethics and by the 
labour quotas they had to meet or face the gulags... 
incapable of not doing their job well, they were simply 
too scared.•I 
In the years of the thaw after Stalin's death, Pavlovsky claims, this fear had 
been tempered by hope and a progressive spiritJ^^ Memories of 'past 
h o r r o r s , h e says, had inspired 'this incredibly optimistic culture...There was 
a sense that everything terrible was over.'^" 
But not for very long. By the late 1970s, he contends, as a result of 
Brezhnev's firm grip on the reins of power, the ranks of this cultural 
intelligentsia had again been depleted to the point of political unimportance. 
Central to this was the backlash instigated by the government against the 
wave of protests that followed the 1968 Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
According to Pavlovsky's account, it had taken little more than half a dozen 
years for the Kremlin to destroy the loose alliances that constituted the 
dissident movement at that time, including the last of the liberal 
intelligentsia which had been an integral part of it. During the years of 
Brezhnev domination. Increasing numbers of civil activists were exiled or 
imprisoned in the gulags, not only those from Moscow but also 'from 
Kharkov, Odessa, Lvov, Leningrad, Tbilisi, Baku, Erevan cosmopolitan 
centres, capitals with a tradition of intelligentsia.'^^''In addition, there was his 
government's strategic partial opening of the borders, which deliberately 
aimed to foster the migration of cultured, urban Jewish professionals to Israel 
Ibid. 
" 0 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
" 3 Ibid. 
" " Ibid. p2 
or the United States. As well there was the 'mercenary'^" submissiveness of 
high profile artists and intellectuals to the authorities in exchange for KGB 
permission to travel to Paris or LondonJ^^ These were years, Pavlovsky says, 
during which he witnessed directly the recreation of a climate of fear that 
effectively deterred a new generation from filling the void left by people who 
had been arrested,"^ or who had left, or had been forced to leave, for the 
West.138 
Despite the fixation on the Soviet Union's dissidents by the West's Cold War 
liberals, Pavlovsky claims the 1960's generation should not be remembered as 
especially heroic in the face of the regime's renewed oppression. In common 
with their century predecessors, theirs was a case of lost opportunities and a 
naive embrace of 'moral purity' rather than an effective engagement with 
political power. And in the following years through the rise and fall of 
Gorbachev, nor did they have much understanding of the 'opportunities and 
risks,inherent in his particular policies. In this context, Pavlovsky's 
judgment of some of the West's most respected Russian anti-communists, such 
as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner, is harsh and 
dismissive. Initially, he says, such members of the intelligentsia had been 
committed to what he calls 'Soviet Republicanism',^'*°that is to the Eastern 
European model of action, represented by Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and 
later Poland's Solidarity. This approach was 'based on a public stance taken 
by prominent intellectuals willing to interfere in public affairs.' The 
problem, Pavlovsky says, was that there was no precedent for such activism in 
his country, nor a unity of voice or sense of leadership amongst its high-profile 
representatives. As he puts it: 
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I realized this very distinctly when Adam Michnik came to 
Moscow during at the time of the Round table talks in 
Poland to reach an agreement on Soviet non-
interference. And I remember thinking at the time that 
it would have been impossible for us to frame our goals 
in these terms in our countryJ"*^ 
For the most part, he says, this liberal intelligentsia turned out not to be 
supporters of the wider dissident movement, but rather singularly nationalist, 
anti-Leftist and anti-Totalitarian. Moreover, he accuses them of having lived 
out the years of oppression under Brezhnev's rule by retreating Into their 
dachas and nurturing their private consciences. For Pavlovsky, his youthful 
disenchantment with Russia's post-Stalinist/post-Cold War so-called Liberalism 
was vindicated by their failure to take a stand on behalf of the imprisoned 
dissidents, who were 'their own people after all'.^''^ He believes it not only 
revealed to him their blind cowardice, but also that by any assessment of 
their actual impact within Soviet society they had proved themselves to be 
'politically impotent and s t e r i l e ' . B y the beginning of the 1980s, he claims, 
those that remained of the movement had simply become a small sect of 
human rights moralists who increasingly sought to derive their legitimacy 
through their appeals to the international community: 
The argument was that since we've failed to cultivate 
strong public opinion in our own country, let's use the 
International one. The West became "the raw material 
provider" of the Soviet dissident movement, Kant is dead 
- or he left the USSR on an Israeli visa - and Kissinger, 
C a r t e r and R e a g a n b e c a m e the new m o r a l 
authorities....But who were the Soviet authorities 




community, and what about? We had nothing to propose 
and we did not pose a real challenge 
In 1993 with the failed anti-Yeltsin coup, Pavlovsky says he was forced to 
accept that what remained of a liberalizing form of Communist rule had 
clearly 'fallen a p a r t . H e believes Yeltsin had successfully destroyed 'not 
just the Soviet Union,'^'•^but an ideal arena, that had been fostered by 
perestroika, for free debate about the new socio-economic and political 
models that were being tested in his countryJ^i^As an ambitious member of 
the emergent inner circles of power, Pavlovsky says now turned to 'political 
technology' which he defines as expertise in 'the politics of non political 
p o w e r . H e also describes it as the strategic manipulation of electoral and 
grass-roots politics to ensure the consolidation of government by a reformist 
liberal elite. Such a regime embodies an archaic ' m a n o r i a l ' ^ ^ o form of power. 
In other words, although lacking in genuine democratic representation, it sees 
itself as governing on the people's behalf, and pays careful heed to their 
expressed needs and wants.^^^ Here Pavlovsky characterizes it in terms of a 
radical liberal conservatism that brings together: 
...the platform of Liberalism on the one hand and that of 
mass social populism on the other. A peculiar option, 
something similar to the Tea Party in the US: a rightwing 
programme couched in leftist terms. 
A half a lifetime later, Pavlovsky's central preoccupations remain the fragility 
of liberal reform in Russia; its losses and gains under Putin; the Insignificance 
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of the dissident movement immediately before the fall of Communism and 
ever since that time; and the moral and political responsibility of his country's 
elite intellectuals to strive to ensure that Russia's future is better than its 
past. Significantly, throughout his very lengthy interviev/ with the European 
Council for Foreign Relations, he consistently uses the plural pronoun 'we' in 
the discussions about Russia's liberals. Similarly, his scornful denial of the 
existence of a credible contemporary intelligentsia appear to be the attack of 
an insider, of some-one whose deliberate self-construction is as an 
exceptional, recalcitrant kind of intellectual. 
Ironically, his oppositional stance and relentless monitoring of Russia's 
political and cultural directions thus appear to qualify him at the very least 
for membership of a modern-day cultural intelligentsia, however decimated 
its ranks may be. That is, by implication he emerges as having a great deal in 
common with Pipes's catch-all definition of the classic Russian intelligentsia 
as composed of nationalistic, aspirational, cultured individuals with critically-
thinking personalities. 
CHAPTER THREE 
FINDING AUTHORITARIANISM IN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN'S RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 
In France, revolutionary tyranny is an evil belonging to a 
state of transition; in Russia despotic tyranny is 
permanent. 
Astolphe de Custine, 1843. 
Russia is a tyranny, the vilest tyranny that ever existed. 
The great mass of Russian people are gripped by a gang 
of cosmopolitan adventurers, v^ho have settled down on 
the country like vultures and are tearing it apart. 
Winston Churchill, 1924. 
So now you know why I shall never offer anything to the 
Washington Post again. The lofty gaiety of my writing is 
unsuited to the brisk thudding of its middle of the road 
cliches. 
Isaiah Berlin, Collected Letters 1928-46 
One of the Cold War commonplaces about Russia, notably expressed for 
example by George Kennan, was its abiding embrace of authoritarianism. 
From Catherine the Great's savage massacre of the peasants following the 
Pugachev rebellion in the 1770s, to the slaughter by Tsar Nicholas I of the 
Decembrist sons of the nobility in 1825, to Stalin's gulags, whether Tsarist or 
Communist, successive regimes have been characterised in terms of a highly-
centralized, personalized power structure, with an intolerance of dissidence 
that too easily descended into barbaric brutality. Living beyond Europe's 
farthest edge, Russia's peoples are said to have been bypassed by 
Enlightenment modernity, the rise of liberal constitutionalism in the West^ 
and the gradual entrenchment of concepts of individual rights and democratic 
freedoms. 
For many writers and scholars, from Russia's sympathisers to its severest 
critics, this history of authoritarian governance is at the heart of centuries of 
tragedy.^ It has meant that generations of v^ould-be liberals have had no 
homegrown political experience of the ideas and institutions that might have 
fostered a path to a future other than that of twentieth century 
totalitarianism and its aftermath. Instead its legacy is said to be a toxic mix 
of Slavic exceptionalism, a defensive, isolationist nationalism based on the 
alleged communalism of Mother Russia's children, and, paradoxically, 
Russians' love of strong leadership that is written into their genetic code. 
For those commentators inspired by such Cold War thinking, it is a legacy that 
continues to inform contemporary politics. Their assumption is that Putin's 
reclaiming of the presidency In March 2012 is part of a decade-long reversion 
to the structures of authoritarianism. In consolidating a 'power vertical,' he 
is simply drawing on his country's traditions, in which there has been little 
room for liberal voices, or indeed for opposition of any kind. 
The following chapter critically considers these assumptions regarding Putin's 
authoritarianism. It is divided Into two sections. The first section considers 
the view that Russia's centuries- long succession of authoritarian regimes is a 
likely determining feature of its post-Cold War politics. It argues that the 
conceptual framework underpinning revelations about the descent Into 
authoritarianism in contemporary Russia is neither clear nor conclusive. It 
should be emphasized that this approach is not driven by any kind of 
etymological pedantry about Inappropriate trans-cultural terminology. Nor 
does the conclusion imply that this turn of events In Russian governance might 
not be taking place, though an evaluation of the research so far does suggest 
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that this is not an easy matter to be certain about. Rather the claim is that 
the conceptual basis for asserting it is distorted by self-serving ideological 
presumptions and crude comparisons of alleged civilizational trajectories. 
'Unfortunately in political thought,' British political philosopher John Gray 
observed, 'the aim of inquiry is rarely to test basic beliefs. More commonly it 
is to insulate those beliefs from refutation by e v e n t s . T h e concern is that 
one of the lessons of the Cold War is that understanding how far and in v^hat 
ways contemporary Russia might be understood to be authoritarian matters a 
great deal in terms of Western political, cultural, economic and security 
initiatives, which are based on assessments of the fragility of the current 
regime's grip on power and of where the country might be heading. 
The second section develops this scepticism about depictions of Russian 
authoritarianism through a critical look at contemporary sociological 
perspectives. Its starting point is the shift away from Cold War academic 
studies that primarily were concerned with comparing the singular virtues and 
faults of American democracy against the multifaceted iniquities of Soviet 
communism. Following Fukuyama's work,"* the comparisons these days are 
internationalist, and much exercised by the complications of laying down the 
route map/s to the 'end of history'. The section considers a selection from 
the plethora of global statistical surveys that point to authoritarian attitudes 
and trends under the Putin regime, as well as appearing to lend empirical 
support to the widespread vilification of Russia as 'a potage of poverty, crime, 
corruption and extreme terrorism.'^ 
Section One: 
Assertions of Russians' racial characteristics and cultural mindsets are often 
dismissed by the more tolerant citizens of the West as either trite or tainted 
by prejudice. Or they are seen as belonging in the kind of tub-thumping 
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political rhetoric that is likely to be more revealing of the flawed biases of 
the speaker than providing credible insights into the world of contemporary 
Russia. To paraphrase Martin Malia: 'Tell me someone's domestic politics, and 
I will tell you his/her perception of the Soviet Union and its aftermath.'^ 
Making sense of claims about an atavistic Slavic embrace of authoritarianism 
embodies a tangle of daunting and long-standing philosophical and 
methodological challenges. Central to these challenges is the question of the 
interaction between ideas and actualities, between historical narratives about 
Russia and what is perceived to be actually happening in the country today. 
With what certainty can a so-called entrenched authoritarian political culture 
be deemed to shape and constrain the way power is structured and functions 
under the Putin regime? In particular, what perceptual continuities and 
discontinuities might be said to serve the re-creation of an understanding of 
Russia in a post-Cold War multi-polar world? As the LSE scholar, the late 
Phillip Windsor observed, the fall of communism marked '"the end of an 
empire" - not the Soviet one, but political science'.^ In its place an 
international academic industry has arisen devoted to trying to make 
comparative sense of the government that has emerged from the deluge. This 
includes the considerations of modernization theory, democratisation 
trajectories, authoritarian reversals, and transitional states. As acknowledged 
in recent academic research, there remains a great deal of research work yet 
to be done. 
How persuasive then are today's Western interpretations of the ways that 
whatever liberal ideas may flourish among Russia's intellectuals appear to be 
unable to find 'a welcome among the masses and acquire the driving force of 
a political passion?'® As suggested in the previous chapter, tacitly such an 
approach assumes the Hegelian notion that once a certain kind of elite 
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understanding comes to dominate an era, the rest of society cannot hold out 
for long. Thus the question becomes how to account for a political dynamic, 
in which the virtues of Liberalism are notable for their absence as a strong, 
positive theme in contemporary Russian thought. 
Is Liberalism simply waiting in the wings, poised to take flight with the 
flowering of civil society, as many of today's fellow-travelling Westerners 
fondly hope? Or is it a matter of the rekindling of the older, pre-Bolshevik 
stream of liberal pluralist thought that was the focus of Isaiah Berlin's 
scholarship. Here the claim could be that the dynamic of change might best 
be understood through a careful study, for example, of the methods by which 
the Putin government has subverted dissent using its autocratic controls on 
the legal or electoral systems, or the media. For the new Cold War warriors 
in particular, this approach has ensured a ready leap to judgment about 
contemporary Russia's regression to despotism. 
Underpinning such threads of debate is the problem of the perverse, open-
ended 'cunning of contingency,'' of the interplay of chance and the 
constraints of circumstance that also influences our narrations of the 
interactions of ideas and actuality, if only with hindsight. As philosopher 
Leszek Kolakowski writes: 
There is abundant evidence that all social movements 
are to be explained by a variety of circumstances and 
that the ideological sources to which they appeal, and to 
which they seek to remain faithful, are only one of the 
factors determining the form they assume and their 
patterns of thought and action.^" 
Both historically and sociologically, the challenge is how plausibly to account 
for the 'variety of circumstances,' which in reality can be comprised of thick, 
tangled knots of complexity, or alternatively an almost inexhaustible 
catalogue of necessary conditions. The implication too is that though there is 
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a great deal about Russia to observe and reflect upon, there remains much 
essential information that may elude us. This is not to suggest that the 
current government operates within the 'poisonous atmosphere of oriental 
secrecy and conspiracy' which Kennan wrote characterized Stalin's Soviet 
Union." Instead, to paraphrase Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, in face of 
the frequent blurring of the boundaries between insight, conjecture and more 
solid, evidence-based analysis, the choice is always between the view: 'like it 
or not, nothing else could have happened;' or the alternative: 'but for 
unavoidable errors or accidents none of this need have happened. 
With regard to the issue of Russian authoritarianism, this choice tacitly 
represents a contentious demarcation line between the new Cold War warriors 
and the post-Soviet Union's more sympathetic fellow travellers. For the 
former, the weight of political tradition ensures that the Putin government's 
so-called descent into authoritarianism has a doomsayer's inevitability. For 
the latter, such cultural and political determinism is unjustified. As Reddaway 
and Glinski argue, the denial that there always exist other courses of action 
for both individuals and nations suggests 'a poverty of imagination - or a lack 
of will - in those whose interests and beliefs would favour a different path of 
development.'^^Thus for today's optimistic fellow travellers there is an 
abiding need for the West to recognize that Russia may well be riding a 
fortuitous tide into a future where they can realise their own singular vision 
of an inclusive and stable world. 
This last view is elegantly and movingly expressed in the later writings of 
George Kennan. Though generally branded as the architect of America's Cold 
War Containment Doctrine, Kennan came to wear the epithet like a curse. 
For much of his post-diplomatic career as one of the United States' foremost 
public intellectuals, he lamented the ways the doctrine had been distorted to 
justify militant anti-communism and the deranged Realism of the Rand 
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Corporation. He believed this path 'as much as any other cause, led to [the] 
40 years of unnecessary, fearfully expensive and disoriented process of the 
Cold War.'^'' In a prescient statement about the folly liable to be manifest in 
American foreign policy towards contemporary Russia, Kennan warned that his 
government should recognize that: 
it is destined to move through the forest of international 
events like a man with some sort of muscular affliction, 
obliging him to perform purposeless and self- defeating 
movements and, recognizing this, that the government 
will avoid getting into games which call for the utmost 
coordination and control of muscular powerJ^ 
In an earlier monograph on the century Russian travelogue, 'Letters from 
Russia,' by the French aristocrat, the Marquis de Custine, Kennan evoked an 
alternative concept of Russia, which would be 'the opposite pole to all the 
brutality, the callousness, the meanness of spirit,'^^ evident in the country's 
history. Echoing Isaiah Berlin's views, he writes that the forces of Liberalism 
in Russia's late and early twentieth century also 'had their roots in what one 
would have thought was unhopeful soil:'^^ 
...that they survived, and eventually manifested 
themselves, and grew was the reflection of a certain 
ineradicable, defiant faith in the value of the human 
individual and meaningfulness of human experience.'^® 
Repeatedly during his long career, Kennan stressed the need for an informed 
but humane Western sensibility towards Russia, in the face of which any 
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assumption that its people might in some final analysis prove to be an alien 
and incomprehensible 'other' was a nonsense. Still, as a former professional 
diplomat with a firm belief in his own good judgment, he wrote that 
psychologically the mass of Russians appeared to be at least partly complicit 
in the institutionalization of authoritarianism in their country, rather than 
merely its wretched victims. It was a view that resonated with that of many 
Russian intellectuals of former eras, such as Alexander Herzen or novelist Ivan 
Turgenev, with whose work Kennan was familiar. 
Kennan, though, was a man of his time, though an exceptionally astute one. 
As a member of the first United States diplomatic mission to the Soviet Union 
in 1933, he witnessed first-hand the unquestioning zeal of Stalin's minions 
during one of the Show Trials' prosecutions of doomed, terrified men.^' He 
believed the experience had taught him that there were no easy answers to 
the question of what singular elements can nurture and fashion such an 
authoritarian regime - Russian tradition, political and economic 
circumstances, or the national characteristics of a sometimes pitiless and 
cruel folk. Or perhaps it was a fundamental aspect of the general human 
condition that repeatedly in history had demonstrated that the repulsive 
methods used by a country's leadership are able to take advantage of and 
manipulate 'the helpless corner of man's psychic structure....this Achilles' 
heel in (our) moral composition' that makes us weak and cowardlyT^" It was a 
question, Kennan wrote, that 'is still as valid as the day it was first stated.' ^^  
Admittedly, though, these observations were written in 1946 in response to 
the barbaric, barely-comprehensible realities of Stalinism and Nazism. Still, 
they serve as a reminder that we do not yet have an answer to whether 
authoritarianism is a universal potential anchored in flawed human nature, or 
a case of Russian or German extreme moral exceptionalism. For Kennan, this 
uncertainty meant we have no option but to defiantly embrace 'the supreme 
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make-believe'"that progress would ensure 'in the long run each man can be 
taught to rise above himself. ' " As a portrait of a twentieth-century lifetime 
as a fellow-traveller, Kennan emerges as having a cold eye for what he saw as 
the cultural and strategic realities of Russia versus the West, and a 
sympathetic benefit-of-the-doubtism regarding what the future might hold for 
the country. 
Methodology and Mayhem in Authoritarianism: 
It should be emphasized that scepticism about Western characterizations of 
Russian authoritarianism is not an oblique attempt to erect a cultural 
relativist paradigm, that is, a 'yes-but-on-the-other hand what's the in-
country perspective?' in which today's Russia sympathizers can be accused of 
embracing the kind of naive, simplistic notions that have invited scorn in the 
past. Examples of such stances might include the view that condemnation of 
post-Cold War corruption in Russia is misguided because at a grassroots level 
it is an essential element of a black economy that fosters mutual survival and 
support presumably so long as you are not struggling to find a place for your 
child in the local school or start up a small business. Or there is the more 
muddled claim that the Putin regime's authoritarianism can be tolerated, if 
not excused, because down the long centuries Russians have always felt the 
need of a strong leader - a sentiment that needs to be distinguished 
presumably from support for an authoritarian one, such as Genghis Khan, Ivan 
the Terrible or Josef Vissarionovitch Dzhugaschvili. 
On a more prosaic level, given the challenges and irregularities of data 
collection, even in the last half century, it is difficult to see how such views 
could be convincingly substantiated. Moreover, as the influential American 
sociologist Charles Tilly argued, such so-called sociological insights have little 
to do with even pseudo-scientific claims to objectivity. As a matter of fact, 
Tilly claimed, much of what has passed as academic study and expert analysis 
in the social sciences has proved to be spectacularly useless, especially when 
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it came to enhancing our understanding of the world around us or finding out 
what might happen next. Tilly believed that the discipline of sociology is 
driven largely by individuals with a passion for facilitating processes of 
change. The underlying sense here is the perspective prefigured by Isaiah 
Berlin regarding the central importance of human agency in bringing about 
new social and political directions. It is an approach in radical contrast to the 
assumption, for example, that there are abstract systemic stages of progress 
towards democracy, such as 'background pre-conditions, the exit from 
authoritarianism, transition to democracy, and democratic consolidation.'^'' A 
similar point could be made with so-called reversions to authoritarianism, 
interpretations of which Tilly believes are inseparable from the human 
interactions that create them in circumstances that are 'highly contingent. 
In a beguilingly down-to-earth book, titled 'Why', published two years before 
he died in 2008, Tilly locates processes of change in social transactions, that 
is in the multifaceted ways and the words we use to describe to each other 
the events around us. Investigating these interactions through well-
structured, self-reflective research and historical documentation is what can 
constitute the kind of human intervention that promotes change. In 
sociological terms, above all this means clarifying step by step the specific 
contingencies that obscure the possibility of other ways and means of 
interacting. In other words, the best kind of sociology is not about the 
contentious struggle to encapsulate cultures such as Russia through the lens of 
weighty conceptual patterns, for instance such as democratization, or the 
progress of technological developments. 'We now have long experience,' Tilly 
claims, '...that the empirical accomplishments of looking for laws of large 
processes and structures ... are close to nil. Moreover, he believes that 'it 
is implausible that the regularities operate on that level. ' " Instead he 
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advocates the use of inductive reasoning from the specifics of interpersonal 
processes. This 'methodological localism,'^® he says, is potentially more 
informative about the 'sequences of contingencies'^' that link social and 
political events. 
Moreover, because such research is conducted through engagement and 
dialogue v^ith actual participants in these events, it constitutes a dynamic 
intervention that can generate more enlightened, insightful narratives and 
thus serve to open up nev^ perspectives and potentials. As a way of clinging 
to an optimistic sweet reasonableness with regard to the possibilities of 
positive improvements in societies, Tilly's sentiments embody a sociological 
approach with which perhaps the late George Kennan might have agreed. 
With some measure of scorn and relief, Tilly also argues that the grip of Post-
Modernism on sociological methodologies finally has been broken. He claims 
the result has been an enhanced awareness that the good sociologist cannot 
enter into arenas, such as democracy promotion, modernisation or war 
prevention 'without touching on contested political and moral positions.' ^°His 
belief in the role of benign interventions in human affairs and of the potential 
for the cultivation of shared moral sensibilities is thus underpinned by his 
rejection of what he believes is the outmoded and ethically abhorrent spectre 
of a post-modernism. Such a world, he suggests, wrongly assumes that we are 
incurably and fundamentally blinded by our West-centric enculturation to the 
complex alien realities of societies other than our own. As Italian philosopher 
Umberto Eco countered in an address on the theme of the philosophical 
incomprehensibility of Post-Modernism: 'Reality is out there, and we "kiss it" 
each time we fall and smash our face on the g r o u n d . O u t of the ashes of 
Post-Modernism, Eco recommends reviving an older Kantian concept of 
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an external world of humankind that we strive to analyse and reflect upon. 
'If there are no facts, only interpretations,' Eco insisted, 'then what are you 
interpreting?'" 
In this view, which has the alluring virtue of commonsense, Russia is that 
sprawling, multicultural federation to the west of Europe, the meaning of 
whose history, culture and politics we can delve into, argue about and, just as 
often, also misunderstand. The country is not a mystery or an enigma, as 
Winston Churchill famously proclaimed. Rather, in common with all human 
societies, it is a complex, half-understood secret to be further explored as 
best we can."Such a methodological approach can serve to cast light on some 
of our core contemporary notions about Russia, to strive to chart the contexts 
and limitations of our assumptions, for example, about its authoritarianism, 
as one aspect of an ongoing and open-ended revision of what we think we 
might know for certain about the Putin regime. As Kant's theory of knowledge 
suggests, this striving is not likely to realize a perfect understanding during 
my lifetime or yours, but it is nonetheless what defines us as part of an 
empathic common humanity.^'' 
Section Two 
This section focuses on the consensus amongst a great many of the more 
conservative commentators on contemporary Russia that Putin's third term 
government has reverted to the wrong side of any continuum from 
democratization to authoritarianism. It argues that this consensus relies 
excessively on the blunt methodological tool of comparative quantitative 
surveys and indexes. In particular, diverse international indexes, including 
the US-based Freedom House, Berlin's Transparency International, the World 
Bank Doing Business Rankings, Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom 
Index, and the British-based The Economist Democracy Index, are in 
agreement that today's Russia belongs in the darker regions of world rankings. 
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Primarily a product of Western think tanks and NGOs, these annual rankings 
employ a kind of name and shame strategy which it is believed provides 
leverage in diplomatic and other negotiations between governments In 
fostering compliance with what are believed to be the benign, democratic 
norms of global governance. In reality, they can equally prove to be counter-
productive, as likely to provoke intransigence and resentment as the 
opposite. As well, they are often more informative about the vagaries of 
international opinion, than of any kind of accurate empirical record. 
Consider, for example, Putin's anointment as the world's premier politician, 
out-performing Pope Francis, Barack Obama and Nelson Mandela in the 2013 
World Rankings." Based on a survey of 175 news agencies and other media, it 
is an accolade that it is unlikely to be repeated following the eruption of 
Ukraine's civil war in 2014. By July of that year a poll by Pew Research 
indicated that the percentage of Americans who held a favourable view of 
Putin had declined by almost a t h i r d . A s Tilly's work suggests, at worst this 
profusion of rankings simply subsumes the lives of individual Russians into 
abstract patterns and trends that ignore their Interventionist, one-
dimensional, Eurocentric and sometimes offensive implications. 
In this regard, the indices produced by The Economist magazine during the 
last decade have never shared the apparently short-lived enthrallment with 
Putin adopted by other international media in 2013. Rather It has maintained 
a steady path of damnation of Russia in the aftermath of the Cold War. This 
approach is In spite of the Independent Levada Research Center's polling 
which concluded that since 2008 the trajectory of the President's approval 
rating, domestically at least, has continued upwards to reach a six-year high 
in August 2014 at 87percent." The might suggest perhaps Western-style 
democratization and compliance with an apparent global consensus are not 
the most pressing issues on the minds of most Russians. 
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Certainly this is a perspective that finds support in one of The Economist 
magazine's more recent indices which provides a statistical ranking comparing 
alleged rates of democratization across the v^orld. Specifically, its 
intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2012 was published in the wake of what it 
termed Putin's 'retrograde and cynical'^® announcement that he intended to 
reclaim the presidency in March 2012, and after the December 2011 
legislative election, the outcome of which brought thousands of his country's 
men and women onto the streets in protest. Putin's subsequent return to the 
presidency, the report said, 'marked a decisive step in Russia's long-running 
slide towards outright authoritarianism.' 
The index's conclusions were largely based on the scoring of a list of sixty 
indicators of democratization by a series of panels of anonymous experts. 
Though only the names of 73 of its regional team directors are listed on the 
website, the Intelligence Unit claims to have 100 fulltime country specialists 
spread across the globe, plus a world -wide network of 650 contributors. 
Australia, for instance, which is ranked sixth on the index had an allocation of 
four regional analysts whose ambit extends to South East Asia and the Pacific. 
By contrast, Russia had one regional director, London-based Serbo-Croatian 
Lazo Kekic, whose team members were anonymous and of an unspecified 
number. Kekic's area of expertise is listed as all of Europe and the Balkans, as 
well as the Russian Federation. With a notable absence of foresight, no 
dedicated analyst was listed on the magazine's website for Ukraine. In 2012 
the country was still under the authoritarian, corrupt leadership of ousted 
president, Viktor Yanukovich. Oddly it would seem, it was nevertheless 
ranked by The Economist Democracy Index at number 80, 42 points ahead of 
Russia and at the top of the ranks of hybrid democracies, a mere one point 
below a flawed democracy." 
In addition to its systematic garnering of the opinions of its regional experts. 
The Economist intelligence Unit's 2012 report used comparative global 
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surveys and in-countty polling by other research institutions, especially those 
by the American-based Pew Research Centre. These were combined with the 
final scores of questionnaires completed by the Unit's network which had 
been aggregated according to five categories: pluralism and the functioning of 
a country's electoral processes; its commitment to civil liberties; the quality 
of its governance; its levels of political participation; and, more obscurely, 
how supportive was its democratic political culture. In this last category, for 
example, Russia scored a lowly 3.74 out of a possible 10, with only a 
marginally better 5 out of 10 for political participation. By contrast Ukraine 
scored 7.06 out of 10 for its civil liberties and 7.92 out of 10 for its electoral 
processes and pluralism - again a strange result, given that within a couple of 
years the country had fragmented into bloody conflict. The Unit's overall 
result ranked Russia 122 out of 167 countries, between Ethiopia and Jordan. 
It also re-confirmed the country's downgrading from a hybrid to an 
authoritarian regime, re-iterating many of the reasons given the previous 
year. 
As both the 2011 and 2012 reports stated, the ranking primarily reflected the 
widely-held view in the West that Putin's managed democracy (or 'stage-
managed democracy,' as the report described it^°) has made a mockery of 
'the institution of the presidency and the electoral p r o c e s s . B e y o n d an 
uncompromising anti-Putinism and perhaps some unstated geostrategic 
considerations with regard to the West's divergent relations with Russia and 
Ukraine, the reports did not address the question of the need for any further 
investigation. Such research might include the questions: by exactly what 
processes, and in response to what specific contingencies, was the nature of 
Russian democracy allegedly continuing to be undermined by its current 
governance? 
As suggested above, a self-congratulatory consensus which maintains a steady 
stream of denigration of post-Cold War Russia has emerged in many of these 
global surveys and rankings. In addition to the above index, for example, the 
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IMF's 2011 Russia report, though continuing to be moderately embeUished by 
the more hopeful economic neo-Liberalism of the Yeltsin years, qualified its 
judgment that 'some progress had been made'^i^in what it indicated was the 
country's road to institutionalizing democracy. The report warned that weak 
governance and increasing moral hazard in Russia's financial sector are 
persistently undermining the prospects for the kind of regulatory economic 
framework that not surprisingly foreign investors find reassuring. Significantly, 
it is a conclusion that reflects the repeated public acknowledgement by 
Putin/Medvedev government of the exceptionally expansive scale of the 
country's costly corruption. Commissioned by the Ministries of Economic 
Development and of the Interior, the Indem Foundation in Moscow has 
surveyed the varieties and cases of corruption since the mid-1990s. In its 
periodic reports to government, it describes everyday corruption as continuing 
to be endemic to all levels of Russian society. 
In particular, the Foundation has focused on revealing the routine bribery of 
medical professionals in the health services, officials in army recruitment 
centres, bureaucrats dealing with licensing and the establishment of small to 
medium businesses, and of school directors by families to secure places for 
their children.''^ On a much larger scale, others have added to the culture of 
corruption the multi-billion dollar embezzlement of funds from state-funded 
projects, such as the redevelopment of the Vladivostok region in 
preparation for the 2012 APEC summit, or the installation of Russia's Glonass 
(GPS) s y s t e m . I n addition, there are the allegations by whistle-blower 
Sergei Magnitsky of a $US230 million tax scam, the largest in the country's 
history, in which members of Moscow's police force, together with federal 
government officials and the Klyuev Organized Crime Group are said to have 
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colluded. The latter group has also been accused by Western human rights 
organisations of the murder in 2009 of thirty-seven-year-old Magnitsky while 
he was in pre-trial detention/^ 
In 2008 Medvedev launched a National Anti-Corruption Plan whose aim was to 
strengthen criminal prosecution, while at the same time improving the pay 
and conditions of Russian workers in hope of reducing the temptation to 
accept bribes. Though the plan has gone forward with Putin's return to the 
Presidency in 2012, for example, in the move to regulate capital outflows 
from the country, in part as a means of curtailing money laundering by 
criminal gangs, neither leader has indicated that it has reaped significant 
successes. Speaking after a report to the government's Anti-Corruption 
Council by its Investigative Committee pointed out that '34 percent of all 
corruption crimes in 2010 were committed by law enforcement officials,"' 
Medvedev described the ongoing situation as not only 'sad and dangerous,"" 
but also clearly indicated the laws had 'failed to reach their objectives."' 
Contrary to any easy assumption of the consolidation of authoritarianism 
under Putin, the failure of these recurrent initiatives to constrain corruption, 
or indeed to have had any significant effect at all, might suggest his 
government's weakness and potential vulnerability. If corruption is so 
pervasive across both the public and private sectors, including the gigantic 
resource corporations such as Gazprom and Rosneft, stronger action to the 
point of an uncompromising 'crack down' by the government could constitute 
little more than a form of regime self-destruction. 
An alternative analysis, writes Russian Academy of Sciences sociologist Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya, sees more positive possibilities in the changing composition 
'Amnesty International Urges Russia to Close Magnitsky's Case,' Amnesty International Russia report 
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and educational attainments of those close to Putin, both in the bureaucracy 
and among elected officials. Her research indicates that in recent years there 
has been an acceleration in the process of replacement of the Soviet Union's 
'corrupt, narrow-minded militocracy,'(the silovikil^" often demonised in the 
Western media. Despite Putin's KGB and FSB background, this dominant 
Kremlin faction has declined in number in favour of a younger, tertiary-
educated, business-orientated elite appointed directly to his team. Over 
time, Kryshtanovskaya says, the continuation of such substantial changes are 
likely to cause 'corruption to subside. 
Not so, according to the anti-Putin, Indem Foundation president, Georgy 
Satarov, at least not v^ithout fundamental reform in other arenas of Russia's 
governance. 'Fighting corruption without having competitive 
elections,' he says,' and free media with authorized access to government 
information is like taking expensive pills without quitting drinking and 
smoking...Any doctor will tell you it won't work." 
The issue of an unreformed culture of impunity towards corruption that is 
intermeshed with a general subversion of democratic processes and 
institutions is central as well to the neo-liberal economics and democracy 
promotion evident in The Economist Democracy Index 2012 rankings and the 
observations of the IMF According to these analyses, entrenched electoral 
fraud and the disregard of the civil rights of its citizens, as exemplified by 
reports of police brutality during Gay Rights and opposition movement 
demonstrations, are especially emblematic of Putin's presidential third term. 
As noted above, this downward slide is believed to be encapsulated by the 
March 2012 presidential elections - the one in which a tearful Putin on a dais 
in Moscow's Red Square proclaimed his victory as embodying the glory of 
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Russia before several thousand flag-waving members of the nationalist 
youth movement, Nashi." 
As with previous Russian elections, condemnation of this result was almost 
entirely dependent on anecdotal evidence and the judgments of Western-
sponsored election monitoring teams. Notably, the reports from both the 
OSCE and from the well-respected Dutch and American funded Golos deducted 
ten per cent from the Central Election Commission's official pro Putin election 
tally of more than sixty three per cent. In fact, a dissenting report from a 
member of the Golos team claimed the figure was more likely a whopping 
fifteen per cent, which if acknowledged by the government would have 
denied Putin a first round victory.^''These alternative, independent tallies 
largely resulted from estimates by informal community groups of ballot 
stuffing and carousel voting. The implication was that when it comes to the 
descent into authoritarianism in Russia, stealing an election was no more than 
business-as-usual. And, according to current statistical estimates of a 
downward trend, there is every chance that it will continue to worsen. 
Or will it? And, if so, why exactly? 
Beyond a catalogue of sharp-ended statistical charting of an alleged two 
decade decline Into a 'democracy recession,'" there remain questions of 
what possible wider presumptions and counter-assumptions about the alleged 
nature of today's Russian authoritarianism underpin these sociological 
judgments. In short, how does one understand a regime that runs an election 
that is said to be clearly fraudulent, but nonetheless generates an 
unprecedentedly high vote against its incoming president? 
Such a sceptical querying is not directed at the quality of at least some of this 
empirically-based research, although, for instance, there was much to 
criticize in the OSCE's March, 2012 election monitoring report. The 
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organisation is an ad hoc grouping of fifty six affiliated states ranging from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok that emerged almost 40 years ago during the 
beginnings of the thav^ in the Cold V/ar confrontation between East and West. 
Its aim has been to foster detente betv^een Russia and Eastern Europe and the 
rest of the v/orld. Though primarily committed to intergovernmental forums, 
report writing, and the airing of admonishing memos between participating 
countries, it works closely with the European Union, from whom it receives 
partial funding. ^^These days it describes itself as 'the world largest security 
organisation'" and focuses on conflict prevention, crisis management, human 
rights issues and democratization/election monitoring. 
With regard to this last initiative, Russia has proved to be a troublesome 
member of the organization. In violation of the OSCE guidelines for the 
conduct and monitoring of free and fair elections, during the 2004 
presidential campaign the government placed restrictions on the number, 
length of stay in the country and permissible regional deployments of OSCE 
observers.5®Though no mention was made of them in the OSCE's report on the 
2012 presidential election, these restrictions appear to have continued. The 
organisation's conclusions on this election were based on the feedback from a 
mere 262 monitors deployed in only 1106 out of the Russian Federation's more 
than 94,000 polling stations, scattered across nine time zones from Siberia to 
Moscow and beyond. In only approximately ten percent of these stations was 
the actual counting of the vote monitored.^^ Moreover, there were no teams 
dispatched to the region of Chechnya, notably brutalized in recent times by 
Russian army forces, but nevertheless where both the voter turnout and pro 
Putin support were claimed by the Russian Electoral Commission to have 
approached 100 percent. In other words, with regard to the coverage and 
competency of the OSCE election findings, what appears to be at stake is the 
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distinction between second-rate research and that which, from certain 
perspectives at least, could be seen to be considerably more credible. 
Which brings us back to the challenge of pinning down these 'certain 
perspectives,' of elucidating those presumptions and assumptions on which 
Western think tanks and polling organisations strive to build an understanding 
of Russia. Consider, for example, political sociologist Larry Diamond's 
cosmopolitan reflections on the entrenchment of authoritarianism in Russia, 
quoted in The Economist Unit's Democracy Index 2011 in support of its 
analysis.^" Diamond's starting point is not events within the country itself, but 
rather international political comparisons framed by the relatively short-lived 
optimism of Huntington's 'Third Wave' of democratic globalization. 
Beginning in 1974 with Portugal's Carnation Revolution, then spilling into Latin 
America and Eastern Europe, this latest wave has surged across the planet for 
scarcely longer than a quarter a century. Diamond's concern is what will now 
follow its apparently quickening ebb tide. In our new century 'a powerful 
authoritarian undertow,'^ has meant a dire list of democratic reversals, 
especially during the past decade of global financial crises and intensifying 
doubt about the exemplary quality of American-style democracy following the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition there are the years of Eurozone 
instability, exacerbated by the European Central Bank's Insistence on further 
austerity measures to assuage the Impact of the greed and economic 
incompetence of Old Europe's democracies. 
Yet to be reckoned with is the longer term influence of the economic miracle 
in the authoritarian state of China, as an alternative model of development. 
Whether such undemocratic countries. Gray observes, are able to successfully 
devise their own forms of modernization may well prove to be 'the great 
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experiment of our t ime. ' " It is a view that resonates with Huntington's own 
subsequent reflections on the future of the recent democratic surge almost 
two decades after it began. In answer to the question of whether we are 
about to see a world inevitably progressing towards democracy, he argues that 
economic development is clearly not a sufficient condition. Of equal 
importance is cultural receptivity in a post-Soviet world where it should be 
understood that 'modernization is distinct from Westernization and is 
producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the 
Westernization of non-Western s o c i e t i e s . I n a succinct statement that 
prefigures his contentious 'clash of civilizations' thesis, Huntington writes: 
Modern democracy is a product of Western civilization. 
Its roots lie in the social pluralism, the class system, the 
civil society, the belief in the rule of law, the experience 
with representative bodies, the separation of spiritual 
and temporal authority, and the commitment to 
individualism that began to develop in Western Europe a 
millennium ago.'^'' 
More provocatively, in face of what he sees as contemporary Russian society's 
rekindling of a cultural heritage steeped in Eastern Orthodox Christianity and 
a Slavic, Eurasian-oriented sense of identity, Huntington argues that the Cold 
War divergences between East and West are likely to prevail. In other words, 
both culturally and politically, Russia is likely to remain on the unenlightened 
side of a civilisational divide. 
Nonetheless, a central problem with Huntington's figurative description of 
democratization as a 'wave', ebbing and flowing, and now with an alarming 
and unforeseen undertow, is the obscurity of the temporal and causal links, if 
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any, from country to country. The answer appears to be that they should be 
understood as a kind of watery ideological, political, economic or cultural 
diffusion, which is anchored in a comparative politics much dependent on 
quantitative research and statistical-based analyses, especially those rankings 
in the indices referred to above. For instance, the widely-cited Democracy 
Index 2011 reported a lower democracy score in 47 countries across most 
regions of the world including Russia, and more than half of the 167 states 
surveyed remain either hybrid or authoritarian r e g i m e s . ^ ^ indeed only with 
regard to those countries of the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) was there reported to be any kind of marginal upgrading, a 
conclusion that reflects the positive assessment of their commitment to 
democratic processes and institutions, although a very tentative one 
In an earlier Country Report, The Economist cautiously suggested these events 
have provided 'some encouragement to the small and beleaguered liberal 
opposition in R u s s i a , ( a s has also briefly the global Occupy Movement 
inspired by the 2007/08 debacle on Wall Street).^^ However, it is by no means 
clear that this report of some encouragement is not merely conjectural, 
particularly as the mechanism of diffusion could involve a diffuse list of 
possibilities. These might range from a half-random and somewhat 
incoherent scattering of concepts of Liberalism and democracy amongst 
different groups in various times and places, to a deliberately targeted use of 
soft power, propaganda or coercive militaristic, diplomatic or economic 
strategies by Western countries in the hope of ensuring a relatively small and 
short-lived movement of anti-Putin protesters will ensure Russia's embrace of 
global democratization. In sum, there is an enduring difficulty of assessing 
exactly what, why or who are the agents of this diffusion. On balance, the 
primary catalyst for popular demands for political change may be a complex 
web of domestic happenstance, economic decline and regime incompetence. 
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rather than a transcendent vision of liberal freedom and democracy fostered 
by external intervention or influence. In other words, the ideological 
justifications for the overthrov^ of a government could be either post hoc and 
a matter of hollov/ rhetoric to the point of non-existence. 
The Economist Country Report 2011 concluded that there v^as little likelihood 
of 'any contagion effect taking root in R u s s i a ' ' ® and leading to a MENA-
inspired, anti-authoritarian springtime. The explanation of this conclusion 
relies more on the report's unreferenced consensus about domestic 
contingencies than of the generalities of comparative politics. Russia's ageing 
population is deemed to be predominantly apathetic and disenchanted with 
democracy. Its rich, resource-based revenues have meant lower levels of 
absolute poverty and an overall rise in living standards, but with a newly-
emergent middle class still only comprising around twenty percent of the 
population, so that: 
Despite its authoritarian drift over the past decade, 
Russia is still a much less repressive and socially stagnant 
society than the authoritarian regimes of MENA 
As a socio-political profile, the report is sketchy, by definition a quick 
summary. In common with other indices and statistical surveys, it reads as 
the first draft of an analysis, whose interest and significance lies in the more 
complex questions it generates about Russia. Is Huntington correct in 
suggesting that, lacking the long accumulation of the civil and political ideals 
of the West, democracy really has little chance there? Is Liberalism the lost 
cause of a small and fitful middle-class intelligentsia? Why apparently might 
most Russians be so apathetic? 
As suggested above, sifting through commentaries, especially from Western 
scholars, for the necessarily complicated answers to these questions is a 
challenging undertaking. McFaul and Stoner-Weiss, for example, amplify the 
conclusions of The Economist's report with the claim that the explanation of 
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Russians' alleged disaffection with democracy is that most of them have been 
duped by a narrative of 'powerful s imp l i c i t y . S o their story goes, Putin 'has 
forged a model of successful market authoritarianism,' after the desperate, 
chaotic years of the 1990s under the Yeltsin presidency. Whatever political 
freedoms and other democratic sentiments have been lost during the last two 
decades are seen by the majority of Russians as 'necessary sacrifices on the 
altar of stability and growth 
Admittedly this analysis predates the temporary slide of Putin's popularity 
rating from around 80 percent in 2008 to approximately 50 percent during the 
2012 presidential elections. Nevertheless, as the more recent opinions of The 
Economist's groups of mostly anonymous experts suggest, their presumption is 
that a more or less exclusive focus on individual security and material 
wellbeing, combined with a compliant, apolitical attitude to the current 
government's 'series of repressive measure'^^ is what generally characterises 
most Russian voters. As presumptions go. It seems a very reductionist one 
that, for example, ignores the possibility that, like the majority of the world's 
citizens, ordinary Russians might aspire to having both a secure economic 
future and a better government that protects their rights and freedoms. And, 
perhaps, given the perceived realities of their lives and recent history, they 
might be understandably sceptical that a path to a different kind of future 
replete with Western-style democracy and prosperity has any potential. 
The Economist's conclusion that, compared to the upheavals in traditional 
regimes of the MENA, Russia is more drifting than authoritarian. Is given a 
stronger resonance in the harsh, first-hand observations of the liberal scholar, 
Muscovite Lilia Shevtsova. The Putin restoration has not taken Russia 'entirely 
back to the Soviet days,' Shevtsova writes." Instead it represents an advance 
on those times into a new historical context, In which the regime 'is leaving 
™ McFaul, Michael & Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn, 'The Myth of the Authoritarian Model How Putin's 
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society alone, giving it the right to seek its own salvation...just don't try to 
seize power.''"' But though the present can never be a re-run of the past, the 
weakness of the voices of hberal opposition is not so very different from the 
early years of the twentieth century, or, more recently, the mixture of 
'naivety, neurosis, brashness and insensitivity'" displayed by liberals during 
the Yeltsin years. 
Shevtsova's judgment is an angry and depressing one, evoking a kind of 
emptying out of optimism In the wake of the Cold War. In other words, the 
average Russian is not necessarily either authoritarianism's naive spear-carrier 
or an apathetic materialist. As scholar Martin Malia puts it more poignantly, 
the experience of almost three quarters of a century of Communist rule has 
created a population Inoculated 'against all ideological politics and (has) 
removed the temptation of further totalitarian adventures . Such reflections 
point to a more singular kind of quasi authoritarian regime in post-Cold War 
Russia, one that has taken flight above the disillusion of Its citizens. For the 
most part, it seems to conjure a parallel world inhabited by a powerful, self-
interested, pragmatic elite, who has no need of full-scale Stalinist murder and 
mayhem to maintain its grip on power. Nor, it seems, of tear gas and tanks, 
or a tractable military that shoots down recalcitrant protesters, as in the city 
squares and alleyways of Cairo or Beijing. 
Still, the problem remains of how is it possible to test and confirm the 
existence and veracity of such a bleak perspective? For Diamond, assumptions 
about the Russian path to authoritarianism that has been facilitated by the 
end of a state-driven ideology are potentially revealing of the obstacles and 
setbacks to global democratic diffusion, or at least the extent to which 
sociological analyses have been self- limiting and backward-looking. 
Triumphalist claims about transitional stages in the inevitable global 
consolidation of democracy, can no longer said to be very convincing.' 
" Ibid. 
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Instead today's sociologists have a great deal yet to learn by rethinking the 
conceptual framework that has underpinned assumptions about emerging 
political systems, the sinister creep of authoritarianism, stalemated regimes 
and positive trajectories of democratization. His concern is not so much with 
the updating of an arena of academic research, but with rallying the pro-
democracy global mission in the United States and among 'its many 
democratic allies' in order to bolster 'at risk' countries^®: 
Now, as democratic setbacks multiply, is the moment for 
a new strategy. Without a clear understanding of the 
fundamenta l problem - bad governance...more 
democratic breakdowns are likely. Without a resolute 
and relentless international campaign...the current 
democratic recession could lead to a global democratic 
depression.'^' 
Not only is 'the empirical reality'®° inside fragile newly democratic or so-
called authoritarian countries such as Russia 'a lot messier than it was two 
decades ago'®^ but also the 'classificatory schemes impose an uneasy order on 
an untidy empirical w o r l d . i n particular, the 'unfriendly'^and probably 
irredeemable Putin regime is one of a number of 'unmistakable cases of 
regress ion,fol lowing its years as a hybrid 'in a strange kind of intermediate 
zone between authoritarianism and d e m o c r a c y . i n other words, as Risse has 
Diamond, 'The Democratic Rollback,' Op.Git. p41 
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pointed out, a term such as 'hybrid' implies httle more than that 'we don't 
really know what we're talking about. 
At the same time, the Russian experience indicates that in common with 
'democracy', the term 'authoritarianism' encompasses a broad church. 
Applying it to the political systems of different countries might suggest 
therefore the need for an array of qualifying adjectives. Thus the question for 
Diamond's cohorts of sociologists and political theorists has become: exactly 
what kind of more nuanced terminology most accurately characterises Putin's 
government? Examples might include crypto, electoral or competitive 
authoritarianism, or more simply the Freedom House Index's Partly Free?®^ 
As Diamond acknowledges, such terminological challenges have significant 
implications for the links between the kinds of generalizations apparently 
shaped by comparisons between countries and the accounts of events and 
trends within countries. Of central importance is whether It is possible to 
pinpoint common tipping points, at which newly-democratic regimes such as 
Russia could be said to backslide into authoritarianism. And then there is the 
Issue of precisely what external incentives might ameliorate such a 
deterioration? As indicated above, the explicit agenda is to unveil what 
promotes the world's most desirable known form of government, namely 
democracy. The downgrading of Russia by The Economist Democracy Index 
2012 from a hybrid to an authoritarian regime certainly Implies little more 
than that in some loosely-definable combination of democratic and 
authoritarian elements, the balance has clearly tilted in the wrong direction, 
and perhaps requires a back-strengthening alignment in the foreign policies of 
democratic states to lure it back into the fold. In other words, the 
downgrading does not reveal much useful, generalizable, predictive 
information about the common ways and means Internal political structures 
and processes can be subverted by authoritarian governance. 
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By contrast, Wilson provides a more colourful characterization of Russia as a 
fake democracy, whose government is given to a cunning and morally 
bankrupt form of virtual politics.®® His v^riting evokes a regime analogous to a 
nasty online computer game in which the web of democracy is gossamer thin 
and quick to disintegrate under various forms of unscrupulous, populist 
manipulation. Supreme power is attained only by the most accomplished liars 
about what is the actual state of affairs along the corridors of government. 
Points might be awarded, for example, for Putin's speech on Russia Day, 2012, 
in which he proclaimed that '...the people of Russia have had an enormous 
input into the progress of global civilisation,' and that '...heated discussions 
are commonplace in a free democratic nation, and that is precisely the course 
that our people have chosen,' after which he concluded, '.. it is Important to 
respect and listen to one another, to strive for mutual understanding and find 
compromises, to unite society around a positive constructive agenda.'®' 
According to this interpretation, the notion of 'virtual democracy' means 'real 
existing authoritarianism', with Putin at its apex. His assertion of Russia's 
embrace of democratic norms mixed with the kind of paternalistic nationalism 
exemplified by the above speech is simply his way of fooling half the people 
most of the time. But the problem here Is that beyond a focus on Putin's 
alleged duplicity, a term such as virtual democracy suggests a world of all-
encompassing, multifaceted authoritarianism, buttressed by elite games of 
smoke and mirrors. It also implies the processes and institutions that ensure 
representative government, Including an independent judicial system, an 
unfettered media, a credible opposition, and free and fair elections have 
been hollowed out by the current power-mongers to the extent that they are 
now largely non-existent. Again by reference to the March 2012 presidential 
election, the public commentaries might equally have arrived at a more 
confusing and open-ended conclusion, and one with very little prognostic 
value. 
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Two perspectives suggest such a conclusion. The first concerns what has been 
heralded as an outbreak of freedom by Russia's growing civil society. 
Notwithstanding Shevtsova's and Pavlovsky's pessimism about Liberalism's 
sorry history and prospects, ever since the eruption of street protests 
following the December, 2011 Duma (parliamentary) elections there has been 
recurrent focus in the International media on Russia's liberal wind of change -
or at least its occasionally gusting breeze. In the immediate aftermath, the 
BBC's Moscow correspondent, Daniel Sandford, for instance, reported that the 
protests were 'certainly the most severe wake-up call' for Putin since the fall 
of the Soviet Union,'® a sentiment echoed by Moscow's Kommersant FM radio 
commentator Konstantin von Eggert who described them as 'a return of live 
politics to Russia, a politics that everyone thought was comatose.''^ Moreover, 
there was an increasing hope in the commentaries that this Opposition 
Movement would sustain its momentum . 
'Their Vigor Unflagging, Russians Protest' ran a Washington Post headline at 
the beginning of February, 2 0 1 2 . B y the end of the month, a week before 
the presidential elections, Putin biographer Masha Gessen, wrote in an 
opinion editorial in the International Herald Tribune of the joy and 
camaraderie as thousands of Muscovites stood shoulder to shoulder along the 
sixteen kilometer Garden Ring Road that encircles the city, in what should be 
understood as the beginning of a campaign of mass civil disobedience 
Still, the more sceptical viewpoint that faced with a real possibility of 
political upheaval and crisis, Russia's liberals appeared to have little to 
contribute to the shaping of a future Russia was endorsed by eyewitness 
reports of the aftermath of the election, primarily those based on the writer's 
own research. Consider, for example, the accounts of the protest in Moscow's 
Sandford, Daniel, BBC News 10/12/2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16122524_ 
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iconic Pushkin Square the day after the Putin victory was announced. The 
crowd numbers were suddenly dramatically smaller than in previous months, 
perhaps seven or eight thousand people. The mood was reportedly low key 
and resigned. No doubt the fact that it was painfully cold - minus 15 degrees 
-had something to do with it. As well the square was grid-locked by hundreds 
of riot police, and there had been talk of a post-election Putin crackdown. 
But there was said to be little sense of a liberal Opposition Movement out on 
the streets and not to be denied by the ruling powers. In the late evening 
winter darkness, under police direction the crowd for the most part quietly 
dispersed. 
By the following weekend, the demonstration scheduled on Arbat Street in the 
iconic century bohemian quarter gathered scarcely sufficient protesters for 
the police to close the road to traffic.'" Moreover, the emphasis in the 
commentaries had begun to shift to an acknowledgement that the movement 
was not notably liberal in Its demand for change, but in fact was a 
comparatively small, fragmented, leaderless grouping across a political 
spectrum that also included the extreme Nationalist Right and the 
increasingly Irrelevant Communist Left.'^ And despite the reportedly larger 
numbers at the few subsequent demonstrations since the election, it is yet to 
be seen how far the legislation passed in June 2012, will help to contain the 
potential for an alternative public voice of Liberalism. The new law increased 
fines for so-called public order violations from around $US30 to $US9000, or 
twelve months wages for the average Russian worker. 
Nevertheless, the eruption of protests has been seen as having unsettled the 
government whose response appeared to waver between the resort to 
prohibitive legislation, conciliatory rhetoric and some policy Initiatives that 
seemed to constitute an attempt to appease the demonstrators. During the 
electioneering, this was interpreted by the more hopeful or provocative 
Horsfield, Dorothy, 'Russia's Liberal Wind of Change' Eureka Street, April 03, 2012; Saradzhyan, Simon 
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Opposition Movement sympathizers, as an indication that fractures were 
emerging in the Kremlin's legendary spin-doctoring. The government's use 
of 'administrative resources' to ensure the electoral outcome, including the 
front-page allegations of an assassination conspiracy against Putin by Chechen 
separatists, were deemed to have been especially lacking in credibility. 
Though unlikely to win any awards for balanced coverage of the campaigning, 
the State-owned broadcast and print media appeared to be a little more 
open, with half the free airtime dedicated to debates and some reporting on 
the protests." At an estimated cost of $US300 million, Putin responded to the 
movement's repeated complaints of electoral fraud in the December 2011 
Duma election by accelerating the installation of CC TV cameras in all of the 
more than ninety-four thousand polling stations across the country; and the 
local media estimated that more than a million civil volunteers were 
mobilized to monitor the voting. Furthermore, though the first round margin 
of more than 13 percent was treated with considerable scepticism, few 
commentators suggested that Putin had not won an undeniable victory. In 
other words, whatever the inventory of the alleged iniquities of his 
government that according to the commentaries constituted a democratic 
reversal, Putin clearly had the support of approximately fifty per cent of 
Russian voters, a figure that few Western governments have achieved. 
Moreover, in the weeks after the March 4 presidential election this support 
appeared to strengthen considerably. 
Politics, Polls and the People: 
Polling by the Pew Research Centre's Global Attitudes Project and by the 
Levada Centre could be said to add to the sense of interpretative uncertainty 
about Russian authoritarianism. Both sets of results supported an electoral 
outcome that pointed to considerable popular endorsement of an allegedly 
undemocratic regime, especially outside the large metropolitan centers of 
Moscow and St Petersburg. The Pew Centre has been conducting polls in 
Russia for a decade, with the aim of tracking changing attitudes towards 
9' Horsfield, Op.Cit. 
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governance and democracy amongst ordinary citizens. Its face-to-face 
interviews v^ith one thousand adults, carried out from March 19 to April 4, 
2012 follov^ing the presidential election, produced the conclusion that the 
majority of the population held apparently paradoxical opinions. Interestingly, 
almost three quarters voiced a favourable opinion of Putin, while almost as 
many similarly endorsed his long-term political partner, Dmitry Medvedev (67 
percent). At the same time, more than half approved of the demonstrations 
that erupted after the December 2011 Duma (parliamentary) vote amidst the 
accusations of electoral fraud. The Pew pollsters interpreted this second 
result as 'consistent with the value placed on core democratic pr1nciples''®by 
a significant number of Russians. As well, only approximately 20 percent said 
that a fair judiciary, honest elections, uncensored media, and a civilian-
controlled military'' were appropriate descriptions of their country. 
As suggested above, it is difficult to know what conclusions about Russia's 
alleged authoritarianism to draw from these statistics. To the Pew pollsters 
they reflect the widening gap amongst the mass of the people between their 
political ideals and their perceptions of the country's social realities. They 
also Interpret the figures as reason for optimism: at last Russians are 
beginning to articulate a homegrown, bottom-up democratic ideology. 
Significantly, the pollsters claim that by comparison with a few years ago 
attitudes have changed so that more people are openly critical of the 
government and see 'freedom of the press and honest elections as very 
Important.'^" And despite the findings that indicate 'democracy' remains a 
tainted term in Russia, there is an increasing Ideological embrace of 'civic 
freedoms and Institutions'. 
So how then to account for the Pew Centre's apparently contrary statistics, 
according to which Putin's popularity rocketed in the months after the 
Pew Research Centre , 'Russians Back Protests, Political Freedoms and Putin, Too.' http:// 
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presidential election? Though unclear, at least from the Pew polls, the answer 
seems to be that the broad support is based on a mix of viewpoints. It should 
be emphasized that outright enthusiasm for an authoritarian leader (as 
distinct from a strong one) was not among them. One explanation could be 
that a solid majority support Putin for fear of someone or something worse? 
Or in the hope that he will deliver on his promises of a modern, prosperous, 
stable Russia? Or because of his articulation of their overriding sense of 
disaffection with the West, especially with the US? Interestingly, the polls 
suggest that domestic opinions are nearly evenly divided between those who 
are confident the country is 'headed in the right direction''°2and the less 
hopeful who are apprehensive that current economic conditions, on which 
their wellbeing depends, cannot last. In other words, in common with the 
rest of humankind, ordinary Russians hold opinions about the state of their 
nation that are uncertain, changeable, inconsistent and on occasions 
downright contradictory. 
Which brings us back to the second perspective on the reasons for concluding 
that conceptualizations of Putin's regime remain unclear and contentious. 
For Levitsky and Way, part of the problem is this democracy promotion bias in 
studies during the last decade or so. This has meant a scholarly focus on what 
sustains or undermines democracies, with 'remarkably little research...on the 
emergence or persistence of nondemocratic r e g i m e s . T h e y argue that 
Russia is clearly a diminished form of authoritarianism, which they describe as 
'competitive authoritarianism', rather than the increasingly diminished form 
of democracy assumed by the international indices. The distinction is 
important because they believe that, unlike the narrowly-focused, procedural 
term 'electoral authoritarianism', it helps to elucidate the specific ways the 
Putin regime strives with varying success to manipulate the structures of 
power, in the electoral system, the judiciary, the legislature and the media. 
In line with the findings of the Pew polls, each of these arenas are seen as 
having the potential to become focal points for an opposition movement, at 
'"2 Ibid. P7 
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least at the level of public opinion and street protests. At the same time, 
because the country is not a full-scale authoritarian regime, the challenge for 
the government is to constantly manage the tensions and contradictions 
resulting from 'the coexistence of democratic rules and autocratic methods 
aimed at keeping incumbents in pov/er.'^ °"' This co-existence represents a kind 
of fault line that serves to undermine any further consolidation of 
authoritarianism, at least in the present time and circumstances. 
It's the Economy, Comrade! 
The phrase is an adaption of US President Bill Clinton's 1992 election 
campaign caption, 'It 's the economy, stupid,' v^hich was said to have been 
pinned on his office door as a reminder that hammering on about the 
economic failures of the previous republican government would do much to 
swing the vote in his direction. Such a viewpoint is frequently applied in the 
analyses of the fallibility of Putin's so-called authoritarianism. The belief is 
that over-dependence on its gigantic energy sector, insufficient funding of 
research and development, corrupt business practices, and slowness to 
modernize and diversify its industrial base means is that if/when Russia's 
resources boom seriously falters under the impact of a prolonged GFC, the 
regime is likely to topple like a house of cards. 
The post-Cold War empirical record evokes a more unpredictable course of 
events. For instance, Malia's review of findings indicates a market recession 
or depression is by no means a necessary harbinger of the imminent collapse 
of so-called authoritarian governance in countries such as Russia. Rather it 
may simply result in a government's tightening of centralized political 
controls and a multi-billion dollar IMF bail-out, as was the case under the 
undemocratic regimes in Nigeria and Jordan. The question here is to what 
extent what are believed to be the basic structural problems in the economy 
combined with bad government ensure such a solution will be short-lived. As 
Hayek argues, the two-hundred-year history of the links between the 
consolidation of Western-style capitalism and the evolution of regime type 
Ibid. P251 
indicates that the success of Russia's market-driven economy is 'a temporary 
c o n d i t i o n , w h i c h will indeed be undermined by its authoritarianism. In 
other words, whatever its current apparent success, the kind of command 
economy that is seen to be a mark of authoritarian governments is anathema 
to the long-term growth of a vibrant market. The trajectory towards the 
wealth accumulation that generates improved living standards throughout all 
levels of society demands individual citizens are able to pursue creative 
economic goals 1n a political climate firmly committed to minimal government 
interference. With prosperity comes the urbanization and embourgeoisement 
of the citizenry, along with the increasing demand for political rights and 
freedoms that challenge and ultimately corrode the power of the elite. So 
the story goes, the stronger the tentacles of capitalist development within a 
country, the weaker the authoritarian rule. 
An alternative view might suggest that this analysis adds up to little more 
than wishful thinking. For some critics in the West, It Is simply an account of 
the march of history that should be dismissed as the folly and pretension of 
'minds befogged by fashionable nonsense about g l o b a l i z a t i o n . G r a y 
writes: 'Russia - rich, nationalist and authoritarian doesn't fit this 
progressive fairytale'.'"^in the aftermath of the Cold War, the reality Is a 
continuing array of prosperous authoritarian regimes,^°®1ncluding that 
allegedly established by Vladimir Putin. For example, the enviable 
performance of East Asian countries such as China, Singapore or Vietnam, as 
well as the recent positive report card on the Russian economy, suggests that 
the market can continue to be very successful under a command. 
In part, much appears to depend on the political agility of Russia's power elite 
in smoothing the path of change and development amongst the mass of the 
population. This Includes Its flexibility in accommodating and defusing the 
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dissent that periodically crystallises around human rights issues, such as the 
protests against the Pussy Riot prosecutions, electoral fraud or corruption. In 
part too, it can also involve a calculated effort by the government to 
decouple the alleged interactive links betv^een the leadership's top-down 
imposition of a neo-liberal economic agenda and its advocacy of a 
homegrov^n, grass roots democracy or the uniqueness of the country's cultural 
identity. As Craig Calhoun puts it, any apparent contradiction between 
globalization in the economic arena and the politics of a democratizing 
nationalism may be avoided 'by assigning these to separate spheres.'^"' 'The 
Chinese phrase ti-yong,' he argues, 'has long signaled this, a condensation of 
Western learning for material advancement. Eastern learning for spiritual 
essence. ' "" Arguably the sometime catch-phrase of the Putin regime, 
'Sovereign or Managed Democracy,' echoes a similar strategy. 
In this context, it should be emphasized that the top-down market reforms 
that were initiated in Russia by the Yeltsin government at no stage appear to 
have been driven by a grassroots movement with any clear vision of the 
roadmap to democratic riches for all. As Reddaway and Glinski claim, the 
program of reforms emerged from an opportunistic cohort of power-brokers in 
the Kremlin, who were beguiled by the evangelical economic neo-Liberalism 
of the flawed Washington Consensus. Reddaway and Glinski argue further that 
the Yeltsinites' 'shock therapy' not only impoverished and decimated the 
ranks of the small embryonic middle-class democrats."' It has also allegedly 
given rise to an increasingly globalised economic regime, in which the IMF 
clearly continues to play 'a definitive role' and which they characterise as 'an 
essentially undemocratic' form of 'Market Bolshevism'.'"^ In Russian historical 
parlance dating back to at least Peter the Great, the term 'Bolshevism' 
denotes: 
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the self-confident, almost vanguard mentality of a self-
anointed elite that sees itself as entitled to Impose 
"progress" and "development"- according to its ov/n 
understanding of these terms - on the "backward" 
majority by wiping away traditional ways of life..."^ 
As a description of a significant aspect of the kind of authoritarianism which 
Reddaway and Glinski argue has continued under Putin, 'Market Bolshevism' 
should perhaps be added to the list of the more nuanced terms for the 
country's governance outlined above. On the one hand, it connotes a singular 
Russian etymology evoking hubris and an unreflective, self-destructive 
commitment to progressivism. On the other, it summons the sometimes 
messianic, destructive rigidity of the IMF's globalised economic neo-
Liberalism. Above all, as a meta-narrative of an economy in the service of an 
historical, culturally-determined pattern of thought, it strongly suggests the 
need for considerably more evidence and contextual information. 
Still, the use of the term 'competitive authoritarianism' to indicate a limited 
form of authoritarianism in Russia also tacitly suggests that during the last 
two decades the West's evolving neo-liberal mission of promoting democracy 
through economic development might not have been entirely malign. The 
claim is that the influence of Western institutions such as the IMF or the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) appear to have 'inhibited the Kremlin from 
destroying some formal elements of democracy, such as comparatively free 
elections and a parliament...'""' In addition, the indications are that today's 
Russia is generally a more open, wealthier society, especially compared to the 
years of Soviet communism or the financial implosion endured by ordinary 
Russians under the Yeltsin's regime's greed and incompetence. For instance, 
according to the figures from the United Nations World Tourism Authority 
(UNWTO), these days Russians have an increasingly cosmopolitan curiosity 
about the West. After passing most of the century under tight controls on 
travel, the country has been ranked seventh in the world for the number of its 
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citizens holidaying abroad. In 2011 Russians spent $US32.5 billion visiting 
foreign cities and resorts, most of them in Europe. 
Nevertheless, one of the fundamental problems with any quasi-religious faith 
in the inevitable long-term line dance of the free market and democratisation 
is how to interpret the phrase, 'the long-term.' For instance, compared to 
the lifespan of a Galapagos turtle, Russia's two decades or more of successful 
so-called competitive authoritarianism looks relatively short. As suggested 
above, like any big idea, 1t is difficult to see what kind of evidence might 
decisively refute such a claim. It seems equally possible that it may simply be 
an article of faith, rather than being illuminated by any aura of empirical 
certainty. 
As Tilly argues too, the growth towards modern democracy even in those 
countries with a strong market economy had seldom involved a seamless 
trajectory. As an ideal of government, democracy is believed to outperform 
all other possible forms according to most measures of material, physical and 
psychological well-being. At the same time, its consolidation continues to be 
largely aspirational, not least because it has always proved vulnerable to 
subversion by powerful political figures and interest groups. For Tilly, the 
historical image is of a continuum from authoritarianism to democracy with 
likely gains or reversals from one period of government to the next. 
Tilly's conceptual framework again evokes the question of the uncertainties 
surrounding the direction in which Russia might be deemed to be travelling 
and whether it is likely or able to sustain the momentum in either direction. 
Despite The Economist Index's downgrading of Russia from a hybrid to an 
authoritarian regime, the promoters of global capitalism such as the WTO, the 
IMF and the World Bank still appear to Insist on the more benign view. In their 
ongoing reporting of the state of Russia, neither institution has much to reveal 
about Putin's alleged backsliding into authoritarianism. 
The World Bank, especially, is less concerned with a head-on attack on his 
government's so-called economic over-centralism and corruption. Its 
United Nations World Tourism Organisation, http://untwo.org accessed 12/9/2014 
approach is more one of relentlessly prodding Russia's financial managers and 
bureaucrats through reviews of the country's recent progress on such micro-
economic issues as the regulatory obstacles to establishing small to medium 
businesses, quality of regional infrastructure, shortages of skilled labour, 
effective drought management or weather monitoring. That is, its focus is on 
stimulating piecemeal, localised improvements that over time it believes can 
become the pillars of an energetic free market. Nevertheless, it remains 
unclear whether this approach will at the same time foster the development 
of a bottom-up, independent, agonistic public sphere to challenge any 
manifestation of corrupt authoritarian governance in Russia. Again, it could 
equally prove to be a triumph of hope over inexperience. 
For the time being at least, when measured in terms of wealth creation and 
overall prosperity, it appears that the Russian version of economic neo-
Liberalism has been vindicated. During the last ten years or so the country 
has very ably shielded itself from the more extreme reaches of the Europe's 
sovereign debt crisis and Wall Street's avaricious bankers. According to the 
2012 snapshot provided by the World Bank Report, the previous financial year 
had seen the country return to levels of growth before the onslaught of the 
2007/08 GFC, an attainment that had yet to be reached in the majority of 
economies in the democratic West. It also had achieved a large trade surplus, 
healthy foreign reserves, and Inflation at its lowest for two decades. As well. 
Its rate of unemployment was declining, in 2012 it had fallen to below six 
percent compared to around eight percent In the United States and Britain; 
and wages were increasing at 'at a solid pace.'"^Th1s has meant that its 
economy was expected to reach the rank of the sixth biggest in the world in 
2012, compared to the eleventh biggest in 2007. Meanwhile its ratio of 
average public debt to gross domestic product (GDP) is an enviable ten 
percent. The ratio measures the amount a country owes as a percentage of 
its total earnings and is generally considered to be a measure of its economic 
vitality. By contrast to Russia, Australia's debt-to-GDP ratio In 2011 was 
around thirty percent, in the United States it was around sixty nine percent, 
" ' W o r l d Bank Report 2012 
and in Greece it was a staggering one hundred and sixty-five percent."^ The 
2012 annual report of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) gave a similarly glowing account of Russia's economic prospects. 
The report evaluated the pattern of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia, 
taking into account perceived political risks, bureaucratic impediments and 
levels of corruption. FDI is the direct investment by a private company in the 
physical infrastructure of an enterprise in a foreign country. UNCTAD's findings 
indicated that with the pervasive anxiety that the economies of the West 
were in terminal disarray, the big players in the global marketplace have been 
shifting significant amounts of capital east into Russia. The organisation 
reported that Russia saw FDI flows, mainly from European Union member 
states, Increase by twenty two percent during 2011/12, the third highest level 
of private investment in the country ever recorded. 
Among the participants in the FDI boom are the world's second largest 
consumer goods company, Unilever, with a US20 billion investment and the 
American company, Boeing, which plans to invest around one billion per year 
for the next thirty years, including five billion in design and engineering 
services. And one of the largest foreign banks in Russia, Germany's Deutsche 
Bank, which for decades has been the bank of choice for many Russian 
companies and leading businessmen, Is expanding its operations. Finally, 
international car manufacturers Including Ford, Volkswagen, General Motors 
and Renault-Nissan have recently signed agreements estimated to be worth 
around five billion dollars for the building of car assembly plants. The 
Association of European Businesses in the Russian Federation whose 
membership is drawn from approximately 600 enterprises in EU member 
states, estimated that car sales in Russia increased by around twenty percent 
CIA World Factbook, Australia, United States, Greece 
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in 2011J2° The new agreements are expected to generate 'at least 300,000 
cars a year per production unit by 2015.'^^^On a more pragmatic level, for 
anyone who has been gridlocked in a traffic jam in downtown Moscow this 
may not be entirely good news. 
Apart from following the money trail out of the ailing economies of Europe 
and the United States into an apparently more lucrative arena, these gigantic 
investments by some of the world's foremost global enterprises appeared to 
be emblematic of a resurgence of confidence in the wealth-generating 
potential of Putin's Russia, in spite of the authoritarian labels that may be 
attached to it. In July 2012 the newly-re-instated President Putin finally 
signed into law legislation bringing the country's trading regulations into 
compliance with the international standards set by the WTO, as a precursor to 
the country's accession to full membership the following month.^^^The 
UNCTAD report concluded optimistically that the prospect of reduced 
restrictions on foreign investment in industries, such as banking, insurance, 
business services, manufacturing and telecommunications, has been a strong 
catalyst for the surge in FDl. 
It remains to be seen, though, whether such a buoyant outlook will persist. 
By late 2014, the mood among commentators in the West prognosticating 
about the likely fortunes of international capitalism had become considerably 
more gloomy. Interrelated factors shaping their perceptions included the 
apparent fragility of the recovery from the GFC, especially in the US and 
Europe, the predicted significant slow-down of China's economic growth, the 
volatility of share markets, and the intensification of the Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL) wars in Syria and Iraq. Specifically with regard to 
Russia, in addition there was the likely repercussions on its primarily 
resource-based economy of the tumble in crude-oil prices to a five-year-low 
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during 2014 J " As well, there were negative effects on its balance of trade, 
especially with the European Union countries such as Germany, of the 
economic sanctions imposed by the West in response to the crisis in Ukraine. 
In sum, the question is the extent to which the combination of declining 
revenue from exporting its energy resources and its ascendency to fully-
fledged membership of the WTO, may have reduced the country's immunity to 
the vagaries of the global market place. 
Conclusion: 
It is difficult to predict how such a mixed, short-term progress report on 
Russia's unsteady transition to a free market economy might impact on the 
Federation's so-called regression into authoritarianism. One possibility is that 
its current constrained embrace of the world of opportunistic globalising 
capitalism under the rubric of 'Managed Democracy' could simply be a case of 
back-to-the-future. In other words, it could simply be a re-vitalisation and 
further consolidation of the 'Market Bolshevism' that is said to have 
characterized the early Post-Soviet years. Equally, as Levitsky and Way 
tentatively maintain, Russia's competitive authoritarianism may be inherently 
unstable. In particular, they obliquely suggest that that the Putin 
government's skill in maintaining elite cohesion, especially through its 
circumscription of the aspirations of an opposition movement, will be the 
likely determinant of his regime's endurance. Here the domination by the 
current regime is seen as dependent on its balancing and controlling 'an 
ongoing, if submerged, struggle for influence among actors within the security 
services, the military-industrial complex, large state-owned companies, and 
possibly between the president and the prime minister. 
As Levitsky and Way acknowledge, such speculations could equally suggest 
that the Putin regime might fragment and disintegrate. In its wake could be 
either 'a chaosocracy' or the kind of liberalising reforms out of which a more 
consolidated democracy could possibly emerge. These hesitant generalities 
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are based on their wide-ranging comparative overview of authoritarian 
countries and they insist there is more work to be done. 
As for what the research so far illuminates about the future prospects with 
regard to the complex shifting inter-relationships that are said to constitute 
Russian authoritarianism, it seems to be a case of on the one hand, on the 
other hand, and only time will tell. 
Or as Malcolm Tucker, the British Prime Minister's vile spin doctor in the BBC 
political satire, 'The Thick of It,' puts it: 'It's the everything, stupid.' 
CHAPTER FOUR 
RUSSIAN CONSERVATISM AND ITS ADJECTIVES 
Who could grasp Russia with the mind? 
For her no yardstick was created. 
Her soul is of a special kind. 
By faith alone appreciated. 
Fyodor Tyutchev (translated by John Dewey) 
The student of politics who looks only at patterns of 
behaviour but leaves out the meaning that actors give to 
their own and to each other's conduct turns into a 
specialist of shadows. 
Robert Legvold 
One of the more recent memes in commentary on the Russian Federation is 
that Putin's third presidential term has been characterized by an increasingly 
entrenched conservatism. Among the prominent elements of this 
conservatism is said to be an ultra-nationalism based on the re-assertion of 
Russian exceptionalism, in which primacy is given to the sense of national 
pride and the reclaiming of the motherland's alleged unique values and 
history. Enmeshed in this conservatism is also believed to be a Schmittian 
friend-versus-foe syndrome, which is evident in the Putin regime's deep-
seated distrust of and opposition to America's geopolitics. This Is said to be 
particularly manifested in Russia's foreign policy in the Middle East, towards 
NATO, and in the securing of its near abroad, for example in the Ukraine and 
Georgia. Domestically, the conservatism of the Putin era generally has been 
seen as deliberately focused on re-conjuring the traditional bonds of Russian 
Orthodox Christianity, Euraslanism and anti-Westernism, resonant of the Cold 
War or of earlier pre-Bolshevik times, especially the Slavophile debates of the 
later years of the century. 
This chapter explores this issue of contemporary Russian conservatism. It 
begins with Putin's open endorsement of a conservative doctrine, but one 
which he believes mirrors similar Right Wing political trends in the West. In 
his December 2013 annual Presidential Address, he encapsulated his 
conservative position as in opposition to the many nations that 'are revising 
their moral values and ethical norms, eroding ethnic traditions and 
differences between peoples and cultures.'^ He believes the result has been a 
destructive, anti-democratic process which is based on a top-down imposition 
of 'abstract speculative ideas'^ that have demanded the people accept 
without question the liberal freedom to reject the difference between good 
and evil. Thus the rise of Liberalism has meant widespread anomie and 'a 
kind of Amoral International.As he puts it: 
Of course, this is a' conservative position. But speaking 
In the words of Nikolai Berdyaev, the point of 
conservatism is not that it prevents movement forward 
and upward, but that it prevents movement backward 
and downward. Into chaotic darkness and a return to a 
primitive state." 
The Russian Federation, he says, is part of the conservative global reaction 
against 'the regression, barbarity and extensive bloodshed' that has been the 
consequence of attempts to push supposedly more progressive models onto 
other nations,^by implication most recently in the MENA countries including 
Syria: 
We know there are more and more people ....who support 
our position on defending traditional values that have 
made up the spiritual and moral foundations of 
civilization in every nation for thousands of years; the 
values of traditional families, real human life, including 
' Putin, Vladimir, 'Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,' December 12, 2013, http:// 
eng.Kremlin.ru/transcripts/6402 plO 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. p3 
" Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
religious life, not just material existence but also 
spirituality, the values of humanism and global diversity/ 
Still, despite Putin's assertion of his country's embrace of what he sees as the 
solid ethical and religious comforts of conservatism, the question remains 
exactly v^hat beyond the generalities this universalist ideology entails in the 
Russian context. For instance, is it a messianic, self-aggrandising form of 
conservatism, one that is underpinned by the threat of militant action against 
its perceived enemies? In other v^ords, is it the kind that became familiar 
through the rhetoric of America's neo-conservatives under the presidency of 
George W. Bush? Or is it primarily an inward-looking, defensive, aspirational, 
often pragmatic doctrine, which is concerned 'to put its own house in order', 
while allying itself to what it regards as an Atlanticist conservative 
resurgence?' And is it still shadowed by the legacy of what Putin has 
described in an earlier Presidential Address were those genuinely tragic years 
for the Russian people in the catastrophic aftermath of the Soviet collapse?^ 
Defining Conservatism: Where East Meets West 
As with the majority of political abstractions, the question here is on what 
conceptual foundations any contemporary characterization of conservative 
ideology, including that of the Russian president, might depend? This section 
explores what has served to define conservatism in the pan European and 
American history of ideas. It begins with the somewhat literal-minded 
assumption that such an ideology constitutes an attempt 'to provide an 
explicit and coherent theory of man, society and the world,'® which at the 
same time fosters a sense of nationality and nationhood. Since, In any given 
era, conceptualizations of conservatism have been prey to internal division 
and debate, the emphasis is on a messy effort at philosophical convergence, 
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that is, on the clusters of ideas and attitudes that are integral to any 
contextualized understanding of conservative doctrine. 
Broadly, these debates within conservatism are framed by: a rejection of the 
possibility of sudden, total, radical social progress of the kind envisioned by 
the French or Bolshevik revolutions; and by implication that experience should 
teach us that there are severe limits to what humankind can reasonably do to 
realize the ideal of the best of all possible societies. For many conservatives, 
the world is everywhere bedeviled by 'illusion and calamity;' ' and evil and 
suffering are plainly perennial aspects of life that no amount of rational, 
enlightened endeavour can completely eliminate. 
In an even less rigorous way, conservatism has also been characterized as 
reactively pessimistic, not only as a realistic response to the travails of living, 
but also in its insistence, for example, on the inevitability of the Russian 
Revolution's failure to create a society even remotely connected to dreams of 
happiness for everyone. This is not to suggest that conservatism necessarily 
implies an unqualified commitment 'to preserving all existing institutions'.^ 
Nor is it necessarily a simplistic belief in the need to reclaim a lost past out of 
the ruins of misguided Utopian social experiments. Often, though, it is 
infused with nostalgia for what is believed to have been the uncomplicated, 
bucolic life of former times, and for small government, which it deems to 
have preserved an old-fashioned sense of the bonds of family and community. 
Centrally too, it has often been associated with assertions of the need to 
restrain the rise of the rampant, opportunistic, amoral, military-industrial 
complex that constitutes late twentieth century capitalism." 
According to this very general conceptualization, conservatism is thus 'a 
philosophy of i m p e r f e c t i o n i n which the world is largely inhabited by the 
fallen, hubristic mob of humanity, whose inherent willfulness must be 
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constrained by wiser souls, such as teachers, community leaders and 
politicians, especially in matters of governance and unfounded confidence in 
unfettered progress. Across the twentieth century the advocates of 
conservatism have seen its enemy as not only the sinister tentacles of Soviet 
communism reaching around the globe, but also its extreme opposite, the 
West's subsidence into post-modern nihilism, with its ideological embrace of 
cultural emptiness and hedonism, of an interpretation of life as without ethics 
or meaning. 
Putin's Conservatism: 
Much, though not all, of the above cluster of conservative ideas is integral to 
Putin's world view as set out in his 2013 Presidential Address. Specifically, 
these include the central importance of the ties of traditional family life and 
community; a rejection of unbridled global capitalism as driven by the hubris 
and moral decay of the West; and a call for the further devolution of regional 
government through the strengthening of resources, financial sustainability 
and independent decision-making in local municipalities. This last initiative, 
Putin says, is modelled on Alexander M's successful Zemstvo Reform of 
1864,^^in which '...local authority - because it is the closest power to the 
people - should be organized so that any citizen could reach out to it, 
figuratively speaking.'^'' As well, his Address elucidates what he believes is the 
need for the improvement of civic education in the Russian Federation's 
schools, with an emphasis on fostering patriotism and individuals 'with a 
strong, internalized knowledge'^^ of traditional values, history and language in 
order 'to help our nation's citizens form their identity.'^^ 
It should be emphasized that Putin's conservative, patriotic rhetoric on the 
aims and challenges of civic education differs very little from similar mission 
statements in the West in which schooling, maintaining social stability and 
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nationalism are interlinked. In fact, such statements are a banal 
commonplace in most countries' articulation of their national goals. For 
example, the 2012 report of the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and 
Reporting Authority is far from being a radically liberal conservative or 
communitarian document. Rather, like Putin, it refers to the importance of 
ideals of citizenship in promoting a sense of belonging through identification 
with Australian values, and by ensuring a tolerant understanding of the 
country's history, culture, languages and religions.^^ Putin makes explicit in 
his Address that he believes such ideals constitute a third v/ay which 
undermines the Liberalism versus communalism ideological divisions between 
Russia and the West fostered by the Cold War. As suggested above, his claim 
is that he has given voice to an international, grassroots phenomenon that 
shares his belief in the need to re-consolidate the building blocks of 
traditional conservatism. 
Following the publication of his Address, one of the most prominent voices 
among America's Old Conservatives, Pat Buchanan, was quick to endorse 
Putin's views, with the claim that he was 'one of us.' A former advisor to 
three American Republican presidents, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and 
George W. Bush, Buchanan has long argued that successive US governments, 
the Neo-Conservatives, ideologues of both the Right and the Left, the 
unelected judicial system, the media and 'the whole panoply of Hollywood 
values'^® have destroyed the cultural fabric of his country. Buchanan is also 
one of the founding members of the American Conservative Movement, whose 
online journal describes its mission as: 'To solve the country's seemingly 
intractable - and in the long-term, lethal strategic, economic, and socio-
cultural problems...[through] a rediscovery of traditional conservatism.'^' 
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Taking a considerable and misleading liberty of interpretation of Putin's 
Address, Buchanan states that the Russian president has in fact an 'ambitious, 
even audacious'^" agenda: 
He is seeking to redefine the "Us vs Them" world 
conflict of the future as one in which conservatives, 
traditionalists and nationalists of all continents and 
countries stand up against the cultural and ideological 
imperialism of what he sees as the decadent west.^^ 
In fact, by comparison to Buchanan's rousing call to battle, Putin's speech 
appears considerably more restrained: 
We have always been proud of our nation. But we do not 
claim to be any sort of superpower with a claim to global 
or regional hegemony; we do not encroach on anyone's 
interests, impose our patronage onto anyone, or teach 
others how to live their lives." 
The debates surrounding the credibility of such a statement with regard to 
the Russian Federation's foreign policy stance, particularly on the Syrian 
issue, is a focus of a later section of this chapter. As regards Putin's 
declaration of a conservative domestic political agenda, Buchanan, among 
others, has also seized upon Putin's alleged rejection in his Address of 'so-
called tolerance'" as 'genderless and i n f e r t i l e . F o r Buchanan, this clearly 
alludes to the evil of homosexuality and is a further indication that the 
Russian President is the kindred soul of America's Old Conservatives. Maybe 
so, but the official Kremlin English transcript of Putin's Address makes no 
mention of homosexuality nor of the phrase 'genderless and Infertile.' 
Buchanan, Pat, 'Is Putin One of Us?, Townhall Masazine, 17/12/2013 http://townhall.com/ 
columnists/patbuchanan/2013/12/17/is-putin-one-of-us-n1764094/page/full p3 
Ibid. 
" Putin, Presidential Address 2013, Op.Cit. p9 
" Buchanan, Op.Cit. p3 
" Ibid. 
Instead it refers to the abstract notion of tolerance as 'neutered and barren'^ 
unless it is an integral part of the common, lived experience of different 
peoples. The Russian Federation, Putin says in the next sentence of the 
transcript, 'with its great history and culture, with centuries of experience'^ 
strives 'for respect and national sovereignty and people's independence and 
identity...within the framework of a single s t a t e . A n alternative to 
Buchanan's interpretation thus might suggest Putin is asserting what he 
believes are his country's exceptional credentials for a leadership role in the 
further consolidation of a multi-ethnic Russian Federation or of a Eurasian 
Union. Contrary to Buchanan's easy assumption, what seems highly unlikely is 
that the Address is an explicit attempt to attract the support of the world's 
homophobic conservatives, or to place Russia as a front-runner in a century 
'Conservative International'^®. 
Russian Conservatism: 
This section focuses on the claims that Putin's conservatism has become the 
dominant and pervasive ideology along the corridors of power in the Kremlin 
and among the elite groupings close to the government. It argues that the 
central problem with such an analysis is that there is not uniform agreement 
amongst the commentariat, both inside the country and in the West, about 
what exactly in practical terms is entailed by his conservatism and therefore 
how influential it really has become. Moreover, as suggested above, like 
'democracy,' a contextualized understanding of conservatism indicates that it 
encompasses a diversity of opinion. 
What follows looks at the fundamentally different perspectives evident in the 
work of two Russian conservatives, both of whom have been seen as key 
figures in determining the ideological directions of the Kremlin. Neither man 
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appears to be hampered by self-doubt in asserting his opinions about how 
Russia is and should be governed. The first is the former Putin-government 
spin-doctor, Gleb Pavlovsky, discussed in Chapter Tv^o. It suggests that 
Pavlovsky's liberal conservatism has evolved into a somev/hat world-weary 
doctrine. Consider, for instance, his answer to the question of why more and 
more Russians might have become indifferent to politics. His views echo 
those of Malia that the end of the Soviet Union saw a widespread 
disengagement with ideological politics: 
Throughout the last hundred years Russia...lived with 
great political projects. Every time...the nation steadily 
diminished. Nowadays we are passing through a period of 
silence, outer peace (most probably not for long) and 
reconciliation with a quiet, not rich existence without 
great risky perspectives. Pray to drag this out for 4-8 
years more." 
Pavlovsky's conservatism appears to be tempered by a liberal, cosmopolitan 
sense of individualism, reformism and the right to independent judgment. As 
always, his transcultural commentaries are peppered with tropes from 
Western popular and literary culture. They are specifically targeted too at an 
international as well as a domestic audience, and are often reactively 
oppositional rather than programmatic. The result is that he is clearly the 
derisive critic rather than the convert to Putin-style conservatism. 'Putin did 
not face his challenge,' Pavlovsky says,' - he didn't set the country he had 
created free. He didn't have the courage to have the final f i g h t . . . . N o t 
surprisingly perhaps, since his ejection from the Kremlin's inner circles, 
Pavlovsky seems to have been relegated to the role of relentlessly sniping 
from the sidelines. 
A second manifestation of what has been seen by some commentators in the 
West as a highly-influential conservative stream of ideas is the alternative 
" Pavlovsky, Gleb, Online interview with Russian magazine Expert, 28 March 2007. 
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New Right radical conservatism of Alexander Dugin. In common with Pavlovsky 
and with Putin's Presidential Address, he too draws heavily (though 
selectively) on the pan-European history of ideas and conservative politics to 
substantiate his ideology. Unlike Putin, though, his world view is labyrinthine 
and sometimes impossibly elliptical in its struggle with complexity. Most of 
the later parts of the chapter are an attempt to explain and evaluate Dugin's 
work, particularly with regard to the claims that it has been the prime 
determinant of Putin's conservatism. 
The Liberal Conservatism of Gleb Pavlovsky. 
This section revisits the conclusion at the end of Chapter Two that according 
to the broad criteria of at least three eminent Western scholars, Berlin, Pipes 
and Bauman, Pavlovsky is clearly an advocate of a practical, non-extremist, 
pan-European liberal conservatism amongst the Putin era stratum of the 
intelligentsia. His Russian language Facebook page indicates he has 
approximately 11,500 online friends, at least some of whom regularly 
comment on his daily sneer at the foibles of the rich and powerful, and which 
certainly suggests the use of social media is a strong feature of his promotion 
of civil debate. A fascinating though formidable research project would be to 
survey the demographics and nationalities of those on his very long list of 
friends, in pursuit of an answer to the question of who is Pavlovsky talking 
with these days. 
In common with one of his most notable century liberal forebears, Alexander 
Herzen, Pavlovsky is concerned with an effective politics that forges paths out 
of his country's benighted recent past to achievable reforms that will benefit 
the ordinary Russian. Like Herzen, he too has a savage satirical eye for the 
ways the foolishness and venality of Moscow's elite have undermined his 
aspirational agenda. In recent years, much of what he says in his 
Bloomberg.com comments, interviews and Facebook blog constitutes a 
mocking, ironic attack on Putin's inner circles of power. 'My specialization,' 
he says, 'is the construction and protection of the government.'^' Given the 
5'Masyuk, Elena, 'What Putin is most afraid of it to be left out,' Interview with Gleb Pavlovsky, Hovaya 
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Kremlin has become 'a coalition of offices and Swiss chalets, where they go 
on Fridays,'3^the unfortunate reality is that his profession no longer has 
anything to offer: 
Who needs any consultants, apart from financial ones? 
The opposition doesn't have a thinking organ. And now 
not in the Kremlin either." 
More a polemicist than a political philosopher, he emerges as embodying a 
critical and self-critical liberal brand of conservatism. A somewhat tarnished 
liberal, he has admitted to marching in the street protests, 'out of some 
residual self-respect.'^'* One of his central concerns appears to be the 
cultivation amongst post-Soviet generations of Russians of a sophisticated 
understanding of the duplicitous language of power politics, which his 
commentaries indicate requires a finely-tuned bulldust detector. For 
instance, attempts to implant political orthodoxy in his country, including 
Putin's new conservatism, are no more than dangerous improvisations: 
... Someone said: what do we lack? No base. Mr Putin 
let's restore the base. Look, we have the Orthodox 
church...Look, people are going all by themselves... "Well 
do try. "[Putin sighs] I think that's more or less how it 
goes. 
No consideration was given, Pavlovsky says, to the effect of this orthodoxy on 
the 10-20% of the population of the Russian Federation who are practising 
Moslems.Similarly, the government's 'insane actions ' " include the judicial 
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would be quickly forgotten out of the spotlight of the national and 
international media. As he puts it: 
How can you be afraid of Pussy Riot to the extent of 
actually creating an opportunity for the expansion of the 
Islamic lobby. This is a significant problem. Now they 
have to bring troops into Dagestan. 
Other recent examples the government's idiocy, he says, include the threat in 
2008 that 'If needs be, we'll disconnect Google and YouTube'" by Minister of 
Communications and Mass Media Nikolai Nikiforov, as part of his attempt to 
tighten controls on internet usage in Russia. 'What am I supposed to think of a 
person,' Pavlovsky says, 'who's ready to unplug civilisation's infrastructure at 
first whistle?'^" 
In other words, in the context of what he believes is a dysfunctional 
government that is simply making policy on the run, Putin's embrace of 
conservatism is directionless, empty rhetoric. Asked about the exact nature 
of Putin's mistakes, Pavlovsky quipped: 'Beg your pardon, has he done 
anything at all?' Instead he claims that there is stagnation in the 
establishment and in the mechanisms of national control, with a pervasive 
sense of self-interest, of fear for what might come next, and of nihilism.''^ All 
of which, Pavlovsky suggests, makes a nonsense out of the conservative 
programs and ideology outlined in Putin's 2013 Presidential Address. For 
instance, Pavlovsky's comment in the midst of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics 






Athletic Russia is his new ideology, a part of his program 
of re- education of Russia that should become 
traditional, disciplined and athletic/^ 
In common with many Cold War liberals and organisations, such as The 
Economist Intelligence Unit and the IMF, for Pavlovsky the downward slide of 
his country's governance accelerated with Putin's decision in September 2011 
to reclaim the presidency. The result has been that within Russia, Putin has 
become 'our zero, a void, a screen where we project our desires, hate 
love."*^ Admittedly this assertion was made before his country's entanglement 
in the Crimean crisis and the civil war in Ukraine. Still, although these events 
generated a strong surge in Putin's popularity, Pavlovsky Insists that Russia's 
meddling was yet another example of Putin's policy improvisation with its 
enhanced risk of unanticipated consequences.''" 
In fact, Pavlovsky says, the Putin majority, that is those who were true 
believers In his charismatic leadership, has almost ceased to exist: 
...if we talk about real emotional trust in him, in the 
precise meaning of this word - and not as an answer to 
sociologists' favourite idiotic question, 'Who would you 
vote for if the elections were this Saturday?...I think only 
15 percent still really trust him.'*^ 
For the ordinary Russian, Pavlovsky says, this sense of security and emotional 
connection with Putin has been replaced by a disappointed pragmatism. As he 
puts it, what those who voted for him in March, 2012 were saying was: if 
not him then who else?"^ It should be noted, though, that Pavlovsky provides 
no evidence, either quantitative or qualitative, to support his very low 
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statistical estimate of Putin as a failed populist, nor his view of the mood of 
disappointment and disengagement from politics among Russian voters. 
Like those in the West who have followed a familiar Road-to-Damascus 
conversion from student dissidence to a late middle age embrace of the Right, 
Pavlovsky's views are infused with disillusionment with the regime he helped 
to shape, mixed with a fatalistic sense of loftier understanding. His 
conservative precepts appear to be a cautious approach to change; the 
centrality of strong, humane leadership and effective governance in ensuring 
social and political stability; and a profound scepticism about what he sees as 
an inflated commitment to transplanting a neo-liberal model of fast-tracked 
democratization into the Russian Federation. A passionate patriot, he laments 
that in America and Europe since the end of the Cold War there has not 
developed any deeper understanding of the complexities of 'the real modern 
Russia."*^ In part these attitudes stem from his distrust of what he sees as the 
self-serving lawlessness of American-dominated economic and political 
globalization. In contrast to his own country's approach to international 
relations, he believes this has led to the United States repeatedly subverting 
the norms of true legal cosmopolitanism on which the stability of the global 
order depends. On this issue at least he is in agreement with official 
government foreign policy, which Putin describes in his Presidential Address as 
a 'values-based""® defence of international law. 
Also in common with many Western conservatives, Pavlovsky appears 
especially dubious about notions of representative democracy, as obviously 
leading to governance by the ignorant, the corrupt and the incompetent. His 
writings are thus underpinned by a concern for a sophisticated commitment to 
the art of the possible amongst the Kremlin's elite. That is, his country's 
need is for an enduring, cautiously reformist, well-managed regime that 
governs on behalf of what it deems to be the people's best interests and 
keeps the potentially restive masses off the streets. In these respects, there 
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appears very little to distinguish his nationalist sentiments from those of many 
of the liberal-minded, conservative citizens of Western countries. 
Still, one of the apparent contradictions in characterizing Pavlovsky as a kind 
of belated voice of loyal opposition to the liberal cause in Putin's Russian 
Federation is that he continues to pour scorn on any suggestion that there 
exists a meaningful intelligentsia in his country. In common with his views on 
the role of the 1960's generation during the Brezhnev years, he insists that 
the scant number of contemporary activists against the Putin government, 
especially against its ongoing violation of the human rights of its citizens, are 
ineffectual and marginalized. As he put it in a Valdai Forum interview in 
2013: 
There is no liberal movement in Russian politics today. 
No-one is offering this kind of alternative.... [and] there 
are no prospects of a legitimate liberal force taking 
shape in Russia.'" 
Instead, he claims there are simply bit players, a passing parade exemplified, 
for example, by the social democratic pro-Western Yabloko party which 'in 
fact play the role of spoilers in the existing system...[and] imitate a liberal 
position rather than embodying it.'^" or like Mikhail Prokhorov's Civic Platform 
are 'extremely ghettoized and cannot really operate as a political party. 
Nonetheless, given one of the foundational assumptions of Liberalism is the 
fostering of a civil society in which there may be vigorous, sometime 
acrimonious, argument about the existence and limitations of Liberalism, 
paradoxically Pavlovsky's scornful dismissal of any such phenomenon in the 
Russian Federation does not necessarily disqualify him from membership 
within the conservative spectrum of a contemporary liberal intelligentsia. The 
complex question here is the real extent to which he is on the sidelines 
charting the rise of an uncivil, modernizing society in his country, one whose 
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intellectuals mostly belong to a less high-minded middle-class. In other words, 
whether the meaning and social context of such a resonant traditional term as 
'intelligentsia' is now in a process of terminal corrosion. 
Aleksander Dugin's Radical Conservatism. 
On a prosaic level, Dugin is in agreement with Pavlovsky that that there has 
never been a liberal movement of any meaning or consequence, either in 
Putin's Russian Federation or during the decades of the Soviet Union. 'There 
are liberals,' Dugin writes, 'but no Liberalism'" because: 
they were severely persecuted by the ideological organs 
in the USSR...[and]...the principles of Liberalism were 
foreign to the instinctive foundations Russian society. " 
Instead, he argues there was an ideological vacuum after the fall of 
communism that was filled by 'an uncritical, ignorant and parodic imitation'^ 
of Western Liberalism. In reality, he says, Russia's liberals after the fall of 
communism were a confused, dishonest, unscrupulous sham: 
Practically none of the post-Soviet elite selected 
Liberalism consciously or deliberately; until the last 
moment of the fall of the USSR, the leaders of of Russian 
Liberalism eulogized the Communist Party, the ideas of 
Marx, the Plan and socialism, while the oligarchs made a 
living in the Committee of the Komosols or sen/ed in the 
KGB...such a cheap and crooked Liberalism was 
maintained in the 1990s as an ersatz ideology...[whose] 
supporters and preachers engaged in careerism, 
privatization and setting up their own little deals." 




The result, Dugin adds, is that Putin has faced no real ideological opposition, 
but only the power-mongering of the 'economic clans'^^ and 'the more active 
agency of influence, deeply entrenched in espionage in the service of the 
West . ' " Moreover, like Pavlovsky, he claims the very fev/ would-be liberals 
turned out to be posturers, that is 'liberals only when Liberalism is 
p e r m i t t e d . W i t h the rise of Putin, they simply adapted themselves to the 
new leadership. In particular, Dugin writes, such 'iconic figures of Russian 
Liberalism' as the free market economists, Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais, 
...behaved like banal opportunists: they could not care less about the 
ideological content of Putin's r e f o r m s . B y Dugin's reckoning, many of the 
country's key powerbrokers and business elite thus have passed from 
communism to a post-modernist Age of the Anti-Christ without having to 
endure the travails of Liberalism. 
Still, whatever Pavlovsky's very private, or even perhaps non-existent, 
religious views, his public statements show no indication he has followed 
Dugin into his unpleasant world of arcane, oracular metaphysics implied by 
the last sentence. What follows provides a contrasting perspective to 
Pavlovsky's liberal conservatism through a considered look at Dugin's ultra-
conservative, radical Traditionalism. As stated above, it takes a critical look 
at both the content of his ideas and the claims that he has become one of the 
most significant voices in post-Cold War Russian nationalist ideology. 
Specifically, it considers more closely Dugin's geopolitics, as well as his New 
Right anti-Liberalism, the most recent comprehensive formulation of which is 
in his book. The Fourth Political Theory. 
Born in Moscow in 1962, Dugin is the son of a former general in Russian 
military intelligence (the GRU), Geliy Aleksandrovich, and his grandfather and 
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great-grandfather were both Russian military officers.^" Though the details of 
his childhood and early adolescence are difficult to verify conclusively, it is 
said that he did not receive a formal education/^ but that he had a gift for 
foreign languages, learning around nine of them." With the help of his family 
connections, he became an autodidact, spending many hours from his early 
teens reading books, especially about mysticism, paganism, geopolitics and 
radical German conservatism. In 'special collections'(spetskhrany) that were 
forbidden to the ordinary Russian.^^ Like Pavlovsky, he became a dissident 
during the Brezhnev era, describing himself as acutely disaffected with the 
'repulsing and entirely vacuous world'^'' of the decaying Soviet Union, in 
which he had grown up. 'In the late 1970s,' he says, ' I came to reject the 
paradigm that served as a basis of that world and embarked on a search for 
alternatives to the paradigm. 
By eighteen he had become a member of the Yuzhinsky Circle, an 
unconventional group whose youthful rebellion took the form of a devotion to 
black magic, mysticism, and what Dugin later acknowledged was 'excess in all 
forms'^^ Including drugs, alcohol and orgies. The circle met In the Moscow 
apartment of prominent emigre poet and novelist Yuri Mamleev, who had 
earlier emigrated to America^^ and who is described by critic Caryl Emerson as 
the 'master of the sexual and necrophiliac grotesque.'^® On a slightly more 
elevated level, its members systematically read and discussed notables of the 
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non-Russian extreme rightwing ideology, many of whom puzzUngly could be 
found in the open collection of Moscow's Russian State Library (formerly the 
Lenin Library).^' For Dugin, the group provided an intellectual milieu, out of 
which crystalised many of his radical ideas about his country's place in the 
world which fundamentally have remained unchanged during the last quarter 
century. Not surprisingly, in his 1993 history of Russian Extreme Rightwing 
movements, the American scholar, Walter Laqueur, scornfully relegated him to 
the rat-bag fringe of the country's post-Cold War subculture, referring to his 
'rehash of geopolitics and Eurasianism, of Judeo-Masonic conspiracy theories 
recycled as "mondialism," and of German metaphysical philosophy with an 
admixture of neo-paganism' as 'the parlor games of a handful of 
i n t e l l e c tua l s . Though the Yuhinsky group has long since dispersed, its 
founder, poet Yevgeny Golovin, has remained a close associate of Dugin. 
More recently, in the gossipy, occasionally flippant prologue to his history of 
anti-modernity movements in the twentieth century, published in 2004, British 
scholar Mark Sedgwick refers to the warning of an unnamed fellow academic 
on the eve of his research trip to Moscow that: '...The main thing to remember 
is that all these people are 100 percent i n s a n e . A s it happened, in contrast 
to many of his scholarly colleagues, Sedgwick proffers the minority view after 
interviewing Dugin that he found him to be 'erudite, and charming too.'^^ He 
adds that Dugin's engaging ways were apparent despite his beleaguered 
awareness that Western journalists and academics invariably characterised 
him (and his sometime Yuzhinsky circle associate, Eduard Limonov) as 
'personifications of the nightmare of a reborn Third Reich armed with nuclear 
weapons.'^'' Sedgwick also notes that Limonov wrote a semi-autobiographical, 
international bestselling novel, which was published in the West in 1979 under 
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the catchy title of It's Me, Eddie. He came to be very publicly loathed by 
Solzhenitsyn who described him as 'a little insect who writes pornography. 
For several years around the early 1990s, Limonov and Dugin worked closely 
together to promote their ultra conservative ideas in Russia. 
In 1983 Dugin was briefly detained by the KGB for singing what he described in 
an interview with Sedgwick as 'mystical anti-communist s o n g s . L i k e 
Pavlovsky, he was also found to be in possession of samizdat copies of 
Solzhenitsyn's books, which led to his expulsion from the Moscow Aviation 
Institute before he completed his studies." Nevertheless, the following two 
decades saw his gradual emergence out of a colourful and dissolute early 
adulthood into a wider community of anti Gorbachev, anti-Western, Rightwing 
so-called defenders of 'the true Russia.'^® In 1987, on the eve of the fall of 
the Soviet Union, he joined the organization, Pamyat (Memory), which had 
become 'the focus for popular opposition to Perestroika.'^' It has since been 
accused of having been sponsored by the KGB 'as a safety valve to let off the 
steam that dissidents were generating.'®" Still, Dugin's involvement was a 
short-lived one. In 1989 he left the organisation, subsequently describing its 
members as 'hysterics, KGB collaborators , schizophrenics.'®^ Instead, as 
suggested above, during the 1990s he became directly involved in extremist 
Rightwing politics by helping to establish the National Bolshevik Party, (NBP) 
under the leadership of his friend and colleague, Limonov. 
The ideology of National Bolshevism, which combines ancient esoteric 
Traditionalist doctrine with a contemporary politics of anti-globalisation, has 
since acquired devotees across eastern Europe, in the UK and in America. 
According to its current non-Russian website, the term National Bolshevism 
" Sedgwick, Op.Cit. p4 
™ Sedgwick, Op.Cit. p223 
" I b i d . 
™ Ibid. p224 
" I b i d . 
8" Ibid. 
8' Ibid. 
was first coined in Germany at the end of World War I to denote a movement 
that was nationalist and Leftwing, and very definitely opposed to Hitler's 
National Socialists. These days it describes its position as 'where the far right 
meets the communist left.' Inspired by communism, especially by Stalin's 
1924 anti-internationalist declaration of 'socialism in one country,' it claims 
its communalist doctrine to be 'the essence of true nationalism.'®^ The 
spiritual health and sense of belonging of das Volk of every nation must be 
vigorously defended through a crusade against international finance 
capitalism, the revelation of the multifaceted evils of which it argues are an 
integral feature of Marxist thought.®^ Dugin himself has described his National 
Bolshevism as 'a fusion of Europeanism and Sovietism.'®'' In terms of a timely 
and appropriate political platform, his doctrine evidently had almost no 
appeal for Russian voters in the immediate aftermath of the fall of 
communism. In 1995, he was singularly unsuccessful in his campaign for a 
seat representing St Petersburg in the Duma. The result was an official vote 
count of less than one percent.^^ Though it has continued to be a small 
presence in the Russian Federation's urban street politics, the NBP is 
unregistered. Following an acrimonious falling out with Limonov in 1998, 
Dugin resigned from the party. 
The period from the late 1990s saw a more positive turn in Dugin's career 
trajectory, and one in which his radical, occultist ideas seemed temporarily 
more muted. In 1997 he published Foundations of Geopolitics: Russia's 
Geopolitical Future, Thinking Spatially. The book was written under the 
patronage of members of the GRU and of the Russian General Staff Academy, 
whose interest in Eurasianist geopolitics is said to have reached back to the 
1950s.®^ Since the late 1990s evidently the book has become the standard 
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textbook in military training i n s t i t u t i o n s . 2 0 0 1 , Dugin launched the 
International Neo-Eurasian Movement whose geopolitical ideology had been 
described in his book. The movement drew further on an eclectic mix of 
European, British and American literary and philosophical sources, which he 
has since frequently claimed have appealed to and proved to be intellectually 
digestible to the Russian Federation's power elite under the Putin regime. 
Prominent among these seminal non-Russian influences on his ideas were the 
discipline of geopolitics from the beginning of the twentieth century; the 
Conservative Movement in Germany between World Wars I and II; and the pan-
European extreme Right Wing school of thought, especially the works of 
Italian academic Julius Evola and of Dugin's longtime friend, French 
philosopher Alain de Benoist. In 2008, again allegedly because of his links to 
some of his country's politicians, sympathetic academics and senior military 
figures, Dugin was appointed professor in the Department of Sociology at 
Russia's oldest and most high-profile university, Moscow State University, and 
the inaugural director of its new Centre for the Study of Conservatism.« 
Since March 2012, he has been a member of the Council of Experts advising 
the Chairman of the State Duma, Sergei Naryshkin.®' 
A former diplomat and possibly a KGB employee in the Russian Embassy in 
Brussels from 1988-1992, Naryshkin subsequently worked under Putin in the 
office of the former Mayor of St Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak. Before taking 
up his current role, he has held a variety of corporate and administrative/ 
political positions, including head of foreign investment with the St 
Petersberg's Industry and Construction bank, Promstroibank; Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of United Shipping Corporation, and Deputy Prime Minister 
for External Economic Activity, especially in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States(CIS). Not su25 Marcgrprisingly, he is sometimes said to be 
8' Ibid. 
™ Umland, Andreas, 'Fascist Tendencies in Russian Federation Higher Education The Rise of Aleksandr 
Dugin and the Faculty of Sociology of Moscow State University,' OpEd News 24/8/2014, 
www.opednews.com/articles/Fascist-Tendencies-Russ-by-Andreas -Umland-110823-348.html accessed 
3/11/2014 
8' Russian Federation Analytical Digest No135, 5 August 2013 www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/ 
RAD-135-6-9.pdf. 
one of Putin's high-level insiders.'® As an expert advisor to Naryshkin, Dugin 
has promoted his Neo-Eurasian conservatism in part by cultivating links 
between various Duma parliamentarians and the European Nev^ Right 
organisations, for example, in Austria, France and Hungary. In particular, this 
has involved his organizing public fora in these countries, as well as 
invitations to the elite of the extremist Rightwing to visit Moscow.'^ 
These days, though only occasionally featured in the non-Russian mainstream 
print or broadcast media, Dugin has continued to be an indisputable front-
runner among the contemporary Russian intelligentsia as Western scholars' 
most relentlessly vilified ideologue. Echoing with Laqueur's scornful 
judgment, much of the analysis focuses on his alleged fascist extremism and 
neo-imperialist geopolitics. Since the late 2000s, he has been variously 
described by his critics as a neo-Nazi anti-semite,'^ 'a carrying agent of fascist 
Weltanschauuns,'^^ a palingenetic ultranationalist''' and finally a significant 
and alarming voice in the formulating of the so-called 'Turn to the E a s f ^ in 
the Putin government's domestic and foreign policy stances. 
Such a catalogue of denigration is no doubt understandable as Dugin's world 
view does indeed appear to have incorporated all the elements of the West's 
worst nightmares about a resurgent Russian Federation. In his prolific 
writings on his numerous personal websites, in his books, conference papers 
and in YouTube lectures about what he calls his post-post-modernist new 
political theory and its associated geo-strategic and geo-civilisational 
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dimensions, he is obdurately anti-Liberalism, anti-American and a true 
believer in the imminent and inevitable apocalyptic Third World War between 
the West and the East. The US is the centre of 'v/orld evil, death, 
dissolving[sic], division and loss of organic wholeness,' Dugin writes, in his 
Neo-Eurasia Movement manifesto. Its liberals are: 
confused, vain, individualist, oligarchic, deprived of any 
moral, spiritual and traditional orienting points... 
understanding their technological and economic 
superiority as a mandate for a privately-owned hegemony 
on a planetary scale. 
Echoing his earlier National Bolshevism, he thus accuses America's liberals, 
who he appears to assume are the majority of the country's population, as 
constituting the shallow, dehumanized force for neo-liberal globalized 
capitalism that should be resolutely resisted by Putin's Russian Federation. 
As evident, for example. In his appointment to Naryshkin's Council of Experts, 
Dugin's views obviously appear to have had some resonance in Moscow's 
networks of the rich and powerful. In this context though, a later section of 
the chapter counters that the insistence, for example, from scholars such as 
Andreas Umland" or Marlene Laruelle'® that he represents the ugly face of a 
neo-fascist, occultist, xenophobic vision Increasingly insinuating itself into the 
Kremlin as a kind of covert, unofficially-endorsed Ideology, appears to be 
over-stated." 
Dugin's Anti-Liberalism: 
Interestingly, as especially evident In his most recent book. The Fourth 
Political Theory, during the last decade Dugin's views have become even 
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more eclectically derivative in their unsystematic reliance on Western 
scholarship. For instance, the first English edition of the book, published in 
2012, contains yet another vituperative condemnation of Liberalism and 
America's so-called militant hegemonic foreign policy stance, much of which 
continues to be based on his interpretation of traditional geopolitics, and 
more explicitly on the radical conservatism of the European extreme 
Rightwing movements. But unlike much of his earlier work, the 200 page 
book eulogises the writings of the German philosopher and ongoing favourite 
of the Far Right, Martin Heidegger, as providing answers to the challenges of 
saving the planet from nihilism. Liberalism and the United States. Heidegger, 
Dugin writes, has constructed 'the most profound - ontological! - foundation 
for the Fourth Political Theory...the most all-encompassing, paradoxical, 
profound, and penetrating study of Be i n g .Un fo r t una te l y for the earnest 
scholar, neither in this work nor in any other writings available in translation 
has Dugin elucidated Heidegger's phenomenologlcal approach to ontology with 
sufficient clarity or sophistication to support this claim. For instance, he 
makes his own fundamental and obtuse amendment to Heidegger's concept of 
Dasein with the suggestion that it provides a basic 'existential 
anthropology'^°^ on which to map his highly original Fourth Political Theory. 
So far, he says, this map describes fourteen different directions for the 
development of Dasein. His list includes Dasein and the state; Dasein and 
power (the will to power); The horizons of political temporality; The Prince 
and nothing; Revolution and the flight of the gods; and Urbanisation and the 
house of being. It is however a completely open, apparently perilous work-in-
progress: 
It summons us to live dangerously...to liberate... all those 
things that cannot be driven back inside only then will 
the stakes be truly great, when the danger is infinite. 
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In order to be truly authentic, Dugin writes, his Fourth Pohtical Theory should 
avoid becoming 'a set of basic axioms.' Rather, it is more important 'to leave 
some things unsaid, to be discovered, in expectations and insinuations, in 
allegations and premonitions.' For Dugin, choosing the path to this half-
understood, uncertain future is thus replete v/ith a messianic fantasy that 
appears to be born of a raging desire to bury all conflicting, superseded 
ideologies. It also appears perhaps to be more than a little touched by Lear's 
tormented, howling threat: 
I will do such things 
What they are, yet I know not: but they shall be 
The terrors of the e a r t h . 
As suggested above, it is difficult to assess how Heidegger might have 
responded to Dugin's expansive use of his philosophy. 
Though claiming Heidegger as its primary source of inspiration. The Fourth 
Political Theory includes a whistle stop intellectual tour through European 
and American thought since the eighteenth century, a short index of which 
includes Hume, Bentham, Nietzsche, Darwin, Marx, Freud, Weber, Huntington 
and Fukuyama out of dozens of other influential thinkers at an average rate of 
two or three per page. Thematically it seizes upon the continuing great 
debates of the post-Enlightenment about the meaning and possibility of 
progress; the disenchantment of the world'"" without the comforts of religious 
certainties; the meaning of liberty; and the dark Nietzschean pessimism that 
particularly from the late century has been a feature of interpretations of 
modernity. Such streams of ideas and argument invariably serve as a 
miscellaneous confirmation of Dugin's trenchant views about the decadence 
of the West. 
Shakespeare, William, King Lear,'The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, Act 2, Scene 4, lines 
280-282, Shakespeare.mit.edu 
104 Weber, Max, as cited in Koshui, Basat Bilal, The Postmodern Sisnifkance of Max Weber's Legacy: 
disenchantins disenchantment, Macmillan, 2005, p11 
Specifically, for Dugin, Liberalism is a political and economic philosophy and 
ideology that '...is a disgusting, human-hating, mean doctrine. It is loathsome 
in theory and p r a c t i c e . g y y^gy o f explanation. Chapter Nine of The Fourth 
Political Theory provides what he calls 'a stricter definition'^"^ of 'the 
principles which lie at the base of historic L i b e r a l i s m . T h e r e are nine of 
them, and together they condemn Liberalism as selfish, greedy, excessively 
egalitarian, a leveler of the distinctions between 'races, peoples and 
religions,'^™ and the destroyer of governmental and religious institutions. 
Drawing on conceptualizations of positive and negative liberty by John Stuart 
Mill and Benjamin Constant (whom he mistakenly refers to as 'Constance'^®'), 
Dugin adds that in practice liberals, such as Locke, Adam Smith, Kant, and 
Bentham, then 'right up to the neo-liberal school of the Twentieth century, 
such as Friedrich Hayek and Karl Popper,' ^^°dogmatically propose we should 
be free from: 
Government and its control over the economy, politics 
and civil society society; Churches and their dogmas; Any 
form of common areas of responsibility for the economy; 
Ethnic attachments; Any collective identity whatsoever; 
111 
More obscurely, though presumably in reference to what he believes is 
Liberalism's fundamentalist antipathy to socialist and communist ideologies, 
they apparently oppose: 
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Any attempt to redistribute, with one or another 
government or social institutions, the results of material 
or non-material labour..."^ 
With the apparent conviction of an Old Testament hell-raiser, Dugin 
concludes: 
'Freedom from' is the most disgusting formula of slavery, 
inasmuch as it tempts man to an insurrection against 
God, against traditional values, against the moral and 
spiritual foundations of his people and his culture. 
It looks a redoubtable undertaking to unravel Dugin's deeper reasoning and 
terminological confusions in compiling such a list. A more immediate reaction 
might suggest that his crude, distorted compression of more than 300 years of 
philosophical discussion and contextualization of interpretations of Liberalism 
makes almost no sense. Perhaps, a highly recommended response could be to 
take around the hat and enrol him in Western Political Theory 1.01. 
Nonetheless, Dugin writes, the triumph of Liberalism during the twentieth 
century over the competing ideologies of communism and fascism has indeed 
meant the realization of the Hegelian prediction of The End of History. This is 
clearly evident in the arrival of the nihilist, post-modernist 'kingdom of the 
Antichrist ' "Vhich he says 'is not simply a metaphor capable of mobilising the 
masses, but a religious fact - the fact of the A p o c a l y p s e . i t is a reality, he 
says, that has been long-predicted by occultists in diverse cultures across the 
globe. Oddly, he insists this pre-determined march of history does not 
preclude the invention of a new world, but only if we so choose. The sense 
here appears to be that, goaded by the cattle prod of fate, humankind is 
scrabbling like crazed sheep into an Armageddon at the end of time. It will 





Golden Dawn, in which Heidegger's pure being-in-the-world will find its 
spiritual home. 
To initiate this turn of events, Dugin writes, it will be both possible and 
necessary to bypass the abominations of the Age of Enlightenment and the 
downward path it has created to postmodernity, whose heroes are now 'the 
w o r l d ' s c lowns . . . " f reaks " and " m o n s t e r s , " " t r a n s v e s t i t e s " and 
"degenerates." ' "^ Specifically, his Fourth Political Theory calls for a modern-
today crusade by the defenders of The Tradition's values of family, 
community and spirituality against the US, the West and globalization. This 
means tearing the evil of Liberalism 'out by its roots.' He acknowledges 
that the Russian Federation could only pursue such a mighty undertaking 
'together with all the world powers, who, in one way or another, oppose "the 
American century." ' " ' 
Dugin's Fascism: 
Though Dugin's unearthly invocations raise questions about the lifetime 
effects of his youthful drug-taking, two important points perhaps should be 
emphasized. The first is that millenarianism, in both Christian and non-
Christian eschatology, and from which Dugin uncritically derives many of his 
anti-liberal beliefs, has had a long and rich cultural history across the 
countries of East and West. As Gray argues, it has frequently involved a 
destructive Utopian project, in which 'there are no circumstances under 
which it can be r e a l i z e d . I m m e d i a t e examples from modern secular 
utopianism, he says, include the impossibility of establishing a western-style 
market economy in the post-Soviet Russian Federation, or liberal democracy 
in post-Saddam Iraq.^^^ The likely success of Dugin's global militant crusade to 
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destroy Liberalism could also be said to fall into this category. With typically 
pessimistic, though more moderate conservatism, Gray implies too that 
contrary to Dugin's fantastical imaginings, history may well be a nightmare 
from which we will never awaken 
The second point is that, despite the claims of his critics such as Umland and 
Laruelle, it is difficult to sustain the argument that Dugin is a categorical 
fascist. For a start, fascism has a long-standing problem of adequate 
definition. Unlike Liberalism or Marxism, in particular, it does not have a body 
of substantial foundational texts on which to build a legacy of contentious 
theoretical understanding. Nor have scholarly attempts to erect a notion of 
generic fascism been accepted as particularly persuasive. For instance, 
'palingenetic ultra nationalism,' a definitional term put forward by Roger 
Griffin'^^to denote the common root of all manifestations of fascism, and 
much used by Umland in his descriptions of Dugin's views, has been strongly 
challenged as failing to capture a sense of the ideology's unique conceptual 
core. As Gregor argues, the problem here is that 'palingenesis,' (or national 
rebirth) is 'a universal archetypal human myth'i24 and therefore not 
necessarily fascist; and the concept of 'ultra nationalism' is 'felicitously 
vague ' . ' " 
In their extended public debate about interpreting Dugin's work,'^^ Gregor 
also rejects what he sees as Umland's commonplace and inaccurate conflation 
of Right Wing extremism with fascism. It ignores fundamental differences, 
Gregor says, between the history of real existing fascism In Italy and Nazi 
Germany and the ideas of notable twentieth century Far Right, non-fascist 
ideologues. These include Alain de Benoist and more Importantly the Italian 
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aristocrat, Julius Evola, whom Gregor claims in fact has been the central 
influence on Dugin's writings. 
Gregor's perspective is that fascism can only really be meaningful if it is 
understood to have been anchored in events before, during and after the 
second World War. It is a view shared by the historian, Eric Hobsbawm. He 
characterises the actual relationship between Right Wing intellectuals and 
activists and fascism's various manifestations across most of Europe during the 
first half of the twentieth century as only sometimes to have been mutually 
supportive. They had in common, he writes, nationalist sentiments, anti-
communism, anti-Liberalism, and 'a preference for politics as street 
v i o l e n c e . A t the same time, Hobsbawm argues, given that theory was not 
'a strong point'^^®of fascist movements who were 'devoted to the 
inadequacies of reason and rationalism and the superiority of instinct and 
wiir^^' the relationship was often non-existent. Rather, he writes, at times a 
preoccupation with fascism was merely a temporary, 'decorative'^^" feature of 
conservative intellectual life, especially in Germany: 
Mussolini could have readily dispensed with his house 
philosopher, Giovanni Gentile, and Hitler probably 
neither knew nor cared about the support of the 
philosopher Heidegger. 
Hobsbawm adds that, with the defeat of the Axis powers, 'fascism dissolved 
like a clump of earth thrown into a river,'"z disappearing with the interwar 
world crisis of social and economic Liberalism 'that had allowed it to 







e m e r g e . ' ^ " <|t; had never been, even in theory,' he says, 'a universal 
programme or political project. 
Almost seventy years later, scholars such as Gregor argue that 'fascist 'now 
appears to function mainly as a pejorative term, which intentionally evokes 
Nazism and the genocidal murder of innocents. As Umland's way of 
portraying Dugin, he says, it has very little cognitive substance. Moreover, the 
diversity and content of Dugin's work suggest he has no 'special attraction to 
the core ideas of Nazism and Fascism:''^' 
Together with polar myths, gnostic wisdom, alchemy, evil 
demiurges, 'eschatological pathos ' , and 'mystic 
materialism,' Dugin's ideas 'run the gauntlet from the 
occult to the absurd... He seems to have an 
indiscriminate taste for any bizarre notion that crosses 
h i s p a t h . 1 3 6 
Given the frequency with which Dugin is reviled as a latter-day fascist, it is 
worth emphasising that in the Fourth Political Theory, he indicates that he 
does not regard himself as any kind of a fascist. In fact, he dismisses fascism 
as the short-lived 'third political t h e o r y , ' ^ ^ y y ^ h i ^ h j j currently being 
superseded by his own fourth and final theory. Fascism has disappeared, he 
writes, expiring before the alliance of Liberalism and communism, and 
because of 'Hitler's suicidal geopolitical m i s c a l cu l a t i on s . Bu t its spectral 
presence lingers, he says, not merely as a term of abuse, but more luridly as a 
'bloody vampiric ghost tinged with an aura of "absolute evil" ...attractive to 
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the decadent tastes of postmodernity, and...still used as a bogey-man to 
frighten humanity.'^ 
Dugin's Sphere of Influence: 
As with all Dugin's philosophical writings, one of the central problem with The 
Fourth Political Theory is that it is a long way from being a dazzling display of 
erudition. Unlike the work of many of his Russian academic colleagues, 
including those who are currently employed in prestigious universities in the 
UK and America, the book has not been taken up by mainstream Western 
publishers. Nor has his writing generally stimulated respectful or substantial 
critical scholarly review. Instead its English translation was published and 
distributed by the UK-based Arktos Press, which since 2010 has devoted itself 
exclusively to the ideas of European and American ultra-conservatives, mixed 
with those of some of the wackier esotericists of earlier times. These include 
the more academic books of French New Right ideologue, Alain de Benoist; 
American Old Conservative Paul Gottfried; and Oswald Spengler, author of the 
classic. The Decline of the West, first published in 1918. They include too 
some of the works of the self-designated magician and alleged employee of 
British intelligence, Aleister Crowley; American horror novelist H.P Lovecraft; 
as well as a new edition of Louis Pauwel's and Jacques Bergier's bestselUng 
1960's Counter Culture and New Agers' handbook, The Mornins of the 
Masicians. Described by Sedgwick as 'a phenomenally successful mixture of 
esotericism, scientific popularization, and science fiction,'^'"' this last book 
claims to unveil the hidden history of Europe as a tale of occult conspiracies 
and the machinations of aliens during their secret visits to planet earth. The 
book was reputedly influential amongst members of the young Dugin's 
Yuzhinsky Circle. 
In what appears to be a case of Dugin's unilateral self -promotion, he 
describes himself on the Arktos website as 'the prominent Russian geopolitical 
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thinker...who has served as an advisor to Vladimir Putin.' ^'•^Beyond 
membership of the Naryshkins's Council of Experts, as well as anecdotes about 
Dugin's alleged friendship with Putin's close associate, Igor Sechin, and others 
among 'a hawkish, security-oriented clique of i n s i d e r s , t h e r e is scant 
available evidence to suggest that Dugin has ever really occupied such an 
exalted position. 
Perhaps the best clarification of his actual role in government policy and 
Ideology is the testimony by Dugin himself In an interview in 2007. In it he 
brags about his shaping of Kremlin ideology, even though those in the higher 
echelons of power are not necessarily cognizant of his overweening influence: 
My thought prevails; my discourse reigns. Yes, the 
government does not disclose its sources....Yes, there are 
whole circles that stand between me and the 
government...that add to the concentrated Idea of 
Eurasian geopolitics, conservative Traditionalism, and 
other ideologies...and create a watered-down version. 
But, in the end, this version reaches the government 
which incorporates it as if it were something obvious. 
Putin Is becoming more and more like Dugin, ... 
implementing the program I have been building my 
entire life.^'''' 
There seems to be no public record of Putin's response to such assertions by 
Dugin. Nor Is it clear, given Dugin's admission that he is remote from many of 
the inner circles of government, and without direct access to its highest 
levels, how 'a watered-down version' of his views might have suffused 
outwards and upwards through a highly-factionallsed Kremlin to become the 
dominant mode of understanding his country's place in the world. Beyond the 
anecdotes culled from Moscow's kitchen cabinets or media snippets about who 
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is an insider or an outsider in the Kremlin, how is it possible to track and 
measure such an apparent convergence of opinion? For example, one focal 
question here is the extent to which the Kremlin's 2013 re-commitment to 
fostering a Eurasian Union reflects Dugin's anti-liberal, militant Neo-
Eurasianist ideology, as he appears to fondly imagine; and similarly with 
regard to the government's commitment to securing its spheres of influence, 
for example in Iran, Syria and Ukraine? 
Interestingly, much to Dugin's chagrin, in June 2014 he was dismissed from his 
position as professor of sociology at Moscow State University, where Putin 
was appointed Chair of the Board of Trustees in July, 2013. At the same time 
as Dugin's sacking the Dean of the Faculty, Professor Vladimir Dobrenkov, who 
recruited him, also left the university. According to the online journal. The 
Interpreter, Dugin's sacking followed the submission of a petition to the 
University's rector which was 'the last straw for the university leadership.'^ 
The journal was established in 2013 with seed funding from the London-based 
Herzen Foundation. It describes itself as primarily dedicated to dismantling 
the language barrier by translating media reports from the Russian press and 
blogosphere into English.^''^In its translation of an article from the Russian 
online news agency, newsru.com, it reported that the petition contained 
10,000 signatures from both Russian citizens and Ukrainians, protesting 
against Dugin's murderous rhetoric in an interview with the pro-separatist 
ANNA news service in Ukraine. It also reported that his Moscow university 
department has served 'as a launching pad to recruit direct support for the 
Russian fighters in U k r a i n e . D u g i n ' s lengthy, somewhat paranoid response 
to his dismissal, excerpts of which were transcribed by the journal, insisted 
that it was the result of a conspiracy against him by the liberals and anti-
Putin forces, adding: 
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I am convinced that the the idea of firing me simply 
could not emerge from the chairman of the Supervisory 
Council of Lomonosov Moscow State University, RF 
President V.Putin and he could not give approval for such 
a move J 
The Influence of Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism on the Putin Government's 
Policies: 
As suggested above, beginning v^ith the 1997 publication of his book. 
Geopolitical Foundations. The Geopolitical Future of Russia. Thinking 
Spatially, Dugin has been regarded as significantly, though certainly not 
uniquely. Instrumental within post-Soviet Russia in popularizing the views of 
the founder of the discipline of geopolitics, Britisher Halford Mackinder about 
the indomitable Eurasian heartland. Dugin's book encompasses his Russian 
perspective on the threat to his country posed by the West's foreign and 
security policies that are driven by geopolitical rivalry over control of the 
'rimlands.' As a result. Identifying the alleged voice of Dugin's anti-liberal 
Neo-Eurasianism In Putin's public statements and policy directions has become 
an increasing preoccupation of many Russia watchers. Leverant, for Instance, 
describes Dugin's influence as 'immense.'^"' Umland warns that his doctrine 
has moved beyond the subculture of 'lunatic fringe politics and occultism with 
a taste for the b i z a r r e ' ^ ^ o ipj-g the mainstream ideological market place. 
Laruelle writes of his ubiquity, of his having assumed a position 
'simultaneously on the fringe and at the centre of the Russian nationalist 
p h e n o m e n o n . T h i s last statement is particularly challenging. Where is the 
centre of this nationalist phenomenon located? Amongst the divided, 
argumentative intellectuals of the cities, with their cloistered scholars, their 
neo-socialist collectives such as Chto Delat, their nihilistic post-modernist 
artists, the five dozen or so anarchists of the Pussy Riot collective, Volna, 
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(War); or In the muted street protests of the professional, urban middle 
class, many of whom are the children and grandchildren of Pavlovsky's 1960s' 
lost generation? Or is it regional, homegrown, grassroots, an atavistic tide 
spreading across the expanses from Moscow to Vladivostok and beyond, as is 
apparently wishfully conjured by Dugin's contemporary Neo-Eurasianists and 
conservative extremists? 
Equally, perhaps it is possible to speculate that Dugin's role might be to serve 
as a kind of ideological stalking horse, a latter-day unholy fool in the midst of 
the Russian regime, whose role is to amplify Western suspicions about Putin's 
motives and intentions and invoke a spectral sense of 'Watch out! If not us, 
then there is worse waiting in the wings.' It is no doubt a risky strategy that 
could simply exacerbate perceptions that Russians embody an inherently alien 
and intractable culture. On the other hand, perhaps it could prove to be a 
useful stimulus to the West in its diplomatic negotiations to minimise tactics 
that further estrange the Kremlin. At best it could be an incentive to 
intensify the kind of post-Cold War fellow-travelling, in which it is hoped 
informed insight and appropriately respectful strategies of political and socio-
economic engagement that take a careful measure of Dugin's limited 
significance will ensure Putin's Russian Federation will remain receptive to 
the West. This latter approach is implicit, for example, in Kissinger's 
condemnation of America's strategic posturing during the Ukrainian crisis as a 
case of the danger of inept diplomacy leading to unintended consequences: 
Putin is a serious strategist - on the premises of Russian 
history. Understanding U.S. values and psychology are not 
his strong suits. Nor has understanding Russian history 
and p sycho logy been a s t rong point of U.S. 
policymakers...For the West, the demonization of 
Vladimir Putin is not a policy; It is an alibi for the 
absence of one.^" 
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In fact, there appears to be no available evidence, at least in official 
speeches and interviews published on the Kremlin Archives website or in 
English editions of the Russian media that the more abstruse, apocalyptic and 
neo-pagan aspects of Dugin's ideas have made even a marginal contribution to 
the Putin government's foreign and domestic policies. One of the possible 
explanations for this, Leverant suggests, is that: 'His positions are too 
complex, his style too abrasive and his character too rebellious and 
independent.' As suggested above, the same claim has not always been made 
with regard to the Realist geopolitical elements of his Neo-Eurasianism. 
Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism. 
This section explores the separate issue of the ultra-conservative geopolitics 
of Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism, especially its relationship to the Russian 
Federation's contemporary foreign policy. Enmeshed in his anti-Liberalism 
doctrine, his radical views are again strongly derivative of Western thought. 
As indicated above, the fundamental geo-strategic conceptual framework of 
his Neo-Eurasianism is derived from the work of the British geographer and 
stalwart of King, Country and Empire, Halford Mackinder, who founded the 
discipline of geopolitics in the first two decades of the twentieth century. As 
Sedgwick points out, extracts from Mackinder's writings are a prominent 
feature of Dugin's 1997 book. Geopolitical Foundations: The Geopolitical 
Future of Russia. Thinkins Spatially. 
Ostensibly, at least, there appears to be much about Mackinder's 
deterministic worldvlew that is relevant to Dugin's New Age absolutist 
mysticism about the central importance of the continent of Eurasia. At the 
heart of what Mackinder believed at the time was an overlooked scholarly 
arena was his holistic belief that human history was 'part of the life of the 
world o r g a n i s m . s h o u l d be emphasized, though, that unlike Dugin, 
Mackinder was distinctly uninterested in Neo Eurasianlsm's evocations of 
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cosmic mysteries, paganism, the ancient Nordlc/Ayran folk from the Arctic 
Circle, Gaia, or of humankind's lost spiritual centre. Instead he insisted that 
the study of geopolitics was 'an empirical inquiry about the determinants of 
settlement and growth' within the world organism, the essential and pressing 
focus of which should be our planet's massive island landmass of Eurasia. 
From ancient times, Mackinder argued, war and invasion were intrinsic 
features of the historical dramas that formed the nations of this landmass: 
For a thousand years a series of horse-riding peoples 
emerged from Asia rode through the open spaces of 
southern Russia ...shaping by the necessity of opposing 
them the history of each of the great peoples around -
the Russians, the Germans, the French the Italians and 
the Byzantine G r e e k s . ^ " 
In a seminal paper. The Geosraphkal Pivot of History, presented to his 
Edwardian upper class colleagues of the Royal Geographical Society in 1904, 
Mackinder warned of the threat to Great Britain posed by the exceptional 
strategic advantages of a Eurasian continental heartland under Russian 
domination. Its unrivalled geographical features, he argued '...ice girt in the 
north, water girt e l s e w h e r e , w i t h vast steppe-lands 'wholly unpenetrated 
by waterways from the o c e a n m e a n t that it was the world's greatest 
natural fortress. With a touch of poetry, he also described the heartland thus: 
'At mid-winter, as seen from the moon, a vast white shield would reveal the 
Heartland in its largest meaning. 
In addition, Eurasia's immense natural resources, including the world's biggest 
gas fields, in combination with the region's coming industrialization and 
modernization meant that Russia was likely to emerge as not only an 
impregnable but also an immensely wealthy global power. Mackinder's firm 
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belief in the potentially calamitous effects on the seafaring British Empire of 
a militant fortress Russia, buttressed by its domination of Eastern Europe and 
especially if it were allied with Germany, is summarized in his oft-quoted 
trilogy of propositions: 
Who Rules East Europe Commands the Heartland, 
Who Rules the Heartland Commands the World Island, 
Who Rules the World Island Controls the World. 
For Mackinder, heeding his dire warning meant securing control of the 
heartland using economic, diplomatic and militaristic policies that ensured its 
containment through strategic encirclement. In this context, he divided the 
World Island between its geographically shielded core and the surrounding 
inner crescent or rimlands. The latter he distinguished from the rich, 
westernised, capitalist outer crescent ardng across the globe. The inner 
crescent was composed of those countries which directly bordered the 
heartland, such as Germany, Austria, India and China. The outer crescent 
included the sea powers of Britain, Canada, the United States, South Africa, 
Australia and Japan. 
Not surprisingly perhaps, Macklnder's influence has been traced across the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries by scholars and strategic thinkers, 
including In Nazi Germany where geopolitics was popularized by strategic 
theorist Karl Haushofer and by Carl Schmitt. In his expanded and updated 
online summary of Geopolitical Foundations, Dugin claims to cover this 
historical terrain with chapters ranging from 'The Fathers-founders of 
Geopolitics' [sic] to the internal geopolitics of post-Soviet R u s s i a . A s well, 
writing in 2004 on the centenary of Macklnder's paper to the Royal 
Geographical Society, eminent American scholar and security strategist Paul 
Kennedy was fulsome in his praise for the geopolitical wisdom of Macklnder's 
concept of the pivot of history. He argued that: 'The two world wars were 
struggles for control of what the author called the "rimlands," that swathe of 
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territories running from eastern Europe to the Himalayas and beyond, just 
outside the Asian "heartland" itself.'^'^ Moreover: 
Soviet domination of that region....caused many a US 
geopolitician (Nikolas Spykman, for example) to recall 
Mackinder's theories. And the recent projection of US 
military pov/er into Afghanistan and various central Asian 
republics has rekindled interest in the hypothesis.^" 
Mackinder's influence is also manifested in the exclusionist approach of the 
Allies to Russia in the post-World War II implementation of the Marshall Plan, 
and in America's enthusiasm for the consolidation of the European Union; in 
the Cold War containment doctrine inspired by George Kennan; and in the 
further expansion of NATO and the EU into Eastern Europe follov^ing the fall of 
communism. Similarly, one of the principal architects of America's post-
Soviet realpolitik approach to foreign policy, Henry Kissinger, acknov^ledged 
his debt to Mackinder when he issued this warning in 1994: 
Geopolitically, America is an island off the shores of the 
large landmass of Eurasia, whose resources and 
population far exceed those of the UnitedStates. The 
domination by a single power of either of Eurasia's two 
principal spheres - Europe or Asia - remains a good 
definition of strategic dangerfor America, Cold War or no 
Cold War.i" 
Thus Mackinderism has been integral to both the old and new Great Game for 
economic leverage and strategic influence in the MENA countries, as well as in 
Central Asia including Afghanistan. In particular, it is implicit in the 
contemporary analyses by the Realist school in international relations of 
countries' internal meddling in the ongoing horrific civil war in Syria in terms 
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of perceived threats to what Mackinder had declared more than a century ago 
to be their imperative spheres of influence. Here the essential Realist focus 
is on the v^ays that, driven by self-interest, diplomatically, as v/ell as 
through the provision of v^eaponry and financial support, America has 
consistently helped and encouraged the rebel fighters in opposition to the 
Russian Federation's similar unwavering support for the Assad regime. 
Fundamentally though Dugin's philosophical cogitations challenge the 
reductionism of the prevalent Realist interpretations of international affairs, 
in which Mackinderism is assumed simply to provide specific geo-strategic and 
geo-economic dimensions to the US and the Russian Federation's divergent 
pursuit of their countries' national interests. As Solovyev puts it, the bedrock 
of this approach is: 'The concept of controlled or mastered space...as the 
inevitable and ultimate foundation of world o r d e r . I n Dugin's more esoteric 
view, Eurasia is the heartland of a unique sacred geography. This means that 
from the dawn of earthly time there has been an unbridgeable divide between 
the peoples of the land or the Tellurocracy of Eurasia and the sea power 
civilization or thalassocracy of the West. ^^ ^ This has created a perennial, 
often bloody conflict, 'between the ancient secret orders of Eurasianists and 
Atlanticists ...emanating from two of the four elements of alchemy- namely 
fire and w a t e r . T h e conflict intensified from late antiquity with the 
schism between the Western and Eastern Holy Roman empires. For Dugin, the 
Roman Catholicism and Protestantism that developed in the West are 
apostasies. By contrast, following the fall of Constantinople, the holy 'Rus,' 
together with Genghis Khan's Tartars, safeguarded the religious and cultural 
mysteries of the East and Moscow thus became a Third Rome. 
As a civilisational typology, Thalassocracy implies the liberal individualism of a 
nomadic or seafaring folk, and is strongly associated with the seaboard 
countries of the West. It also embodies the concept of manifest destiny. 
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according to which a nation deems itself to be the ideal human community 
and apotheosis of world historyJ'^ Out of this hubris emerges universalism 
which presupposes that Thalassocratic political, cultural and economic norms 
and institutions should dominate the entire planet. The British imperialist H. 
Mackinder, Dugin writes, '...was a brilliant representative of the thalassocracy 
and ensured the transfer of the tradition of thalassocratic strategy, the 
procedure of geopolitical apperception from Great Britain to the United 
States.'[sic]i^8 
In radical contrast, the peoples of the Eurasian Tellurocracy have a deep-
seated attachment to the earth, to open spaces, and are conservative, 
hierarchical and authoritarian in their structures of government. Dugin 
emphasises repeatedly that as a hegemonic, Atlanticist sea power, the United 
States is now the prime focus of their ancient enmity, in the twentieth 
century, he says, 'the civilization of Land was incarnated in the most 
complete form in the USSR,'^^' and 'the historic logic'^^° underpinning 
Mackinderism found its paradigm in the Cold War. In the post-Soviet world, 
Dugin says, 'End of history in geopolitical terms means end of land, end of 
East.'^^^ Thus he endorses the Huntington thesis of the coming great clash of 
civilisations, but in his view there will be only two titanic opponents - the 
thallosocracy of the West and the tellurocracy of the East. 
In common with his anti-Liberalism doctrine, Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism is thus 
unconstrained by Mackinder's predilection for empirical evidence or doctrinal 
coherence. Rather it is a syncretic, all-encompassing world view embedded in 
traditional values that Dugin claims are at heart spiritual, communitarian, 
multi-ethnic and transcend any need for Enlightenment models of rational 
thought. As he puts it: 
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The Eurasianism is a very large set of ideas, attitudes, 
approaches concepts, which represent a complete model 
of world out look, appl icable di f ferent levels. 
Eurasianism also contains, along with the political 
component, the purely philosophical, historic-cultural, 
historical, sociological and geopolitical onesJ^^ 
In other words, it is an exceedingly complicated, often cryptic, melting pot of 
ideas, that are much dependent on rickety, speculative mythological 
foundations. Moreover, given Dugin's occasionally strained command of 
English, it is not always possible to decipher what aspects have been lost in 
translation and what were never there in the first place. Consider, for 
example, his Eurasianist explanation of the need for multipolarity in 
contemporary international affairs: 
At this level, Eurasianism proceeds from the principle 
that the unipolar models, where dominate the Western 
values, claiming also the title of universal models, are 
totally one-sided and unacceptable and require a radical 
revision. A multipolar world represents the idea that the 
world must have...a series of poles in mutual equipoise... 
the American, European and Far East poles ...Particularly 
this Eurasian world-view has given birth to the idea of 
the necessity to integrate the post-Soviet space: in order 
to be a pole of a multipolar world, Russia alone is not 
enough.^" 
For his critics, arguably there is much that is immediately mystifying in the 
above statement. For instance, is there more than one universallst, and 
presumably thalassocratic unipolar model, as he seems to be claiming? If so, 
are they actually, or potentially, conflictual or in agreement? What 
distinguishes them? Which actual countries embody one or another model of 
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unipolarity and, at the same time, embrace Dugin's apparently unlversalist 
notion of Western values? And why should multipolarity necessarily improve 
relations between countries, or result in the creation of a mutual equipoise 
between polarities that is any more or less harmonious than what has 
happened so far in human history? Finally, what is the relationship between a 
Eurasian Tellurocracy and the rest of the new multipolar world? 
Elsewhere in his work, Dugin has sought to provide answers to at least some of 
these questions in his apocalyptic philosophising about his country's 
exceptional credentials for transforming the world. The folk of the Russian 
Federation have become a unique synthesis of the Germanic, Slavic, Turkic, 
Ugric and Iranian nations of the East, he says, and therefore constitute a 
Chosen People, heir to the pure spirituality of the ancient Nordic /Aryan race 
from the Arctic Circle. Here Dugin appears to embrace the alternative pre-
Christian literature of mighty conflagrations and arcane legends in which the 
enchantment of the world has never been lost. 
Still, given more than a century has passed since Mackinder launched his 
geopolitical theory, it should be emphasized that Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism is 
but one version in scholarly discussions, especially in the political and 
intellectual circles of today's Moscow. Significantly, unlike the work of other 
high-profile Russian geopoliticians, such as Eduard Solovyev, Vladimir Kolosov 
or D.N. Zamyatin, his geopolitics have not become an integral part of 
transnational scholarship and collaborations centred on relations between 
geography, spatiality and patterns of human settlement and nation- building. 
In fact, his writings have been largely dismissed by many of his academic 
colleagues, with a research focus on re-examining the links between Russian 
historical manifestations of Eurasianism and Mackinder's geopolitical thought. 
As Shakleyina and Boguturov put it, Dugin's work is 'an oversimplified 
interpretation of the role of natural and geographical factors in international 
relations, an approach that is degrading to the study. 
Shakleyina, Tatyana a Bogaturov, Aleksei, 'The Russian Realist School of international relations,' 
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Similarly, in a polite but more obliquely condemnatory article about Dugin in 
the international Journal of Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 
Solovyev argues that geopolitical analysis in his country is 'yet to turn into a 
fully-fledged academic discipline.'^" Rather it remains a vocation. Dugin, in 
particular, he writes, has offered himself to the Kremlin as an authority on 
the art of ruling promoting a philosophy of international relations 'which is 
either overloaded with normative judgments or suffers from some "naVve 
Machiavellianism.'"^^^ Solovyev suggests too that Dugin's retrogressive 
Mackinderism fails to recognise that since the end of the Cold War a new 
world order is emerging: 
What we are witnessing is how the mutual relations of 
power centres, regions, and individual states achieve a 
new complex and multi-dimensional quality and how 
previously clear boundaries are disappearing^" 
The Syrian Conflict and Dugin's Vocational Geopolitics. 
In an interview with controversial Far Rightwing German journalist Manuel 
Ochsenreiter in September, 2012, and re-published by ALTERNATIVE RIGHT, an 
online magazine devoted to radical Traditionalism, Dugin described the 
ongoing war in Syria as the third and perhaps final 'moment of revelation' for 
the Russian Federation's geopolitical future. The first of such moments was 
during the second Chechen war (1999-2009) when his country 'was under 
pressure by Chechen terrorist attacks and the possible separatism [sic] of the 
northern C a u c a s u s . I t was a turning point, Dugin claims, when Putin was 
forced to accept that 'all the West, including the U.S.A. and the European 
Union, had taken sides with the Chechen separatists and Islamic terrorists 
fighting against the Russian army.'^^' Putin's second revelation was 'when the 
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Georgian pro-Western Saakashvili regime attacked Zchinwali in South Ossetia 
in August 2008.'^®° Again the response of the West to the Russian Federation's 
subsequent counter-attack against Georgia made clear that the Putin regime 
had few international friends, despite what should be understood as its 
humanitarian effort to protect its traditional ethnic minorities in South 
Ossetia and Abkharzia. As Dugin puts it, these same proxy wars and 
conspiracies against his country by the West are now being repeated in Syria. 
Thus he believes that the third revelation with which Putin must resolutely 
contend is that the Syrian war is not merely about the fight against Bashir al 
Assad's regime by 'extremist, terrorist, hyper-fundamentalist pockets''®^ and 
'hireling Sunni radicals supported by the West.'^ ®^ Like the assassination of 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo in 1914, it has the 
potential to be a trigger, he says, 'for a fully-fledged World War 111,'^ ®^  with 
the Russian Federation, Iran and China pitted against America and its 
European lackeys. As with his anti-Liberalism views, Dugin's geopolitical 
language is deliberately portentous. Armageddon is already upon us. At the 
same time, his analysis veers between biblical evocations of impending doom 
and hardline, militant Realism. The latter approach also seems more than a 
little driven by a propagandistic anti-American zeal, carried forward by 
Dugin's conviction that 'you're either with us or agin us.' 
On the one hand, he asserts what he sees as the geopolitical reality that 
without the West's interference, the Assad regime's victory is inevitable and 
only then will the country begin to stabilise and reform. The alternative 
strategy of a US or NATO-led intervention would lead to further chaos and the 
continuation of the savage civil war. Claiming first-hand knowledge from his 
consultations with Syrians during a recent visit to the country, he maintains 
that despite their justified grievances against the Assad government, the 
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majority of the people 'will stand until the end and will fight to the last drop 
of blood against the pro-American salafi rebel groups.'^®'* In other words, as 
with the Georgia conflict, both morally and geo-strategically the Russian 
Federation has no other option but to make a stand on behalf of the Syrian 
people. For if Putin's Russian Federation and its allies, China and Iran, 
succumb to the threat of US-led military intervention and allow the overthrow 
of Assad, then 'we will sign our own death warrant: 
And then it will be better to hand over power to Alexei 
Navalny now, because Western puppets and the 
representatives of the colonial administration will gain 
power in all these countries sooner or laterJ®^ 
On the other hand, Dugin reiterates his long-standing belief that because of 
the fundamental global division between those countries that support the 
unipolarity signified by US hegemony, and those that support post Cold War 
multipolarity, 'a war of the worlds, a war for the f u t u r e , h a s an horrific 
inevitability. The Atlanticist powers, that is 'the Americans, their satellites, 
and their mercenaries,'^®^ have determined on a geo-strategic road to a truly 
apocalyptic final battle with the Eurasian land powers, foremost among which 
Is the Russian Federation. His analysis leaves open the question of whether 
the Syrian conflict will ensure the final tipping point has been reached. 
Among Dugin's critics in the West, Dunlop suggests scathingly that such 
militant geopolitics, 'will presumably strike most Western readers as both 
mad and c r u d e . . . H e adds that Dugin's 'ideas and prescriptions are Indeed 
extreme, dangerous and repellent...'^®' Fortunately, with regard to the real 
world of ideologically-driven foreign policy, with Its combination of high level 
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diplomacy and strategic posturing about the wars in Syria and Ukraine, Dugin 
does indeed appear to be naive and ill-informed, not least about his own 
government's policies and intentions. In particular, the Putin/Lavrov 
conciliatory initiative in the first weeks of September, 2013, which gained 
both UN approval and Assad's cooperation for the destruction of his country's 
arsenal of chemical weapons, has emerged as embodying what the President 
Emeritus of The International Crisis Group, Gareth Evans, described as 'good 
international citizenship.'^'" It also directly contributed to Putin's inclusion in 
the list of 278 nominees for the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize 'for his role in 
averting an air strike in Syria after the chemical gas attack in August 2013.'^ 
As a matter of fact, it did indeed embody a timely and imaginative 
compromise between the Western powers, the Russian Federation and China. 
It not only forestalled any likelihood of US congressional endorsement of even 
a limited punitive military intervention in Syria as a result of the country's the 
large-scale deployment of a highly toxic airborne poison. As well, it 
represented a proactive humane hope that at least during the Syrian war 
Obama's red line could not again be crossed and small children murdered in 
this way in the suburbs of Damascus during the silent pre-dawn hours. 
Moreover, the initiative also appeared to demonstrate a convergence of 
opinion between the Russian government, the US's more moderate left-of-
centre Democrats, the anti-Obama Republicans and the majority of ordinary 
Americans. Together it seems they shared an ideological fatigue with regard 
to the cost in blood and treasure of sustaining an interventionist global war on 
terror, especially in the face of BBC reports that the pro-Assad men, women 
and children of Damascus were preparing to stand shoulder-to-shoulder on 
the hills surrounding the city as human shields against a Western attack.^'^ It 
is also reflected a strong memory of the Bush administration's delusional 
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intelligence-gathering on Saddam Hussein's mythical stockpile of weapons of 
mass destruction before the 2003 Iraq War. 
Conclusion: 
Writing in early 2013 in an opinion piece for Britain's Financial Times, Dugin 
strongly defended Putin's new conservatism as pragmatic and not 
transgressive of 'the limits of moderate Western-style nation-building.'^'^ He 
is, Dugin wrote, a conservative moderniser at home and a realist abroad and 
will continue to insist on 'state sovereignty, distrust globalisation, limit 
liberalisation, and keep democracy strictly within a sovereign national 
framework.'^''' In foreign affairs, he added, '"balance of power" is the key to 
understanding Mr Putin's conservatism...He will pursue the national interest, 
regional and global power, protectionism and m e r c a n t i l i s m . 
It should be noted that, like other aspects of Dugin's self-styled explanation of 
Putin's 'art of ruling,' his characterisation of Russia's economic policies as 
'protectionist' seems oddly ill-informed. In 2012 his country ascended to the 
anti-protectionist World Trade Organisation. Still, on the surface at least, his 
article suggests that he finds very little in conservativism, Putin-style, with 
which to disagree. At the same time, most of what he has written elsewhere 
about his own personal ideology amplifies the conservatism outlined in Putin's 
Presidential Address into a doctrine of perennial enmity between Russia and 
America, ultra nationalism, authoritarian government and the need for an 
uncompromising, militant foreign policy stance. By contrast, in his public 
rhetoric Putin has consistently maintained more mainstream conservative 
views. Thus, while Dugin has become part of the conversation in today's 
Russia about geopolitics and the irrelevance of Liberalism, it seems safe to 
conclude his millenarian. Far Right grab-bag of ideas about the imminent 
Armageddon involving East and West are proving to be marginal to Putin's 
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policies. Perhaps too Dugin is among the people around the corridors of the 
Kremlin whom Pavlovsky insists airily 'have completely gone off the bend.'^'^ 
'"•Masyuk, Op.Cit. p5 
CHAPTER FIVE 
LIES, DAMN LIES AND DIPLOAAACY: JOHN LE CARRE, EDWARD SNOWDEN AND 
THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD OF ESPIONAGE. 
Oh what a tangled web we weave 
When first we practise to deceive 
But when you've practised quite a lot 
You really get quite good at it. 
Nicholas Elliot, Director MI6 
I, for one, have always regarded espionage as the vilest 
human pursuit...One loathes spies not so much because of 
their low rung on the evolutionary ladder as because 
betrayal invites you to descend. 
Joseph Brodsky, Of Grief and Reason. 
I believe there is something out there watching over us -
unfortunately it's the government. 
Woody Allen 
This final chapter considers some of the developments in the world of 
espionage as a core aspect of the adversarial contemporary perspectives on 
Russia. As suggested in the introduction, broadly the intensely polarised 
conflicts are between commentaries based on broad-sweeping civilizational 
comparisons, in which Putin's government is characterised by an increasingly 
militant reversion to the autocracy and neo-imperialism of his country's past; 
and those by analysts more sympathetic to Russia, who view the country as 
much misjudged, a place not yet fully understood by the West, one that might 
be evolving its own highly contingent path through modernity. Within this 
second group, there is an underlying distrust of the alleged evidence-based 
insights of scholars and journalists antipathetic to Russia, a deep-seated 
suspicion born of what they dismiss as clearly manifestations of American or 
European ideologically-charged agendas. For their critics, such attitudes are 
redolent of the naivety of those fellow travellers of the first decades of 
Bolshevism. 
Nov^here perhaps is unravelling this tangle of ideology, distrust and scepticism 
more challenging than in the attempts to write truth to the history of 
espionage during the Cold War and afterwards. Admittedly, to the extent that 
any account of the past invites interpretation and counter-interpretation, the 
challenges of elucidating its role during the second half of the twentieth 
century and the first decade and a half of the twenty-first is doubtlessly no 
different from any other historical scholarship. But as is evident in the 
thriving industry in Cold War and post-Cold War academic research, 
documentaries, feature films, novels, biographies, confessional literature and 
exposes by whistle-blowers, especially of the iniquitous conspiracies allegedly 
committed by the CIA and Britain's MIS and MI6, this arena of research is 
marked by the particularly enduring exploration of the elusive subterranean 
role of spying in determining the interplay of international events. From 
double agent Kim Philby's defection to the Soviet Union, to the assassination 
of John F. Kennedy, the Iran Contra Scandal, the destruction of New York's 
Twin Towers and Edward Snowden's monumental theft of his country's secrets, 
it is also a role which was famously characterised by the Cold War CIA 
Director, James Jesus Angleton, as a striving to navigate through 'a wilderness 
of mirrors.' Angleton could well have added a few more lines from the T.S 
Eliot poem, 'Gerontion,' from which he drew the phrase and which reviles the 
spiritual emptiness that is legacy of war, whether covert or on bloodstained 
battlefields: 
After such knowledge what forgiveness? 
Think now History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors 
And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions. 
Guides us by vanities.^ 
Here espionage inhabits a world where almost by definition facts and fictions 
are not easily distinguished, where our moral compass has been fractured and 
I Eliot, T.S. 'Gerontion,'www.bartleby.com/199/13.html 
'neither fear nor courage saves us...'^ Such de facto disabh'ng of our 
Intellectual and ethical certainties by the secret agencies of government has 
invited cynicism about the realities of life under democratic governance. It 
has challenged fundamentally too notions of a deliberative, evidence-based 
inquiry generating much more than tall tales, biographical ruminations and 
probable interpretations, pieced together through incomplete or leaked 
documentation. Often the result is a labyrinthine, confusing narrative, in 
which open source material that depends on alleged expert commentary, 
scholarly research, and reported diplomatic and military initiatives might be 
either undermined or enhanced by inaccessible secret Intelligence. In 
attempting to prise open the world of espionage, with its noble lies by 
governments to foster nationalist sentiment, plausible deniabillty, the 
declaration of states of emergency which bend the laws protecting liberal 
freedoms, and the manipulation of intelligence gathering for pragmatic 
political ends, there always remain questions of what do we not yet know, or 
have not been told? Central to this is the difficulty of evaluating the extent 
to which wittingly or unwittingly the combination of news aggregation across 
global media outlets, including online news organisations, social media and 
blog sites, and selective reporting of propaganda from government and non-
government sources distorts any tenable account of what actually could be 
said to have happened yesterday, last week or last year. 
The chapter Is divided into three sections. The first section considers the 
Interrelated perspectives of two highly significant figures In any explication of 
contemporary espionage. The first is the renegade American security analyst, 
Edward Snowden, who most commentators agree has accomplished the largest 
single theft of covert Information In the history of intelligence organisations. 
The second is spy novelist and public intellectual, John le Carre, whose books 
have been on international bestseller lists consistently throughout the two 
generations that span the transition from the Cold War to the entrenchment 
of the new Russia. The second section explores in more detail the 
implications of contemporary intelligence gathering In the aftermath of the 
2 Ibid. 
Cold War, including its capabilities, limitations and implications for Russia-US 
relations. Section Three constructs a story of Syria's use of chemical 
weapons against its own people as emblematic of the difficulties of separating 
the apparent certainties asserted in public disclosures, for example by the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by the UN and by the Obama 
Administration, from the messy claims about contradictory underlying 
realities. In particular, it provides a unique assemblage of the alleged 
revelations of the significant role of covert intervention by Western 
intelligence agencies in the Syrian war, which have been a central stimulus in 
determining Russian foreign policy towards the conflict. The story primarily 
draws on the flood of intelligence leaked in 2013 by Snowden; the open 
correspondence from a disaffected group of retired American analysts 
formerly employed by the CIA and other US security organisations; and 
information from Syrians themselves which is freely available on the internet. 
Section One: Watching the Watchers. 
Since the launch of one of his most successful novels, The Spy Who Came In 
from the Cold, more than 50 years ago, Britain's John le Carre has been an 
influential figure in framing common perceptions of the unconscionable 
nature of modern espionage. A significant number of his 23 books published in 
the last half century take inspiration from the relations between Cold War and 
post-Cold war Russia and the West, much of it drawing on his insider's 
experience as an employee of his country's intelligence services. In the 
1950s, while he was still in his early twenties, he worked in Austria, 'trolling 
through the displaced persons camps'^ searching for fake refugees and 
potential recruits who could be induced to return to their homelands in 
Eastern Europe to spy for England. As he later discovered, he was one of the 
many intelligence operatives whose name was passed by the leader of the 
Cambridge Five espionage circle, Kim Philby, to his Russian KGB controller.'' In 
1960, after graduating from Oxford University and a string of odd jobs. 
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including a year teaching at Eton, he joined the foreign intelligence service, 
MI6. He became part of what he calls, 'the cold-war set-up properly,' serving 
for a time in the British diplomatic mission in Bonn, until he resigned from the 
service when he was aged 33, 'having made a negligible contr ibut ion.As he 
puts it, '...I don't suppose I spooked around for more than seven or eight 
years...but that was my little university for the purposes I needed later to 
write. 
The result of these years has been that, as a novelist and an outspoken 
political commentator, le Carre rails against the mendacity and occasional 
stupidity of this secret world of double agents, honey-traps, strategic lying, 
the peddling by governments of convenient untruths, pervasive covert 
surveillance, rendition and torture, terminations with extreme prejudice 
(otherwise known as extra-judicial murders), or the funding of proxy wars, for 
example, in Afghanistan, the MENA countries Including Syria, and in Russia's 
spheres of Influence in its near abroad and In Central Asia. Unlike the 
glamorous, womanising members of an upper class, well-funded gentleman's 
club conjured by Ian Fleming's James Bond novels, le Carre's spies are 
marginal, rootless men. Love affairs and friendships are domains of mistrust, 
or romantic causes that expose hidden, often fatal vulnerabilities. The 
conviction that they are fighting the good fight for their country has become a 
half-corroded memory of lost ideals. In a fatalistic way, their acts of 
subversion against their own spymasters are no more than an inadequate 
atonement for all the damage done by their kind. As le Carre's fictional 
honourable schoolboy, Jerry Westerby, reflects, '...trouble is, sport, the 
paying is actually done by other poor sods.'^ One day, Westerby adds, he 
would make a point of telling his Circus controller, George Smiley, what he 
now understood 'about the selfless and devoted way in which we sacrifice 
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other people...'® Most of all, le Carre says, his books are about 'the peculiar 
tension between institutional loyalty and loyalty to oneself; the mystery of 
patriotism...what it's worth and what a corrupting force it can be when 
misapplied.'' In the words of Alec Leamas in The Spy Who Came in from the 
Cold, espionage's dark, sometimes morally repugnant world is inhabited by: 
a squalid procession of vain fools, traitors too, yes: 
pansies, sadists and drunkards, people who play Cowboys 
and Indians to brighten their rotten lives. 
Moreover, during the past 30 years, the sophistication of satellite and other 
forms of computerised surveillance has meant that le Carre has also added a 
new generation of tractable technocratic functionaries, as well as high-
minded whistle-blowers, to his definitional list. 
In critical reviews of his novels, le Carre is sometimes acclaimed as displaying 
an authoritative prescience in revealing the habits of public dishonesty of 
those in power, encapsulated by the satirical dictum 'All power corrupts, but 
some of us have to rule.' As the critic, Mark Lawson, writes, le Carre has 
charted, 'pitilessly for politicians the public and secret histories of his time, 
from the second world war to the "war on terror"." Consider, for example, 
the prodigious revelations about the contemporary world of espionage on the 
USB sticks obtained by The Washington Post and Britain's The Guardian 
newspapers in June 2013. They had been meticulously compiled and indexed 
by Edward Snowden, a former employee of the CIA and of the one of 
America's biggest private security company, Booz Allen Hamilton, which was 
under contract to the National Security Agency (NSA).^^ Former senior 
executives of the $AUD6 billion company include the Clinton Administration's 
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Director of the CIA, R. James Woolsey, and President Obama's current Director 
of National Intelligence, James Clapper. In an uncanny collision of fiction and 
fact, Snowden's leaks emerged less than a month after the publication of le 
Carre's A Delicate Truth. The novel's plot involves the determination of a 
conscience-stricken senior civil servant to bring to account the perpetrators of 
a botched joint operation betv^een British intelligence and a US private 
defence contractor called Ethical Outcomes. 
After extensive consultations v^ith US and British intelligence agencies, both 
The Washington Post and The Guardian newspapers published only a small 
quantity of Snowden's leaked information because sensitive details on current 
operations were 'so pervas i ve .S t i l l , the reports did contain a twenty-page 
summary of the $AUD57 billion 'black budget' for fiscal year 2013 for the 
funding of an American 'espionage emp i r e ' . Among the notable revelations 
was that the largest share of the proposed budget went to a resurgent CIA, 
whose various initiatives included an energetic engagement in renewed 
efforts to sabotage or steal information from foreign and domestic computer, 
mobile phone and landline networks. It was also revealed that there has been 
extensive collaboration between the US and Britain's Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to ensure the further development of 
these sophisticated satellite and electronic surveillance systems which dally 
sweep the planet vacuuming up information indiscriminately on both private 
citizens and public figures. Not surprisingly perhaps, in the wake of 
Snowden's leaks, Putin has described the internet as a long-term CIA 
controlled project which was still developing and from which Russia needed to 
be protected.^^ Although confirming the existence of surveillance of criminals 
and potential terrorists In his own country, Putin has also denied that his 
government engages in US-style mass-scale spying on Russian citizens. 'We 
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don't have as much money as they do in the US,' he said, adding, 'Our special 
services, thank God, are controlled by society and the lav/...'^ ^ 
The American reality, Snowden said, was that the nature of his v^ork as an 
employee contracted to the NSA meant that he v^as in clear violation of the 
US Constitution. Under the programme, 'Boundless Informant,' he was able 
to access the mapping of 'incidents of NSA Interception, collection, storage 
and analysis of events around the w o r l d . T h e s e indicated that the Agency 
was collecting more information about its own citizens than about Russians in 
Russia. Whenever one of his fellow Americans picked up the phone, made a 
call, a purchase, bought a book, Snowden said, he could sit at his desk and 
see it crossing his screen.^® 
Still, despite the extensive global surveillance, the Black Budget's explanatory 
notes also outlined the existence of 'critical blind spots'.^' Not surprisingly 
perhaps, at the top of a very short list was North Korea. But significantly, 
Russia was firmly among those countries whose government had been proving 
to be 'difficult to penetrate.'^" In particular, it had not been possible for the 
US to assess 'how Russia's government leaders are likely to respond to 
"potentially destabilizing events In Moscow, such as large protests or terrorist 
attacks.'" Beyond high level diplomatic exchanges and electronic and 
satellite surveillance that yields information, for example about military 
deployments, economic initiatives or infrastructure development, the 
question remains of the extent to which uncertainty about the motives behind 
the Kremlin's policy directions might continue to be added to the NSA's list of 
known unknowns. If so, it would be interesting to speculate why there appear 
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to be no secret briefings and back channels between the West and Russia of 
the kind that have been well-documented as having taken place during the 
later decades of the Cold War. 
Snowden's leaked information that America's spy agencies admitted to having 
comparatively negligible intelligence on the motives and intentions of the 
Kremlin's powerbrokers provides a mystifying contrast to their public response 
to his leaks. In May 2014, The Wall Street Journal carried a damning report 
on Snowden by journalist Edward Jay Epstein, headlined 'Was Snowden's Heist 
a Foreign Espionage Operation?' Four days later the conclusions of Epstein's 
article were partially challenged by the Washinston Post,^'^ which nine months 
earlier had been one of the first to publish the selections from the NSA's Black 
Budget papers. Nevertheless, Epstein's allegations were swiftly repeated or 
summarised across dozens of international online websites and blogs. His 
report had aimed to make nonsense of what it argued were ill-informed 
assumptions about Snowden's motives. There had been an ingenuous and 
unjustified celebration, Epstein suggested, of Snowden's presumed courage 
and extraordinary personal integrity. The eulogising of his actions was 
exemplified by le Carre's comments in his interview with the German current 
affairs magazine, Der Spiegel, shortly after it had been made public that the 
NSA surveillance programme included the hacking of Chancellor Angela 
Merkel's private conversations on her mobile phone. Le Carre's response was 
that Snowden deserved a medal for unveiling the monstrosities committed by 
the NSA and reminding Americans of their need to protect their hard-won 
liberal freedoms.^^ 'I was aware how the Americans skim everything,' he said, 
"... And of course it is illegal.'^'' 
Epstein's counter-argument seemed to be exclusively based on circumstantial 
evidence. Analysis of the chronology and content of the 1.7 million 
documents downloaded by Snowden from the NSA's Sigints (Signals) 
" Baker, Stewart, 'Is Snowden A Spy?' Washinston Post, May ll"", 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
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Intelligence Centre in Hawaii, Epstein wrote, has strongly indicated to many 
in the senior ranks of the US intelligence community that his whole operation 
had been controlled by the Russians. Specifically, much of the information 
was said to refer to America's multifaceted strategic defence. According to a 
former senior CIA official, Robert Baer, who claims continuing close links with 
the spy agency, Snowden leaks had the hallmarks of a brilliantly planned FSB 
operation. Admittedly he could not prove such an allegation, Baer said, 
adding that nevertheless 'it makes an old Cold War warrior like me very 
s u s p i c i o u s . I n addition, there was the fact that Snowden was subsequently 
granted asylum by the Putin government. This has meant that an enemy of 
the United States now has access to detailed documentation of 
'unprecedented size and complexity'^' of the 'military capabilities, 
operations, tactics, techniques and procedures'," including America's foreign 
and domestic espionage, particularly 'the secret operations against the cyber 
capabilities of adversaries.'^^ 
For many of Snowden's US critics, the salient point was his obvious 
anticipation of the strong probability that his revelations would inevitably 
jeopardize his personal security. Epstein claimed that from the beginning of 
his self-imposed exile, Snowden had deliberately made available to the 
general public 'only a minute fraction'^'of the NSA material he had copied. As 
a calculated means of ensuring that he would find safe haven in Russia, his 
whistle-blowing narrative is thus 'at best incomplete, at worst fodder for the 
n a i v e . I n other words, Snowden is simply an ego-driven, dissembling, A-list 
traitor who has imperilled the security of his homeland under the guidance of 
Putin's security service. 
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How plausible are such incriminating accusations? As suggested above, 
without considerably more information that might or might not be available 
to the American intelligence community, it is impossible to evaluate the 
evidence with even a hint of conviction. Are they perhaps the belated 
response of a destabilised US security establishment, which has become 
unhinged by new Cold War paranoia? Or are they part of a deliberately 
misleading strategy of attempted damage control? If so, on the surface at 
least, they have all the bathos of a ham-fisted case of implausible deniability, 
that has simply utilised a sympathetic media outlet, both to vilify Snowden 
and evoke a populist narrative of America under siege from Russian spies, as 
well as Islamist terrorists. 
The difficulty here is that even as the plot of a le Carre novel about a 
successful conspiracy by the Russians, in which the entire inner core of the 
NSA's secrets and lies is exposed by the well-intentioned treason of a middle-
ranking, 29-year-old computer technician, it is likely to strain credibility. On 
the other hand, as an actual sequence of events, Snowden's intelligence coup 
might suggest a case of 'stranger than fiction' that is not without precedent. 
For almost thirty years beginning in the mid-1930s, Britain's double agent, 
Kim Philby, shunted copies of files crammed with almost the entire MI6 
archive to 'Moscow C e n t r a l , t o the astonished chagrin of his family, close 
friends and many of his colleagues. As Macintyre writes, ironically there were 
periods when the ease with which this was achieved left even the Cold War 
Russian intelligence organisations incredulous about the veracity of what 
Philby had passed onto them." 
'Well done, lad! ' " was le Carre's response to what he believed was Snowden's 
professional agility in defence of the rights enshrined in the American 
Constitution. He also warned him to pay careful attention to his own safety, 
because in the corridors of US power he had committed 'a mortal sin - you 
le Carre's fictional term for KGB headquarters in Moscow during the Cold War. 
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have made the U.S. government and corporate America look like idiots.'^ 
Evidently too, le Carre's unequivocal endorsement of Snowden's efforts has 
been shared by assorted members of the West's political commentariat, not 
least in America. Right Wing Texan Conservative, Ron Paul, for example, 
praised him for having 'done a great service to the American people by 
exposing the truth about what our government is doing in s e c r e t . I n 2013, 
Snowden was awarded the Sam Adams Award for Integrity in Intelligence. The 
award was established in 2002 in honour of CIA whistle-blower Samuel A 
Adams, who documented the Johnson's Administration's lies about the 
escalation of the Vietnam War. Among the previous winners are Wikileaks 
founder Julian Assange; Snowden's fellow NSA employee, Tom Drake; and the 
retired intelligence analyst with Australia's Office of National Assessments 
(ONA), Andrew Wilkie,^' who accused the Howard government of exaggerating 
intelligence to justify support for the US invasion of Iraq." 
In common with Vladimir Putin, Snowden was also nominated for the 2014 
Nobel Peace Prize. In their supporting testimonial, the two members of 
parliament from Norway's Socialist Left Party, Baard Vegar Solhjell and Snorre 
Valen, described him as contributing to the creation of a more stable and 
peaceful world order.^^ in 2014, he was awarded the Ridenhour Prize for Truth 
Telling in a ceremony at Washington's National Press Club. Presenter James 
Bamford suggested jokingly that Snowden's achievement was that NSA now 
stood for 'Not Secret Anymore. ' " Previous winners of this award include 
Daniel Ellsberg, who in 1971 while employed by the Rand Corporation leaked 
the 7000 page Pentagon Papers which documented the Johnson 
Administration's 'self-serving, presidential and congressional objectives in 
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prolonging and escalating an unwinnable conflict""' 1n Vietnam; and Seymour 
Hersh who had unveiled the My Lai massacre by American troops during the 
Vietnam War, and the culture of torture and humiliation of prisoners held at 
Abu Ghraib in Afghanistan. 
In his Ridenhour Prize acceptance speech delivered by video link, Snowden 
strongly endorsed le Carre's apprehensions about the erosion of liberal values 
as a result of the failure of proper vigilance by his country's citizens. He 
emphasised the absolute necessity of continuing to press for reform to the 
weak accountability legislation for surveillance operations by intelligence 
agencies. Referring to Benjamin Franklin's oft-quoted aphorism, it was a 
matter, he said, of 'A republic, if we can keep it."*^ 
At the same time, Snowden insisted in an interview following his acceptance 
speech that the ethics of leaking information always presented a complex and 
difficult dilemma because 'every case is unique. It depends on what you see, 
how do you see it, what is involved."*^ He warned that, however seemingly 
justified, revealing classified information should be a path of last resort, one 
that is approached with circumspection and awareness of the likely 
consequences. As a first step, he advocated lobbying members of Congress, 
not least for better legal protection of whistle-blowers, so that 'if you reveal 
classic waste, fraud and abuse, frivolous spending..."'^ the FBI will not be able 
to 'kick in your door, pull you out of your shower naked at gunpoint in front of 
your family and ruin your life."^ This was the experience, Snowden believed, 
of whistle-blower Tom Drake, a former senior NSA executive who a few years 
earlier also had made public his allegations that the agency's surveillance 
programme was violating the liberties of American citizens. In 2011, having 
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drained his family's finances on legal defence, Drake could be found working 
in an Apple store in Washington answering questions about iPhones/^ 
It should be emphasised though that, as with le Carre, Snowden's cautious 
endorsement of whistle-blowing did not imply a general condemnation of 
espionage. Neither man has questioned the fundamental necessity of spying 
as a means of safeguarding the security of his country. Rather the issue is 
who spies on the spies to ensure the protection of the rights of individuals 
against immoral and illegal practices by the covert institutions of government. 
In this context, le Carre distinguishes between essential intelligence that: 
At its best...is simply the left arm of healthy government 
curiosity. It brings to strong government what it needs to 
know. It's a journalistic job...but done in secret...But it's 
a good job as long as intelligence services collect 
sensible information and report it to their governments, 
and as long as that intelligence is properly used, thought 
about and evaluated. 
As well, le Carre adds, it is unquestionably important 'to spy the hell out of"' 
terrorist organisations. But all the rest of what he calls junk, including 
intervention, destabilisation and assassination is '...not only anti-constitutional 
but unproductive and silly'"® because of the law of unintended consequences: 
Look at Afghanistan. We recruited the Muslim extremist 
movement to assist us in the fight against Russia, and we 
let loose a demon.'" 
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Also on le Carre's list of junk espionage is the information gathered by 
America's unconstrained global satellite and electronic surveillance systems; 
'...the cost of the evaluation,' he says, 'is disproportionate to the result.'^"His 
controversial underlying suggestion is that the gathering of human intelligence 
(HUMINT) by skilled professionals in direct communication with informants in 
various countries may be more reliably, rapidly and less expensively 
interpreted than a dense swamp of electronic data. 
Nevertheless, as Snowden and le Carre both argue, there appear to be no easy 
answers to the challenge of knowing how far one should go in defending the 
liberal democratic values of one's country, whether as a whistle-blowing 
intelligence analyst or a spy. Behind their view is the assumption that this 
should not be an innocent question, that it Is necessary to weigh carefully the 
costs not only to yourself, but also to those you love and to your fellow 
citizens, of breaking open a world of secret information. In the words of 
Graham Greene, whose influence on his own work le Carre has acknowledged, 
in such circumstances innocence 'is like a dumb leper who has lost his bell, 
wandering the world, meaning no harm.'^^ In le Carre's fiction, to be a spy is 
to have been trained to distrust mere good intentions in favour of outcomes, 
of being one step ahead of the game. It is a role that at best Is morally 
ambiguous, enmeshed in complex plots and places where it is no longer 
certain that worldliness and tradecraft will, or should, turn out to be more 
important than compassion towards others. Implicit in this perspective is 
Isaiah Berlin's unfounded assertion that to be human Is to share an atavistic 
revulsion for the notion that the sacrifice of even a single individual is an 
acceptable price to pay for the future happiness of all of us. 
For le Carre's spies, the problem is that to place the needs of one person 
above some hollow, utilitarian pursuit of the national good most often means 
that they become martyrs in what after all might be an insignificant moral 
gesture. By the end of The Spy Who Came in from the Cold, when Alec 
Leamas realises he has been misled and manipulated in a repugnant. 
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politically expedient intelligence operation masterminded by Britain's George 
Smiley, he chooses to be shot alongside his lover, Liz Gold, by the security 
guards in the no-man's-land that divided East and West Berlin. His is an act of 
contrition for his part in the conspiracy of circumstances that led to her 
murder; and a romantic vindication of the transcendent value of his love for 
her. At the same time, because he is a dispensable, down-at-heel, aging spy, 
v/ho has foolishly defied the call of his masters to save himself, Leamas's 
death is unlikely to elicit much regret, or even to be long remembered, in the 
shadowlands he has inhabited. 
Unlike Snowden's carefully-planned rebuke to his country's illiberal 
powerbrokers, le Carre conjures a much darker world where espionage and 
ideology deliberately conspire against a compassionate acknowledgement of 
humanity's frailties. Often his novels emerge as modern allegories about 
moral corruption, as a kind of revelatory warning of the existence of 
contagious sociopathic forms of human evil. Spying may be driven by hatred 
as much as by high-mindedness, and its methods may mirror the worst 
excesses of the enemy. In the final pages of Smiley's People, the Russian 
masterspy, Karla, has been defeated by his old adversary, George Smiley, who 
has pursued him through the landscapes of his crimes, his tortures, his 
murders, the cunning of his wreckage of Smiley's marriage, and of the British 
secret service, to which belonged Smiley's unfaltering loyalty. But waiting in 
the snowy, freezing evening for Karla to cross the bridge from East to West 
Berlin where the lamplighters of British Intelligence are waiting for him. 
Smiley finds himself unable to accept that this is the moment of his triumph. 
Overwhelmingly he understands too clearly that Karla's defection is neither 
proof of his professional mastery of his enemy, nor a fitting retribution for all 
the killing. As an old man making his way slowly, Karla has acquired a human 
face. His betrayal of his homeland is driven by his self-sacrificial love for the 
vulnerable, wayward daughter he has sought to hide in a Swiss sanitarium. 
Smiley looked across the river, le Carre writes: 
...and an unholy vertigo seized him as the very evil he 
had fought against seemed to reach out and possess 
him...On Karla had descended the curse of Smiley's 
compassion; on Smiley the curse of Karla's fanaticism. I 
haveve destroyed him with the weapons I abhorred and 
they are his. We have crossed each other's frontiers, we 
are the no-men of this no-man's- land." 
In the first book of the Smiley trilogy, Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy, the 
narcissistic cruelty of the mole. Bill Hayden, is emblematic too of this 
contagious malevolent fanaticism. 'What the gods and all reasonable humans 
fought in vain,' le Carre writes, 'was sheer, wanton, bloody indifference to 
anybody's interests but their own. ' " In common with descriptions of Kim 
Philby, on whom le Carre's characterisation is based, Hayden appears to be 
charming, irreverent, smart-as-hell, beguilingly worldly in his affected 
cynicism. For the privileged members of England's Pigs in Clover Society, 
Hayden quips, the name of the game these days is: 
You scratch my conscience, I'll drive your jag...As a good 
socialist, I 'm going where the money is; as a good 
capitalist, I 'm going with the revolution. If you can't 
beat it, spy on it.^'' 
Similarly, le Carre suggests Philby's secret life in the service of the Soviet 
Union guaranteed him membership of an even more exclusive club, made up 
of his succession of comradely KGB controllers, and of those few men from his 
university days who shared his contempt for the hypocrisy of his colleagues 
and for Britain's decaying grandiosity. As well, his outrageous, bullying, upper 
class father and his absentee mother had created In him an outsider's 
sensibility. Philby himself denied he was a traitor. 'To betray you have to first 
belong,' he said, 'I never belonged. I was a straight penetration agent. ' " 
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The implication too is that his youthful romance with Marxism as a student at 
Cambridge, which led to his recruitment by the KGB, had opened up to him 
the seductive excitement of some kind of underground act of revenge.^^ In le 
Carre's contentious opinion, Philby 'really carried, metaphorically, a pistol in 
his pocket for the whole of society. If anything embraced him, he wanted to 
kill i t . ' " Such men, he implies, constitute the kind of dangerous fanatics 
about whom Isaiah Berlin also repeatedly warned us: those for whom the most 
punitive, barbaric means are justified in the pursuit of self-aggrandising, 
vengeful, messianic ends, whether of a world made perfect by communism's 
Utopian dreams or safe for the allegedly exemplary universal freedoms of the 
world's democracies. To paraphrase Alexander Herzen, ordinary human beings 
become merely collateral damage on the altar of such abstractions. Or for 
such fanatics, le Carre writes, 'killing had never been more than the 
necessary adjunct of a grand d e s i g n . T h o u g h meagre consolation, Philby's 
prodigious, self-destructive consumption of alcohol, which intensified as MIS 
closed In on him, as well as the final quarter century of his marginal, 
disappointed, degraded existence in Moscow, points away from any kind of 
rapturous vindication of his communist convictions towards 'a sharp sense of 
their futility.'" 
Still, it has been estimated that Philby was responsible for the deaths of 
hundreds of agents of British and American intelligence across Europe and the 
Middle East, as well as the failure of every one of its major Cold War 
operations against the Soviet Union. According to the former CIA operative. 
Miles Copeland, who had believed himself to be one of Philby's closest friends 
during their time together In Beirut in the early 1960s, 'We'd have been 
better off doing nothing. 
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In the aftermath of the information now publicly available online (and 
perhaps more extensively to the Russian government), through Snowden's 
monumental leaks, the question is whether the same observation could be 
made today about the West's staggeringly expensive global surveillance 
programmes? So far, as Baer points out, they seem to have had limited 
success in the crucial challenge of predicting acts of terrorism; instead their 
usefulness has been primarily in reconstructing crimes, such as the Boston 
Marathon bombing, after they have been committed.'^ Conversely though, 
Baer argues that Snowden's information may have contributed to America's 
uncertainty about Putin's intentions in Crimea, as the Russians 'could have 
changed the codes and frequencies of communications to stop the US listening 
i n . ' " Or more memorably, he says the impact of Snowden's revelations may 
have necessitated the rebuilding of all such aspects of the West's 
compromised intelligence apparatus/^ 
Implicitly this might suggest that, together with the acknowledged failure of 
the US intelligence-gathering networks to have actually infiltrated the inner 
circles of the Kremlin, their other, more technologically-sophisticated, forms 
of espionage, such as satellite and electronic surveillance, have suffered a 
dramatic setback. On the other hand, it should be emphasised perhaps that 
because his leaks constituted a limited snapshot of the NSA, circa August 
2013, it appears very likely that he created only a temporary hiatus in the 
West's ambition for total global surveillance. Given the current depths of 
disaffection between Putin's Russia and the US, again this raises the question 
of what exactly in the Obama Administration's response to the post-Snowden 
crisis in Ukraine might have been different if this alleged black hole in its 
intelligence had not opened briefly? 
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Section Two: What do we know and how do we know it? 
One of the more common, liberal-oriented perspectives on relations between 
the Kremlin and the US government is that they might best be defined as a 
case of mutually assured incomprehension. As noted in the previous chapter, 
it is a view currently strongly shared by Nixon's National Security Advisor, 
Henry Kissinger, who spent much of the later decades of the Cold War on 
diplomatic missions to Moscow and continues to be well-known and welcomed 
in Kremlin circles.^'' Harvard-trained Sovietologist, Angela Stent, warns too 
that much of the academic scholarship that informs US policy-making was 
squandered during the decade after the collapse of communism in the 
fantasies of the economists and democracy experts who flocked to Moscow, 
knowing very little about Russia. Nor are sufficient funds now being directed 
into American universities, she says, to cultivate a new generation of 
Russianists with an insider's understanding of events such as the crisis in 
Ukraine or the Putin government's foreign policies in the Middle East. In the 
absence of such scholarship enriching both public opinion and analytical 
intelligence gathering, there is now talk of 'a new Cold War and how hard 
Vladimir Putin will play "great power" p o l i t i c s . 
Today's Russia, Stent insists gently, is very different from Soviet times. Its 
people are open and accessible 'on the street and in the square', and 'it is 
possible to meet for hours with Putin, as I have done every year over the past 
decade, and challenge him with questions.'^' Stent's observations about her 
country's failure to comprehend in any depth what has changed in Russia since 
the fall of communism are echoed in the NSA's claim in its leaked 2013 Black 
Budget papers that there are critical gaps in its intelligence about the 
Kremlin. As suggested above, for an outsider to the closed world of spying, it 
seems to be a remarkably puzzling and possibly disingenuous statement. If 
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true, why exactly has it proven to be so difficult for Americans to infiltrate 
the Russian Federation's inner circles of power, in comparison to their 
apparent successes in almost every other country in the world? Assisted by the 
daily sweep of satellite and electronic surveillance or, more close at hand, a 
new generation of remote, wireless USB sticks, have there really been no 
instances of successful phone or internet hacking of the Kremlin's high-level 
politicians? Alternatively, perhaps even before the possible contribution of 
Snowden's leaks, Russia's information technology and counterespionage has 
been more than a match for the NSA? 
A possible explanation could be that the decline in tertiary education in 
Russian studies signalled by Stent is reflected in the quality of America's or 
Britain's HUMINT. Typically, the West's Cold War spies were recruited from 
Oxbridge or Ivy League universities, were members of the upper classes, were 
very good multi-linguists and, not always judiciously, were believed by their 
colleagues to be 'one of us.' As le Carre suggests, the harvesting of HUMINT 
by personal networking and interviews with significant contacts, as well as by 
using the obsessive archival skills of a George Smiley or the Connie Sachs, 
requires a rich sense of the history and culture of a country such as Russia. 
Ironically, his 'perfect spy', Magnus Pym,^^ is also an accomplished liar, with 
an exceptional, chameleon-like talent for convincingly inhabiting whatever 
persona is required of him. Though it can turn out to be a dangerous, grubby 
occupation, in le Carre's novels the best of British spying is generally 
undertaken by imaginative, reliable, well-trained chaps, home counties types, 
such as Jim Prideaux or Smiley himself, with only a modicum of personal 
vanity and an unexpected amount of Integrity and courage. With regard to 
the complexities of Putin's government, it could be said that these days there 
is simply an insufficient quota of such people in MI6's or the CIA's Russia 
sections. 
Interestingly, le Carre has been accused of having an old Cold War warrior's 
nostalgia for HUMINT, which has failed to keep abreast of the developments in 
Signals intelligence (SIGINT). Le Carre is to intelligence gathering, Burridge 
" le Carre, John, The Perfect Spy, Op.Git. 
writes, 'as the -century Luddites were to the industrial revolution - a rabid 
foe of technology.'^® Burridge argues that in large measure le Carre's scorns 
SIGINT because it is US dominated and exemplifies that country's 
'technological arrogance.'^' Certainly American spies are among the least 
endearing characters in his novels, but many of his fictional British spooks 
such as Percy Alleline or Jack Brotherhood are similarly malleable and 
ethically obtuse. As argued above, le Carre consistently writes as much about 
the limitations of HUMINT as its successes, the harm it can cause as well as its 
achievements. His distrust of SIGINT seems more a matter of the ways he 
believes it dehumanises the processes of espionage to achieve ends that 
demonstrably have violated liberal freedoms in an unconstrained cyberworld. 
By comparison, human agency is 'often far more reliable,' he says, 'than the 
inductive fantasies, which result from the reading of signals and codes and 
photographs.'^" 
Still, it is possible to argue that le Carre does indeed have a relatively 
outmoded perspective on the contemporary world of spying. The horror of 
the destruction of New York's twin towers by a handful of Islamists has been 
an enormous incentive for the erection of a less divisive paradigm for 
intelligence gathering and for what the NSA calls overseas 'contingency 
operations.' Dramatically enhanced by the technological advancements in 
global surveillance, it is one in which ideally the relationship between secret 
agents and SIGINT has become more closely intermeshed. Consider, for 
example, the utilisation of Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX), which 
allegedly intensified in 2011 after US special forces 'acquired computers and 
various storage devices and media from Osama bin Laden's hideout.' ' 
DOMEX's mission statement is to ensure all acquired intelligence, whether 
open source or covert, is analysed and then submitted to a centralised 
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clearing house which disseminates it to all US intelligence agencies/^These 
include, for example, the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the CIA, 
the NSA, the Department of Homeland Security and the Defence Cyber Crime 
Centre (DCCC). Presumably it also shares it with Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, and the UK under the multi-lateral Five Eyes agreement, described 
by Snowden as 'a supranational intelligence organisation that doesn't answer 
to the laws of its own countries. 
Apart from interviews and Interrogations, DOMEX's source materials constitute 
a form of crime scene investigation of almost any information collected in the 
field. The list includes letters, diaries, notes, books, identity cards, cell 
phones, answering machines, radios, computer files, USB sticks, digital 
cameras and video, sound or voice recordings.^" As well, any information 
about the environment and circumstances in which the materials are found, 
and its links to other sites and networks of information, is added to what 
seemingly becomes an increasingly dense and challenging spaghetti of 
analysis. Ultimately the quality of the conclusions depends both on how 
painstaking is the collection of raw data by intelligence officers and whether 
a clear distinction can be made between sound judgment and half-
substantiated opinion. 
The following section explores this Issue of whether such a coordinated, 
multifaceted approach to intelligence gathering might be any more reliable 
than le Carre's superannuated form of HUMINT. Its focus is the leaked 
intelligence, dysinformation and open source material surrounding the 
deployment of chemical weapons in Ghouta on the outskirts of Damascus on 
August , 2013. Determining who was to blame has been an ongoing, highly-
charged arena of contention between the American and Russian governments. 
It Is also revealing of the easy dismissal in non-Russian commentaries, both 
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scholarly and in public discussion, that commitment to legal cosmopolitanism 
might be a feature of Russian foreign policy with regard to Syria. 
Section Three: Lies, Damn Lies and Russian-US Diplomacy, A Syrian Story 
In the ragged, treeless desolation of Syria's Qalamoun Mountains, on the edge 
of the small township of Qara, is the ancient Melkite Greek Catholic 
monastery of St James the Mutilated. Like the landscape that surrounds it, its 
high walls are the colour of pale brown sand. It is an austere, weathered 
stone building that has endured across more than fifteen centuries. For the 
Belgium Catholic priest, Father Daniel Maess, who has been Director of its 
seminary since 2010, it is a place of intense, pure spirituality. He was drawn 
there, he said, by the monastery's deeply ecumenical vision: 'What touches 
me...is the freedom, the freedom of the children of God. ' " Young people of 
all creeds are welcome, not to be instructed in doctrine or to learn to obey 
the rules of the monastic Christian community. Instead it is meant to provide 
a haven where they will be helped in their search for the godliness hidden in 
the depths of their hearts and to find their personal vocation.^' Since the 
beginning of the Syria's civil war in March 2011, Father Maess said, it has also 
provided shelter and help to refugee groups, 'regardless of their religious 
affiliations.'^^ 
The monastery is close to Syria's border with Lebanon in an area that has 
been a strategic crossing point for supplies and for the rebel soldiers of Syria's 
Free Syrian Army (FSA), as well as non-Syrian Islamist soldiers from Hezbollah, 
the Al Qaeda affiliate, the Al Nusra Front, or recruited from other countries 
across the Middle East, Europe, Russia, Central Asia, America and Australia. 
Towards the end of 2013 the intensification of fighting created yet another 
wave of hundreds of displaced families escaping over winter's snow-covered 
mountains to the Lebanese refugee camps. The monastery too was damaged 
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by gunfire and the bombing by Syrian government army helicopters that were 
probably targeting the rebels' arms depots 'placed in trenches...used for 
supplies of water in the Byzantine period.'^® For Father Maess, there can be 
no victors in this war, only a savage, lawless chaos: 
The Syrian regime had long since lost all credibility. 
Today, the urgency is to allow Syria to survived' 
The monastery has also been the home of Mother Agnes Mariam de la Croix, 
where she has been Mother Superior of its female community and a 
passionate, outspoken supporter of its ecumenism. Although her background 
is Lebanese/Palestinian, she has lived in Syria for almost two decades. She 
describes the people of her adopted country as a multi-faith family, whose 
aspirations for democratic reforms she supports, while lamenting what she 
sees as the reality that Syria's thwarted Arab Spring has plunged into an abyss 
of sectarian bloodshed. Tragically, the secular, liberal voices of the uprising, 
she says, are now being ignored in what has become a proxy war involving 
both regional and global powers. The demands of the anti-government 
protestors who gathered on the streets of Damascus at the beginning of 2012 
have served 'as a Trojan horse'®" for intervention by foreign governments. 
This has been especially evident in the hijacking of the uprising by non-Syrian 
militant members of Al Qaeda and other Islamist fighters funded by the Saudi 
monarchy.8^ For though the Sunnis constitute around sixty percent of the 
Syrian population, she says, 'nobody has ever said that all the Sunnis aim...to 
adopt a Wahhabi-like system. 
Like Father Maess, Mother Agnes Mariam is a partisan political advocate for 
peace, whose work has received endorsement from the Vatican and from 
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Catholic groups in America, Australia and Ireland. In January, 2012, she 
helped to found Mussalaha (Reconciliation), which describes itself as 'a 
community-based, non-violent popular initiative stemming from within Syrian 
society.'®^ The initiative's website gives no indication of the numbers and 
reach of its membership, claiming only that it includes 'all Syria's ethnic and 
religious communities who are tired of the war.'®"* In 2013 it became an 
integral part of an international Syrian Solidarity Movement, which not only 
shares its website but also regularly features Mother Agnes Mariam's public 
statements in response to events within Syria. One of the movement's most 
prominent recruits is the Irish Catholic peace activist, Mairead Maguire, who 
in January 2014 nominated Mother Mariam for the Nobel Peace Prize, which 
she herself had been awarded in 1976 for her work with the 'Women for 
Peace' movement in Northern Ireland. She describes Mother Mariam as 'a 
modern hero for p e a c e , w h o s e voice on behalf of Syria's victims of the 
imported terror and home-grown conflict has been 'clear and pure:'®^ 
she has chosen to risk her own existence for the safety 
and security of others. She has spoken out against the 
lack of truth in our media regarding Syria. 
Not every Syria watcher endorses Mairead Maguire's glowing view of Mother 
Mariam's heroic political and religious convictions. Despite such an ostensibly 
impeccable curriculum vitae, the nun has been accused of being an apologist 
for the Assad regime by supporters of the rebels' struggle against what they 
believe is an intransigent, bloody-minded autocracy. Moreover, they claim she 
is not only proven herself to be a useful propagandist for the existing 
government's alleged inclusiveness and traditions of tolerance of Syria's 
diverse ethnic and religious groups. She has also helped to create a distorted 
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picture of the Syrian war as a regional power grab by barbaric Islamic 
fundamentalists, which has resonated well with the Russian government's pro-
Assad foreign policy stance. 
Specifically, her critics allege that her prejudiced political affiliations are 
clearly evident in Mother Mariam's questioning of the documentary evidence 
provided by the United Nations(UN) Mission investigating the allegations 
regarding the use of sarin gas in the August 21, 2013 massacre of civilians in 
the Eastern and Western Ghouta areas on the outskirts of Damascus. The UN 
team had concluded that 'there was clear and convincing evidence that 
chemical weapons were used against civilians, including children, on a 
relatively large scale....'®' This evidence included their alleged confirmation: 
that the exploded rockets and the surrounding area where people were 
affected were contaminated with sarin; that the blood and urine samples 
from affected patients tested positive for sarin; that in the more than fifty 
interviews with survivors, health care workers and first responders many of 
them reported that there were dead and dying in the streets whose bodies 
were unmarked by wounds from conventional weapons; and that the local 
hospitals had been overwhelmed by victims of the attack, with symptoms 
compatible with sarin poisoning.'® 
It should be noted that the UN investigators also stressed that the terms of 
the ceasefire negotiated with local rebel groups to ensure their safe passage 
through Ghouta's streets meant that they had limited access to the five sites 
it examined. In practical terms, this entailed from two and a half to five hours 
at each site over a three day period. They reported too that: 
The sites have been well travelled by other individuals 
both before and during the investigation. Fragments and 
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other evidence have clearly been handled/moved prior 
to the arrival of the investigation team.'^ 
As a result, v/ith regard to the critical issue of contention between Russia and 
the West about v^ho was to blame for the attacks, the report was careful not 
to attribute responsibility either to the Assad regime or to the opposition 
rebels. It did, however, provide a detailed description of some of the rockets 
used, and was able to include a photograph of Cyrillic script on an M14 
artillery rocket, which appeared to confirm its Russian manufacture. In two 
cases, the report concluded that the reverse azimuth of their trajectories 
indicated that the rockets had been launched Into the suburbs of Ghouta from 
the north-west of Damascus. Based on this information, a consensus quickly 
emerged between the UN, the US and European countries sympathetic to the 
Syrian opposition movement that the pro-Assad Syrian army was responsible 
for the attack using its military Installation in this area. 
At the same time, as the Russian government was quick to point out, it 
appears to be equally possible to counter that this consensus should not be 
regarded as conclusive. 'We have serious grounds to believe the attack was a 
provocation by the rebels,' was Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's response to 
the UN report.'^ Its central flaw, he added, was that while it confirmed that 
chemical weapons (CWs) had been used in Ghouta, it had not resolved the 
central issue of 'whether the weapons were produced in a factory or home-
made. ' " In common with Father Maess and Mother Mariam, Lavrov's 
statements embraced the view that, in violation of the humane international 
protocols against the use of CWs, the rebels had murdered civilians in their 
own strongholds of Damascus In a bid to incite a punitive military intervention 
by the West against the Assad regime. Underlying this view Is the analytical 
bedrock of strategic geopolitics: If you want to know the motive, first look for 
those who you believe have the most to gain. In other words, Syria's Islamist 
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fighters were barbarous fanatics, who had not hesitated to massacre the 
innocent in pursuit of their messianic aims. 
Certainly, this is the assumption shared by Mother Agnes Mariam who in mid-
September, 2013 downloaded onto the Syrian Solidarity Movement website her 
own 44-page report into the Ghouta attacks. She has also distributed it at the 
UN in Geneva. Despite the brief eruption of publicity she received in the 
Western media, her conclusions have emerged as highly speculative, which 
perhaps helps to explain why they have not elicited an official response either 
from the UN, or from British, Western European or American governments. 
They have however been cited by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov as 
supporting evidence for the rebels' culpability. 
Her report provides an alternative account of the events of August 21 that 
radically challenges the results of the UN Mission. Instead she has woven 
together an acutely distressing horror story of hidden atrocities against young 
children and adolescents and the stage-managing by the opposition movement 
of the presentation of their bodies to the UN investigators and to the world 
media as the victims of a sarin attack by Assad's forces. Her analysis is based 
on her re-construction of the reported chronology of the attacks, as well as 
her interpretation of 13 videos that she alleges were 'amongst the first 35 to 
have been uploaded by video makers of the Local Coordination Committees of 
the rebels in East Ghouta. ' ' " These 'rebel videos' were wrongly 
authenticated, she says, by the US Intelligence Community and screened on 
September 5, 2013 to America's Senate Intelligence Committee 'to 
incriminate the Syrian State for the illegal use of Chemical arms...''^ 
Mother Mariam says her report was prompted by families contacting her 
organisation, who had recognised their abducted children 'among those who 
are presented in the videos as victims As she puts it: 
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Our first concern was the fate of the children we see in 
the footages [sic]. Those angels are always alone in the 
hands of adult males that seem to be elements of armed 
gangs. 
As a result of her own investigations, she has made the following chain of 
allegations. Firstly, she claims that presumably in close collusion with various 
members of the rebel groups, the local coordinating committees in Ghouta 
posted the photographs and videos much too quickly after the rocket attacks 
for them to be believable; an obviously more acceptable explanation is that 
they were fabricated before the event.'® Secondly, their visual material 
allegedly from different areas of Eastern Ghouta contained images of the 
same children sometimes arranged in theatrically different ways. This 
indicates, she says, that they were moved from location to location as part of 
a pre-conceived plan to mislead Investigators and the media about the nature 
and extent of the attacks; as well the children were laid out in rooms where 
no parents were tending their bodies or had come to mourn them. Thirdly, 
there were confusing and sometimes contradictory reports from so-called 
surviving eyewitnesses, with some claiming they only saw blood-stained 
bodies that had been injured by conventional weapons, others that they had 
smelled the lingering stench of sarin which, as it happens. Is a fast-acting, 
quick-to-disperse, odourless killer. Fourthly, as a rebel stronghold, the 
Ghouta region on the edge of Damascus had been already almost destroyed by 
prolonged Syrian army bombardment; Its empty streets and ruined buildings 
could not have generated the number of dead and wounded alleged by the UN 
Mission. Mother Mariam's report concluded with an urgent and powerfully 
emotive appeal to the international community to investigate the fate of the 
children and teenagers abducted a couple of weeks earlier by the Al Nusra 
Front from Alawite villages in Assad's home province of Lattakla. Their 
unidentified bodies, she strongly implied, had been used by the rebels in the 
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creation of 'a FORGED STORY and a FALSE FLAG concerning the alleged 
Chemical Attacks."' ' 
The nun's plea for a high-level international inquiry into the alleged 
disappearance of the Alawite children has not been realised. Though rumours 
persist about these and other kidnappings across Syria, this reluctance to 
investigate further could perhaps reflect a pragmatic acknov^ledgement that 
little would be gained, given the time that has elapsed since the Ghouta 
attacks and the reality that Damascus and surrounding regions continue to be 
war zones. As well, there has emerged the prevailing sense that the issue has 
become enveloped in the fog of an entrenched propaganda about who should 
be blamed, with supporters of the opposition rebels pitted against Assad 
regime loyalists, including allegedly Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. 
This has meant there is a very long and tangled list of accusations and 
counter-accusations which can be trolled through on social media sites 
including Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and assorted blogsites; in commentary 
from academic researchers into CWs; from strategic analysts pronouncing on 
the likely motives of one or another of the militant groups fighting within 
Syria; and from both freelancers and former senior members of defence 
forces who claim expertise in the manufacture and sourcing of rockets and 
their delivery systems. Often too this debate has been reflected in more 
sketchy versions in online, print and television reports from Syria, across the 
wider Arab region and in the American, British, and European media, including 
those within Russia. 
Amid these reports, it should be noted that in an interview with The 
Washington Post following the Ghouta attacks. Foreign Minister Lavrov 
officially denied that Russia is 'wedded to President A s s a d . I n common 
with Father Maess and Mother Mariam, he describes his country's foreign 
policy as 'concerned with keeping Syria in one piece, territorially integral. 
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sovereign, independent, and secular, where rights of all groups, ethnic and 
other, are fully r e s p e c t e d . A s well he says: 
...it's only now that people start recognising that the 
biggest single threat for international peace and security 
in Syria is probably Jabhat al-Nusra, Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant, and other organisations affiliated with 
al-Qaeda taking hold of the country. 
Lavrov's view repeated earlier statements by Putin in his opinion piece in The 
New York Times, entitled 'A Plea for Caution from Russia,' that there was 
'every reason to believe' the poison gas was not used by the Syrian army, 
but by anti-Assad forces. 'Syria is not witnessing a battle for democracy,' 
Putin wrote, 'but an armed conflict between government and opposition in a 
multi-religious c o u n t r y . T h i s Internal war was fuelled by foreign weapons 
and attracted hundreds of extremists from all over the Arab world, from 
Western countries and from Russia. Presciently, given that within a year the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had proclaimed a modern-day 
bloody-minded caliphate in the region, Putin also warned that this war 
'threatens us 
Nevertheless, the problem remains that two aspects of the debate over 
culpability for the Ghouta CW's attack challenge the plausibility of Mother 
Mariam's September, 2013 report and therefore its use as evidence by Foreign 
Minister Lavrov and by Putin. The first is that despite her opening statement 
Ibid. 
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that she has conducted 'a modest study on some of the 13 videos nominated 
by the US Intelligence Community and similar d o c u m e n t a t i o n , n o t a single 
one of her observations about this visual material appears to be clearly 
confirmable, exclusive or original. In part this is because none of the 35 video 
links listed at the beginning of her report are nov^ accessible. But the second 
more questionable aspect of her allegations is that a scathing dismissal of 
most of them, v^hich was posted almost three weeks before her report was 
published, can be found on the Yahoo-financed social networking blogsite, 
Tumblr. 
Within relatively strict and enforceable guidelines that use blocking software 
for more repellent attempted uploads, Washington-based Tumblr is one of half 
a dozen such blogsite facilitators that provide international online forums on a 
very wide range of issues. It claims to average around 92000 posts per day, 
with extensive coverage and popularity, for example, in Russia, Central Asia 
and, not least, among opposing Shia and Sunni groups across the Middle East. 
In common with YouTube and other social media sites, it appears to rival more 
mainstream media as an ideologically-driven vehicle for accurate discussion 
and documentation of events, and at the same time as a tool for undermining 
such strivings for veracity by disinformation. Unfortunately, for the most 
part, the likelihood of convincingly distinguishing one from the other 
frequently appears to veer between impossible and merely uncertain. 
Tumblr's August 23, 2013 blog. The Ghouta Chemical Attack Propasanda 
Frenzy - Debunked,''°heems to emerge as closer to the latter categorization. 
In other words, despite Russia's claims to the contrary, the blog appears 
relatively persuasive in its insistence that Mother Mariam's report simply 
repeats the poorly-substantiated propaganda that had already been circulated 
on social and other media by both the Assad government and its non-Syrian 
regime sympathisers. 
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In particular, much of the Tumblr blogsite's 'debunking' of the rebel's 
responsibility for the Ghouta attacks is based on the identification of what the 
anonymous authors regard as the absurd protestations of innocence and the 
mendacity of the government in articles from Syria's Ministry of Information 
(SANA), from the Syrian Arab News Agency (PARS), and from reports in 
Moscow's English-language news, Russia Today. It also provides a detailed 
focus on what it calls 'the falsified images and unverified video footage'^ 
which it says have been disseminated to a huge and apparently gullible global 
audience on Twitter, Tumblr, YouTube, Liveleak and Facebook. For example, 
the summary confutes the claim in Mother Mariam's report that the videos 
must have been produced before the Ghouta attacks by pointing out that the 
date and time signatures of their uploading onto YouTube was in accordance 
with Californian time, which is ten hours behind Syria; so that, by any 
plausible calculation, they were posted after the attacks. Similarly, her 
allegation that the videos were stage-managed is rejected through a step-by-
step examination of a series of videos available on the blogsite. The images 
were selected out of 147 known videos from the hours and days beginning 
early in the morning of August 21, 2013. For instance, it seems evident from 
these analyses that, though the faces and clothing of the children were often 
similar, it was simply not the case that the exact same ones appeared in video 
posts from different locations.^"' Moreover, Mother Mariam allegedly has 
failed to realise that many of these images had been quickly circulated to 
local residents and anti-Assad Coordinating Committees within Ghouta, at the 
same time as having been uploaded to wider internet and media recipients. 
According to the debunkers of Tumblr blogsite, in contrast to Mother Mariam's 
highly-biased assumptions this should not necessarily imply these groups were 
claiming the videos as evidence of a specific attack in their area."" 
As suggested above, amid such a proliferation of claims and counterclaims, it 
is difficult not to conclude that at best Mother Mariam might be an amateur 
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and naive conduit for government propaganda. At worst, she emerges as a 
more sinister character, motivated by overweening self-importance and a 
rigidly pro-Assad, anti-Islamist political and religious creed. Nonetheless, 
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's endorsement of her claims does not simply 
affirm a strong polarisation between the West and the Rest that is motivated 
by mistrust and divergent foreign policies. It is also symptomatic of the 
reality that unambiguous evidence about Syria's CWs' usage has emerged as 
one of the early casualties of the war. 
Certainly it remains the case that a more open-minded, sceptical approach 
focused on the UN team's investigation might append an array of vexed 
questions. Among them are how accurate were the calculations of the rocket 
trajectories in the Ghouta attack, given they were ultimately dependent on 
the final angle at which they were deemed to have come to rest, as well as 
whether the rocket engines were sufficiently powerful to cover the necessary 
distance from a launch site to Ghouta? What was the likely impact on these 
measurements of the evidence that the sites had been tampered with 'prior 
to the arrival of the investigation team.'"^ What too of the possible confusion 
generated by video images which indicated not all the munitions that 
exploded on 21 August contained nerve agents."^ And how convincing was the 
conclusion that the existence of the pro-Assad Syrian army's installation in 
north-west Damascus was confirmation of the launch site, especially as the 
rockets could just as readily have been dispatched from the flatbed of a pick-
up truck during the pre-dawn hours of the attack, using Google maps to locate 
targets?"^ What was the significance to the final assessment of the UN 
Mission, especially in ensuring accurate analysis of the type of sarin used, of 
the fact that the investigators were not able to gain access to the various 
areas of Eastern and Western Ghouta until almost a week and sometimes 
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longer after the attack? And despite the existence of cyrillic script on one of 
the rockets launched into Western Ghouta's Moadamiya area,"'* with what 
certainty can it be claimed that it was part of the Assad regime's current 
arsenal of artillery, sold to the government by either the Soviet Union or the 
Russian Federation at an unspecified time in the past? What of media reports 
that, inspired by the Palestinian factions in Gaza and facing an acute shortage 
of weapons, the Syrian rebels have been manufacturing their own short-range 
artillery rockets in suburban warehouses and backyard sheds since 2012; on 
occasions this apparently has involved 'refurbishing weaponry acquired during 
takeovers of Assad's military b a s e s . 
This last view is supported, for instance, by the findings of the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) that: 
The main source of weapons for Syrian rebel groups 
appears to have been the capture of arms from 
government troops and arsenals J ^ ^ 
Confusingly though, it should be noted that these arsenals may not have been 
their only source. Whether the reports are always authentic, a perusal of 
relevant websites and blogs suggests that the supply of weapons to the anti-
Assad Free Syrian Army has benefited substantially from the conflicts in Iraq, 
Egypt, Libya, Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Lebanon. For 
instance, in its recent summary of information available on such internet 
sites, the BBC claims that the result of these local wars is an ongoing 
apocalyptic trade across the Middle East in black market armaments."^ 
With regard to the August 21, 2013, sarin attacks in Damascus, a second 
report compiled in September, 2013 by Human Rights Watch (HRW) provides 
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explicit responses to many of the above questions. However they are 
certainly not unqualified ones. For a start, the NGO acknowledges that, 
unlike the UN Mission, it was unable to gain direct physical access to Ghouta 
in the aftermath of the attacks. Rather its investigation is based on 
interviews by Skype with ten witnesses who provided accounts of their 
experiences after the rockets hit, as well as with three doctors who had been 
at the various locations and who described in detail the symptoms of the 
victims. Its report is careful to indicate that while its conclusions are well-
suppor ted by expert op in ion, they const i tute only ' t he most 
likely'^^^explanation of events. 
In common with Mother Mariam's report and the Tumblr blogsite, the HRW 
also relies heavily on analysis of the dozens of photographs and videos that on 
the morning of 21 August it says 'began appearing on YouTube channels 
associated with the Syrian opposition...'"' These too show clustered groups of 
the dead and dying, with heart-wrenching clips of young children in white 
shrouds laid out in rows in preparation for burial, of a dead baby and two 
small girls, and of men and young boys convulsed and frothing from the 
mouth. As well, there is a still image from a YouTube video uploaded a couple 
of days after the attack of a large number of dead animals, including cattle, 
sheep, birds, dogs and cats.^^° 
At HRW's request, Dr Keith Ward, who is currently employed by the US 
Department of Homeland Security, contributed professional advice on the use 
of CWs in Ghouta.^^^ According to his personal website. Ward has 
approximately 30 years' experience in pure and applied research into their 
detection and clinical effects. Though it does not directly cite his findings, 
the HRW report appears tacitly to indicate that his cautious conclusion was 
that the rapidity of the dispersal of the poisonous gas at the sites of the 
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attacks, the details from medical workers and eyewitness interviews, and the 
images of the victims: 
...all strongly suggest...an organophosphate chemical-
most likely a toxic, but non-persistent chemical warfare 
agent such as sarin...^^^ 
The report also points out that Syrian regime is 'believed to possess sarin, 
a contention that has since been corroborated by the publication of the 
locations of its numerous chemical weapons facilities as part of the 
agreement to allow the removal and destruction of the country's considerable 
stockpiles of sarin and other toxins. 
In addition, the HRW visual material contained high resolution images of 
rocket parts from two of the attack sites. These were among more than a 
dozen such sites identified by satellite mapping of what the HRW headlines, 
apparently misleadingly , as the 'Chemical Weapon Impact Zones In Western 
and Eastern Suburbs of D a m a s c u s . I n other words, there does not appear to 
be any independent, open source available evidence that all these impact 
zones were the result of rockets carrying CWs. Though a little unclear, nor 
does the substance of the HRW report appear actually to claim that CWs were 
confirmed at all the sites charted in their map. 
The map's cross-referenced data sources are exclusively from American 
organisations, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the Environmental 
Systems Research institute (ESRI), and the National Geospatial -Intelligence 
Agency (NGA), which among other tasks services the array of other US 
intelligence agencies and the Department of Defence. Using these photos and 
others from the UN Mission, two freelance arms specialists assisting HRW, 
Australian Nic Jenzen-Jones, and Britisher Eliot Higgins, concluded that 
some of the rocket detritus was from 330mm rockets with a payload design 
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that may possibly have been capable of holding CWsJ^^ According to Jenzen-
Jones, the rockets were compatible with an Iranian Falaq-2 333mm rocket 
launching systemJ^^ In contradiction of the Russian claims, he also 
conjectured that the quality of their construction and uniformity of 
appearance indicated these munition types was unlikely to have been 
homemadeJ^^ 
In its summary statement, the HRW report draws on a tentative supposition by 
Jenzen-Jones that, based on videos such as a 9 minute post on the Facebook 
page of Syrian rebel group 'Dayra Revolution,' these munitions were in the 
possession of the Assad government, who had not hesitated to use 
them J^^The video purported to show regime forces at Mezzeh Military Airport 
on the Western edge of Damascus, launching a 330mm rocket with a CW 
payload towards Eastern Ghouta from a truck-mounted 333mm launcherJ 
Jenzen-Jones's analysis supported this claim, with the crucial exception that 
he was not able to confirm the rocket was carrying a nerve agent in its 
warhead J He did however note that the second type of rocket identified by 
the UN Mission in Eastern Ghouta was the Soviet-manufactured 140mm rocket. 
With only a little more certainty, he claimed, however, that though a variant 
had been designed by the Soviet Union to carry 2.2kg of sarin, 'it is not 
believed to have been In the Syrian arsenal. 
On this last issue, the HRW report challenges Jenzen-Jones's speculative 
conclusion. Eyewitness statements describing the victims' symptoms after of 
the 140mm rockets impacted. It says, as well as the reported absence of 
rocket remnants or injuries from explosive or incendiary payloads, point to 
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the strong likelihood they were carrying C W s J " But, unfortunately, while the 
report documents the sales of 140mm rockets to the Syrian government by the 
Soviet Union in the late 1960s, it appears to have no independently verifiable 
technical details on the crucial issue of whether the CW-carrying variant was 
either among them or actually deployed in Ghouta. In other words, to affirm 
that this second type of rocket lodged into Ghouta was carrying CWs simply on 
the basis of skype interviews with eyewitnesses appears to be a case of 
assuming what needs to be corroborated by identification of the toxin or type 
of rocket by independent investigators on site . 
As a partial response to this issue, the HWR report cites unsourced 
information that not only the Soviet 140mm, but also the Iranian Falaq-2 
330mm rockets, both of which were photographed in Ghouta by the UN 
Mission, have never been in the possession of the armed Syrian opposition. 
Moreover, it says, the rebels do not appear ever to have had 'the vehicle-
mounted launchers needed to fire these rockets.'^" In sum, in spite of HRW's 
repeated assertion that much of its report is preliminary, indirect or 
circumstantial, especially regarding the identification of sarin, it ends with 
the following strongly-worded declaration of Syrian government culpability: 
The August 21 attacks were a sophisticated military 
attack, requiring large amounts of nerve agent (each 
330mm warhead is estimated to contain between 50 and 
60 liters of agent), specialised procedures to load the 
warheads with the nerve agent, and specialised 
launchers to launch the rockets. 
There are two problems here that add to a sense of justified scepticism about 
this final summary. The first is that it ignores the issue of whether it can be 
confirmed that the Soviet 140mm rockets were carrying sarin. The second is 
that if, as seems probable, the Falaq-2 rockets were carrying CWs, further 
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investigation may not be able to produce a more precise and therefore 
uncontentious estimate of the quantity and unique chemical composition of 
the nerve agent actually deployed. Among the difficulties is the mapped 
rocket impact sites are located in disparate areas across the approximately 
370 square kilometres of GhoutaJ^^ Without sufficient information about the 
scale, location and agency of its manufacture, neither the UN Mission, nor 
Human Rights Watch, nor Russia's Foreign Minister Lavrov, nor America's 
Secretary of State Kerry v^ould seem able to make absolutely definitive claims 
about how, where and by whom it was deployed. Instead, if only because of 
the huge quantities of sarin that from the 1980s is known to have been 
stockpiled in government facilities across Syria, what remains is balance of 
probability about who was to blame that appears to be weighted towards the 
Assad regime. 
Or maybe not? What then of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's apparent 
certainty that not only the weapons used in the attack, but also the sarin 
itself were clearly home-made?^^® Moreover, the sarin had been identified, he 
said, as the same type that Russian investigators had confirmed had 
been used by rebels near the north-western Syrian city of Aleppo on March 
19, 2013, 'only of a higher concentration.' Lavrov also said this earlier 
investigation of a reputed sarin attack was his country's humanitarian 
response to a direct request from the Syrian government to the international 
community, which he alleges the UN had chosen not to pursue. It was carried 
out in full compliance, he said, with the guidelines of the Organisation for 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), of which Russia is a member. This 
meant that: 
...Russian experts took samples of air, soil, clothing, 
tissues on site. The samples were under the constant 
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control of the experts, and were delivered to our OPCW 
certified laboratory without a break in this c o n t r o l J ^ s 
Their analysis indicated that the chemicals used, and the missiles into which 
they were loaded, Lavrov said, '...bore no similarity' to those that could have 
been used by the Syrian army.^^' That is, in a blunt denial of the conclusions 
of the HRW report and the US State department, the Foreign Minister insisted 
the weaponry for the Ghouta attack, including their sarin warheads, was 
already in the hands of the opposition rebels at least five months earlier. 
Though not openly acknowledged, Lavrov's confidence regarding the Russian 
teams' alleged identification of similar home-brewed batches of sarin 
following the attacks near Aleppo and in Ghouta may have reflected his 
country's long-standing research into the development and storage of 
precursor chemicals and nerve agents. A recently-published compilation of 
documents and interviews with Russian scientists and policy-makers, as well 
as with their American colleagues and US intelligence agency specialists, 
indicates this research continued in a reduced capacity at least during the 
first decade after the end of the Cold War, and possibly longer. In what le 
Carre has described as 'a stunning and terrifying feat of research and 
narrative,^''" Hoffman argues that by the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet 
Union had amassed 'at least forty thousand tons of chemical agents, and the 
United States thirty one thousand tons,^''^ a substantial component of which 
was sarin. 
The extended treaty negotiations between the two countries that resulted in 
the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention produced an agreed framework for 
the total destruction of these weapons. Nonetheless, one of the legacies of 
the Cold War's toxic nerve agent arms race is that neither in Russia nor in 
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America has this aspiration been fully realised. The independent monitoring 
organisation, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NT!), for example, has estimated 
that in 2006 the Russian Federation had 11,700 metric tons of sarin stored 
mostly in semi-derelict facilities in various regions of the countryJ"^ 
Nevertheless, predictably perhaps, the American government firmly rejected 
Lavrov's assertion that the investigation by an experienced, though 
anonymous, team of chemical weapons experts had verified that the August 
attack in Damascus was clearly the work of the rebels. In an address to the 
US Senate, Secretary of State, John Kerry, countered that he was 'certain^''^' 
the scale of the strike was beyond the capacity of the opposition fighters. 
Significantly though, a recent article in the Scientific American journal has 
weighed into the debate with the suggestion that as a matter of purely 
scientific probabilities neither the Russians nor the Americans have a credible 
claim to knowing who was to blame. According to the report, it is extremely 
difficult to empirically verify the origin of a batch of sarin, or to determine 
whether or not It is home-made, by studying traces in hair or blood, or from 
soil samples taken from an attack site.''''' Specifically, while home-brewed 
sarin contains chemical by-products which distinguish it from the purified 
military grade, without the original recipe for a particular variety, it is 
impossible to identify which of these impurities to look for. In other words, 
the Catch 22 is that it is necessary to know the unique chemical components 
of the batch used before there is much likelihood of establishing that it was 
used at a particular site. Conversely, investigators would need to identify its 
chemical by-products at the site, before they can determine its batch. 
Moreover, even if the ingredients are known, 'detectives would need to know 
the normal levels of these compounds in the soil to assess whether the 
amounts are elevated.'^"'^It should be emphasised though that the UN Mission 
made no suppositions about the origin and purity of the sarin analysed in 
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OPCW laboratories, least of all whether it was a military grade batch from 
Assad's stockpiles. 
Moreover, in spite of the Russian assertions about the evidence allegedly 
provided by their own high standards of scientific investigation, a 
comprehensive report published in 2011 also echoes Secretary of State Kerry's 
firm rejection of what he sees as dubious claims that the Syrian opposition 
fighters had the chemical weapons capabilities for the large-scale sarin attack 
described by the UN Mission. The report was compiled by a group of American 
analysts and counter-terrorism consultants attached to the Center for a New 
American Security, which among other initiatives provides advice to the US 
President on intelligence and defence policy issues. Based on interviews with 
half a dozen imprisoned senior members of the Japanese apocalyptic cult, 
Aum Shinrikyo, as well as the police Investigations into the organisation, the 
report revisited what it termed 'a rare example of known sarin 
manufacture and dispersion by terrorists. Its aim was to distill lessons 'about 
the technical, organisational and psychological dynamics behind this 
effort. 
In 1995, the cult was responsible for a sarin attack in the Tokyo subway that 
killed 13 people and led to an estimated 6000 others seeking medical 
treatment.^''® Currently the group's much-reduced membership can be found 
in small groups in Japan and across the Russian Federation, where it has been 
banned since 1995 and continues to be closely monitored by the 
authorities.^'" In 2001 Aum Shinryko followers were arrested by officials in 
Moscow 'for planning to bomb the Imperial Palace in Japan as part of an 
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elaborate attempt to free their former leader, Shoko Asahara,'^^° who has 
been sentenced to hang by the Japanese courts. 
According to the Center for a New American Security report, guidelines for 
making sarin can be readily downloaded from both Russian and non-Russian 
websites whose information about production procedures has been derived 
from 'German organophosphate synthetic chemistry dating back to World War 
ll.'^^^The report argues that the experience of Aum Shinrikyo demonstrates 
that for such dangerous, socially-marginal groups, its actual manufacture may 
be a complex, lengthy and unpredictable process. At the very least it 
requires the kind of imaginative skills and specialised training only 
haphazardly displayed by the cult's adventurous, tertiary-educated young 
Japanese recruits. Even with the appropriate precursor chemicals, the report 
argues it is not possible for sarin production to be a backyard operation, 
especially with regard to the quantities that both the UN Mission and HRW 
weaponry consultants deemed were likely to have been dispersed during the 
large-scale attack in south-eastern Damascus. The construction of the Aum 
Shinrikyo facilities near the small village of Kamikuishiki at the foot of Japan's 
iconic Mount Fuji included a substantial, multistorey building and a well-
equipped and sophisticated laboratory, which together cost an estimated 
$AUD30 m i l l i o n . d e s p i t e the cult's horrendous ambition to produce 
approximately 3000 kilos of sarin at the site, it fortunately never came even 
close to this goal.^" In fact, the report argues, with more than 100 Aum 
Shinrikyo members working round the clock for approximately 18 months, it 
was only ever capable of producing around 45 litres of the chemical.^^''In 
addition, even this relatively small amount proved difficult to transport safely 
over short distances and to disperse effectively to ensure a large number of 
casualties. 
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In his rejection of the consensus amongst Western powers that the Assad 
government had deliberately exploded warheads loaded with sarin in Ghouta, 
Foreign Minister Lavrov said there was no necessity for his government for to 
reveal covert 'spy reports'^^^because the evidence for Jihadist culpability was 
so pervasive across the internet. Still, as indicated above, on the surface at 
least Russia's use of these sources appears highly selective and certainly 
contentious. Moreover, in its official, high confidence assessment of the 
attacks, the Obama White House also cites 'a significant body of open source 
r e p o r t i n g , t h a t points to the opposite conclusion. Unlike Russia though, it 
refers not only to its collected streams of human, signals and geospatial 
intelligence, but also to classified assessments, which have been 'shared with 
US Congress and key international players,'^" but which are unavailable to 
the general public. It claims that the analysis of this secret intelligence 
indicated, for instance, the likely presence of Syrian government personnel 
preparing chemical munitions during the three days prior to the attack, with 
no indications of such activity by the opposition. High confidence assessment, 
the White House statement says, 'is the strongest position that the US 
Intelligence Community can take short of c o n f i r m a t i o n . F r o m a contrary 
perspective, presumably this means there is an indeterminate margin of doubt 
Again, according to the Russian government, it is indubitably an assessment 
that is clearly unwarranted. Here Foreign Minister Lavrov cites the damning 
claims of a group of retired American intelligence analysts from the the 
Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS). The small group is 
composed of former employees of the CIA, the NSA, the FBI and US Defence 
Intelligence. Its self-designated role is as a watchdog for America's foreign 
policy and intelligence SNAFUs. In 2002 it established the highly-publicised 
annual Sam Adams' Award to honour each year's most significant whistle-
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blowers. As former Australian Prime Minister John Howard has 
a c k n o w l e d g e d , t h e VIPS group's earlier insistence that there was no 
convincing intelligence on the existence of WMD's in Iraq to justify the 2003 
US invasion of the country has been vindicated. 
More recently, in an open memorandum to President Obama written a couple 
of weeks after the Ghouta chemical weapons attack, VIPS declared that in 
reality the most reliable intelligence indicates 'Bashar al-Assad was NOT 
responsible for the chemical incident...on August 21.''^° The memorandum 
states that, according to anonymous CIA officers currently working on the 
Syria issue, the White House press release cited above is a case of deja fraud 
reminiscent of America's pre-lraq War strategic obtuseness and gullibility 
about Saddam Hussein's WMDs. Echoing the qualified conclusions that thread 
through the HRW report, the UN investigation, and the analyses of experts in 
chemical agents and weaponry, it says that as a matter of fact: 
We are aware of no reliable physical evidence to support 
the claim that this was the result of a Syrian military unit 
with expertise in chemical weapons.^^^ 
It also refers to 'some reports ' ' " that the nerve toxins were released into 
Damascus from open canisters rather than rockets. The alternative account 
offered by the memorandum of what actually occurred has the makings of a 
Hollywood 'faction' blockbuster, or perhaps of a lesser novel by le Carre that 
focuses almost entirely on the dirty deeds of an Incurably nefarious and rather 
stupid CIA. The attack was part of a wider black operation, it says, devised 
through the collusion of Turkish, Qatari and US intelligence officials. Its goal 
was to accelerate the removal of the Assad regime by the joint efforts of a US 
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strategic bombing and missile attack and a well-supplied ground invasion by 
the Syrian opposition 
Seven months later the VIPS group's warning to the Obama administration of 
what some sections of the US security establishment allegedly had been 
planning in Syria was explored and amplified by the former Ridenhour prize 
winner, US journalist Seymour Hersh in his lengthy article, The Red Line and 
the Rat Line. Like the VIPS, he too bases most of his revelations on a series of 
conversations with unnamed former American intelligence operatives. The 
result is a catalogue of assertions woven together into a story that in almost 
all its aspects supports Foreign Minister Lavrov's claims. Specifically, he 
writes that from April 2013, it was well known to the British and American 
intelligence communities that Syria's Islamist al-Nusra Front maintained a 
very advanced sarin production programme. In addition, he says that 
according to classified Intelligence from numerous agencies, Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia were the likely facilitators of the purchase, possibly on the 'Baghdad 
chemical m a r k e t , o f the precursor chemicals for the large scale 
manufacture of sarin by these Jihadists. 
Hersh's most significant revelations, though, are centred on the direct role of 
Russian espionage in allegedly identifying through scientific analysis the batch 
of sarin used in Ghouta and therefore exactly where It came from. As claimed 
by Foreign Minister Lavrov, the investigation by his country's experienced 
experts had confirmed that the Syrian opposition already had deployed sarin 
five months earlier in March, 2013 near the north-western city of Aleppo. 
Though not revealed by Lavrov whose public statements refer only to open 
source evidence, Russian military intelligence operatives had also recovered 
samples of the chemical agent used in Ghouta within a few days of the attack. 
They were analysed by the Russians, Hersh writes, then they were passed on 
to British military intelligence by a Russian source, described as 'someone 
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with access, knowledge and a record of being t r u s t w o r t h y . F u r t h e r 
analysis at Britain's Porton Down Ministry of Defence laboratory confirmed the 
presence of a specific batch of sarin. Using as a baseline data previously 
exchanged under the Chemical Weapons Convention about the composition of 
each batch of Soviet manufactured chemical weapons, the laboratory also 
determined that the sarin did not match any of the stockpiles in the Syrian 
government arsenal. 
As further background to his story, Hersh writes that in 2012, assisted by MI6, 
the CIA had established 'a rat line' to transfer weapons and ammunition from 
Libyan arsenals via southern Turkey to the Syrian opposition rebels. The 
agency had rapidly lost control of what was being shipped along the line Into 
the hands of the more extreme Jihadists inside Syria, especially the 
contributions made by the Turkish government. Of particular concern were 
the portable surface-to-air missile launchers that could be used to shoot down 
commercial aircraft. Following the CIA's decision towards the end of 2012 to 
terminate the provision of money and manpower to sustain the rat line, the 
Turkish government shifted its resources to assisting the al-Nusra Front in 
achieving Its own home-made chemical weapons. In fact, intercepted 
conversations and other data collected by the Americans after August 21, 
Hersh says, indicated the Ghouta attack was planned and facilitated by the 
Erdogan government to ensure American military intervention and the 
consolidation of a rebel regime sympathetic to Turkey. He concludes that, 
motivated by the desire not to reveal publicly the extent of its foreign policy 
idiocies, the Obama administration has chosen to ignore this post-attack 
intelligence. 
As suggested above, Hersh has written an extraordinary tale, densely packed 
with quotations and transcriptions of conversations with unnamed intelligence 
agents about their knowledge of secret high-level conversations among other 
intelligence operatives and representatives of foreign governments. Very 
little of what he writes can be Independently confirmed by outsiders. Indeed, 
as he points out at key intervals in the text, his assertions have been firmly 
Ibid. 
denied by other anonymous sources, often from the intelligence agencies he 
cites. The underlying suggestion is that such denials are inverse proof that he 
is unveiling the hidden facts. A multi-award winning investigative journalist 
whose previous reports have been based on deliberately leaked, covert 
intelligence, Hersh appears to have a long-standing and well-earned 
reputation for what his critics did not always immediately acknowledge was 
accurate reporting. Still, the problem remains the extent to which, buoyed 
by his previous successes, on this issue he might have been narrowly selective 
and unbalanced in his selection of secret sources. Above all, his article 
invites the question of whether, pending further more confirmable 
information, to opt for an open verdict born of a necessary scepticism. 
Conclusion: 
What then to make of the relationship between actual relatively recent 
events in which Russia has been embroiled and the role of covert intelligence 
with its leaked revelations and inherent dishonesties? The lesson perhaps of 
the inconclusive maze of interpretation about Syria's chemical weapons is the 
ease with which in the public arena the summaries and estimates by alleged 
experts transmute into political dogma. It points to the importance of not 
pretending to know for certain, or even with high confidence, what we plainly 
do not. If, as le Carre claims, journalism and spying are much the same 
game, then one of their shared characteristics might be the writing of 
history's first draft, where the result may turn out to be no more than a very 
sketchy opening up of an arena of potential understanding which demands 
further investigation. As with the substantial international scholarship 
currently devoted to the complexities of the Cold War, this is often not 
undertaken until long after the controversial events have occurred. Often 
too, what such investigation reveals about this particular era and its legacies 
suggests le Carre's dark, morally degraded world of espionage is more fact 
than fiction. Equally, this history suggests that perhaps we might yet discover 
Hersh's account of the West's complicity in an ignominious geopolitical 
conspiracy is not so implausible after all. 
For the time being, in the chaotic savagery of wars such as in Syria, 
uncertainty might be the best that can be hoped for. In other words, when 
there is much that is deliberately concealed or distorted, and it is impossible 
to distinguish between sound intelligence and deliberate lies, more persuasive 
versions of events such as the murder of Mother Mariam's little angels in 
Ghouta are elusive. The alternative of a leap to judgment beyond the 
limitations of probabilities is unsteady ground on which to forge a humane 
common foreign policy, not least between Russia and the West. 
A satirical anecdote by the former British spy, Nicholas Elliott, might serve as 
a portrayal of 'the wilderness of mirrors'^'^ that aptly describes the world of 
modern espionage. Elliott knew Philby for half a lifetime, had worked with 
him at MI6, and had defended him steadfastly when he came under suspicion 
of being a Soviet agent. After Britain's MI5 had finally gathered indisputable 
evidence of Philby's guilt, Elliott had also conducted the final interrogation of 
his so-called old friend in Beirut in 1963, and may, or may not, have 
facilitated Philby's flight to the Soviet Union shortly afterwards. 
Following Philby's death in Moscow in 1988, resplendent funeral with a KGB 
honour guard and burial in the elite military section of the city's Kuntsevo 
Cemetery, Elliott had recommended to the British government that it award 
him the prestigious order of St Michael and St George. Elliott offered to 
embellish the gesture with an accompanying note that he 'can now reveal 
that Philby was one of the bravest men I have ever known.' The KGB would 
then conclude that in fact Philby had been a triple agent, with the result that 
Britain could thereby enjoy 'the most gratifying posthumous revenge.'^ 
Unfortunately Elliott's proposal was rejected. 
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CONCLUSION 
Whatever you are is never enough; you must find a way 
to accept something, hov^ever small, from the other, to 
make you whole and to save you from the mortal sin of 
righteousness and extremism. 
Chinua Achebe, Anthills in the Savannah. 
What then of the starting point of these chapters in the late century's 
conceptual demarcation line between new Cold War warriors and re-invented 
fellow travellers? Far from fading from public discussion about Russia, the 
division continues to thread through much of the ongoing commentary about 
the country. In fact, the content of the anti-Russia rhetoric has changed very 
little in almost seventy years. In the judgment of today's new Cold war 
warriors, the Russian Federation has an inescapable legacy of cultural and 
political failings that ensure it remains untrustworthy, secretive, xenophobic, 
and expansionist. Consistently too, for the more intransigent new Cold War 
warriors, such as US Republican Senator John McCain or Bush Administration 
Vice President Dick Cheney, this has meant a portrayal of Putin as a wily, neo-
imperialist autocrat, whose domestic human rights violations and foreign 
policy aspirations should be met by a resolute and, if necessary, militant 
response from the West. In this context, Putin's nomination for the 2014 
Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his role in facilitating Syria's Assad 
regime's agreement to divest the country of its stockpiles of chemical 
weapons proved to be a merely a brief respite in his ongoing, widespread 
vilification, primarily outside Russia. Moreover, the eruption of the conflict in 
Ukraine appeared to ensure that this widespread international condemnation 
further intensified. Certainly, the Putin government's acceptance of Crimea 
into the fold of the post-Soviet Federation, and the subsequent civil war 
between eastern Ukraine's pro-Russian separatists and western Ukrainian 
forces, generated a great deal of overwrought anti-Putin/anti-Russian 
rhetoric. 
Especially in America, high profile, long-term Russia Watchers began to warn 
about, and to lament, the unexpected resurgence of an 'immensely-
damaging'^ new Cold War. Among the voices of alarm was Columbia 
University's Robert Legvold, whose arena of scholarship spans almost 40 years 
beginning in the decline of communist rule in the Soviet Union. The hope has 
now collapsed, he wrote, that with the end of the USSR 'Moscow and 
Washington might find common ground...The crisis in Ukraine has pushed the 
two sides over a cliff...Russia and the West are now adversar ies .Un les s 
defused, the grim reality of this revitalised enmity, he argued, is the further 
destabilisation of Europe's 'unsettled center' and of Central Asia. As well, it 
will undermine existing cooperation on significant issues, such as strategic 
arms control, civilian emergencies, counterterrorism and containing the 
ecological impact of developing the Arctic region's huge reserves of 
hydrocarbons.^ 
Though he believed that Washington and Moscow shared culpability for the 
headlong stumble into a new Cold war over the ethnic and sectarian violence 
in Ukraine, Legvold's plea was for the shared commitment of both countries 
to the overarching goal of making it 'as quick and as shallow as possible."* As 
suggested above, his concerns were endorsed by some of America's most 
eminent Russian Studies scholars. Princeton's Stephen Cohen railed against 
the West's escalation of the Ukraine conflict through measures such as 
stronger sanctions against Russia and the intensification of a US-Russia proxy 
war focused on pro-Russian enclaves in Eastern Ukraine. Writing in August 
2014, Cohen described the West as facing 'the worst and most dangerous 
confrontation in many decades...The seemingly unthinkable is becoming 
imaginable: an actual war between NATO, led by the United States, and post-
Soviet R u s s i a . O n e of the lessons of the Cold War, he said, was that there 
^ Legvold, Robert, 'Managing the New Cold War What Moscow and Washington Can Learn from the Last 
One,' Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014, http://foreignaffairs.com/articles/141537/robert-legvold/ 
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was little to be gained by Washington's 'surreal demonization'^ of the Russian 
leader which now constitutes 'a kind of personal vilification without any real 
precedent in the past, at least after Stalin's d e a t h . I n reference to 
Kissinger's critical remarks about the ideological ineptitude and cultural 
ignorance behind this phenomenon in America, he said 'I think it is worse: an 
abdication of real analysis and rational policy.'® 
University of Chicago Professor of Politics, John Mearsheimer, warned too that 
the Ukraine crisis was emblematic of the enduring prevalence in American 
foreign policy of an intransigence that reflected little more than the country's 
moral arrogance and disregard of the motives and intentions of the Putin 
regime. Described as 'one of the country's most distinguished political 
scientists'' and 'a notorious bull in a china shop,'^° Mearsheimer argued 
against the commonplace assumption that 'Putin Is just an aggressive tyrant 
and that he decided to sort of seize Ukraine.'" From a Russian perspective, 
he said, the West's strategic commitment to NATO and EU expansion and to 
democratisation within its border countries, such as Georgia or Ukraine, has 
never been regarded either as acceptable or unthreatening. Moreover, there 
now exists the potential for the punitive reactions of the West to the Putin 
government's involvement in the crisis to further exacerbate a dire situation. 
There was thus nothing to be gained, Mearsheimer said, through the 
continuation by the US and Europe of its encouragement of pro-Western 
sentiment among sections of Kiev's anti-Russian powerbrokers: 'This is 
geopolitics 101. I don't understand why most Americans don't understand 
this.'^^ To paraphrase novelist Graham Greene, Mearsheimer's observations 
suggest another lesson of the Cold War: that it matters not at all whether the 
' Ibid. p2 
' Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
' Mearsheimer, John, 'Conference Call with John Mearsheimer on the Ukraine Crisis,' Foreign Affairs, 
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US might have the best possible reasons for all the trouble it has caused in 
Russia's heartlandJ^ 
In common with Mearsheimer, Kissinger places the balancing of global order 
and stability before the dictates of what implicitly he believed was an overly 
Eurocentric, uncompromising promotion of democratic universalism. Harking 
back to the prescriptions that emerged out of the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna, 
he notes approvingly its aim was to produce a consensus: 
...that the preservation of the system was more 
important than any single dispute that might arise within 
it; that differences should be settled by consultation 
rather than by war.^ "* 
To Kissinger, the history of conflicts and crises suggests the cultivation of such 
a constructive dialogue with the enemy could be said to require the kind of 
skill-set encapsulated by the German concept of FinserspitzensefuehlJ^ That 
is, it requires a superior intuitive, situational awareness, together with the 
ability to respond appropriately and tactfully. As a basis for a dexterous form 
of elite diplomacy, it is also suggestive of the need for an imaginative 
understanding of Russia's cultural and geopolitical stance; one that resists 
self-righteousness in the interests of the greater good of crafting a roadmap 
to maintaining peace and stability. 
Kissinger, in particular, has been described as possessing such an exceptional 
public talent.^^ According to Isaiah Berlin, for instance, his 'shuttle diplomacy' 
during the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt was 'extraordinary.' 
When the histories of our time are written, Berlin said, 'Kissinger will emerge 
as a major transformer of international relationships. His CIA connections, 
" Greene, Graham, 'The Quiet American,' Op.Cit. p72 
" Kissinger, Henry, World Order, Penguin Press, 2014, p61 
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Chile, etc will be forgotten or condoned...'^^ In addition, at least in Berlin's 
fulsome opinion this 'etc' will include presumably his much-criticised role in 
the secret bombing of Cambodia during the prolonged war in Vietnam. 
Still, among Kissinger's list of achievements as US Secretary of State from 
1973-77 were the negotiation of the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, 
the US rapprochement with China, and the US withdrawal from Vietnam, for 
which he shared the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize J® It should be emphasised 
however that his approach was not necessarily anchored in openness or 
honesty about the underlying intentions of the foreign policy of one's own 
country. 'Kissinger can meet with six different people, smart as hell, learned, 
knowledgeable, experienced, of very different views,' observed former Head 
of the US Information Agency Frank Shakespeare, 'and persuade all six of 
them that the real Henry Kissinger is just where they are. ' ' ' 
As a matter of historical record, nor is Kissinger's approach guaranteed to 
promote solutions that permanently avert the periodical eruptions of 
international conflicts, for instance in the Middle East or with regard to 
Russia's near abroad. Instead, given the constantly shifting realities in global 
affairs, what is required is a perpetual, vigilant, multifaceted engagement 
between countries. His historicist approach suggests too that, although short-
lived, successful outcomes are more Hkely to reflect the professional charisma 
and shrewdness of 'the singer not the song.' More cynically, perhaps too it 
points to the need for an accompanying diplomat whose role is to carry a 
carpetbag full of IMF-sponsored monetary rewards and economic incentives 
into negotiations with recalcitrant countries. 
Like Legvold, Cohen and Mearsheimer, Kissinger is the kind of liberal-minded 
fellow traveller with Russia, whose views have much in common with George 
Kennan's articulation of a more benign version of Cold War realpolitik. It is 
one that that embodies the latter's self-reflective American patriotism, but 
" Berlin, Isaiah, BuiIding Letters 1960-1975, Op.Cit. p576 
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not his recurrently tormented conscience about his country's foreign policy 
blunders. In other words, Kissinger emerges as a more pragmatic advocate of 
the liberal pluralist philosophy of Isaiah Berlin, which had such a powerful 
influence on Kennan's approach to US diplomatic engagement with both the 
Soviet Union and the post-Cold War Russian regime. Fundamental to the 
liberal pluralism manifest in Berlin's work is his belief that the history of ideas 
constitutes the public conversation citizens have within and between 
cultures. The West's relations with today's Russia therefore should be 
underpinned by an historical and strategic depth that acknowledges both the 
country's communalities with the West and its ideological, geopolitical and 
cultural divergences from it. 
Kennan's scathing condemnation of the further NATO expansion eastwards 
after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, for example, is reflected in 
Kissinger's view that there was no possible benefit to America in its creating a 
significant crisis with Russia through encircling it with NATO member 
countries, Including Ukraine.^" Citing what he believes was Kennan's prescient 
commonsense, Mearsheimer too insists that the US should have understood its 
political meddling in Ukraine would prove to be 'a bridge too far.'^^ In effect, 
the savage fragmentation of the Ukrainian state has been the outcome, in 
circumstances where preserving the country as a neutral buffer zone between 
Russia and the West should have been the primary aim of American policy. 'I 
think the first thing we have to do,' Mearsheimer said, 'is take NATO 
expansion off the table in a very public way. I think it's also important to 
take E.U. expansion off the t a b l e . I n addition, democracy promotion, he 
says, should be a long-term, low-key project, a secondary consideration if at 
all after the rescue of the Ukrainian economy as a joint endeavour between 
the IMF, Russia and Western E u r o p e . ^ ^ 
Kissinger, Henry, 'Does the West Still Exist? America and Europe Moving Towards 2020,' February 23, 
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Pragmatism, the avoidance of the escalation of the war, and the assumption 
that Russia is not necessarily a unilateral obstacle to the achievement of a 
solution to the crisis, are the bedrock of this less hardline version of 
realpolitik. At heart it represents the liberal pluralist hope that the 
cultivation of an enlightened self-interest betv/een countries that is anchored 
in geopolitical realities can be achieved by a skilful, patient, respectful, 
consistent, knowledgeable diplomacy. For the US, the priorities of such an 
approach, Kissinger suggests, should be more strategic and practical than 
driven by moralistic pro-Western ideology. Implicit therefore is the need to 
quell any inflated Wilsonian mission statements about America's exceptional 
responsibilities as the world's most powerful democracy. This should be 
especially evident with regard to the political sensitivities of the Putin-led 
regime, about which unfortunately the US knows critically little. For Kissinger, 
a more appropriate and constructive approach Involves commitment to 'a 
gradual process, a willingness to pursue ultimate foreign policy goals in 
imperfect stages and to deal with the adversary as a reality while this process 
is going on.'^ "* Presumably too, it involves a mindset that views failures as 
merely temporary setbacks. 
Three other aspects of this interweaving of realpolitik and informed fellow 
travelling reflect the intellectual heritage of Kennan's views and. Indirectly, 
those of Isaiah Berlin. The first Is the Importance of maintaining one's 
professional integrity, if necessary by swimming against the Intellectual 
current. Particularly since the end of the Cold War this has meant an 
outspoken questioning of the received wisdom about Russia in the spirit of 
liberal pluralist Inquiry. The alternative is acquiescence in a herd-like 
consensus that over time may be destructive of the ideals of negative 
freedom that ensure a vibrant civil society. As Cohen says, the contemporary 
dominance of the kind of militant, retrograde conservatism that has 
determined the path to the new Cold War indicates the perilous corrosion of 
these liberal ideals is already well-advanced in his country, '...unlike its forty-
year predecessor,' he argues, 'there is no effective American opposition - not 
21 Kissinger, World Order, Op.Cit. p283 
in the administration, Congress, establishment media, universities, think 
tanks, or in s o c i e t y .Ra the r those woefully few critics of the government's 
policies that have contributed so disastrously to the bloodshed in Ukraine are 
without influential supporters and unorganised.^^ 'In my long lifetime,' he 
writes, ' I do not recall such a failure of American democratic discourse in such 
a time of cris is. ' " 
The second aspect of a notion of a re-invented fellow travelling that is 
constrained by a cautious sense of realism towards today's Russia stems from 
Berlin's repeated warnings about the Utopian dreams of philosophers and 
ideologues. What a short history of the century above all demonstrated, he 
believed, was that visions of perfectible human societies led in fact to the 
creation of nightmarish futures. Experience was a persuasive indicator that 
human life was chaotic and unpredictable, constantly demanding we make 
choices based on a blind reckoning of what is the lesser of two evils, or the 
more desirable of two seemingly good ideas. Berlin's insistence on the 
incommensurate nature of many of our most cherished moral values is echoed 
in Kissinger's pragmatic approach to diplomacy. Paraphrasing Goethe during a 
discussion of realpolitik at Harvard, he said, 'If I had to choose between 
justice and disorder, on the one hand, and injustice and order, I would always 
choose the latter.'z® 
As suggested in Chapter One, the shortcomings of liberal pluralism are that in 
practical terms problems may arise in clearly distinguishing what exactly is 
likely to promote, for example, one or another of the various possible 
combinations of justice, order, injustice and disorder in any given 
circumstance. Equally, determining whether there might or might not be a 
positive or a negative interactive relationship between these concepts could 
prove problematic. The strengthening of legislative measures against election 
fraud, for instance, might appease Russia's opposition protest movement's 
" Cohen, Op.Cit. p2 
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demand for justice in face of the partial undermining of their voting rights. It 
might also defuse any prospect of civil disorder on the streets of Moscow, at 
least on this particular issue. Alternatively, as is fondly hoped by many neo-
liberal conservatives in the West, it might encourage more intensified popular 
protests directed at creating a fundamentally destabilising Russian Spring. 
The third and related aspect is that as a conceptual framework for 
understanding the divisions within Western-oriented perspectives on 
contemporary Russia that is anchored in the agonistic arena of Liberalism, 
new Cold War warriors and re-invented fellow travellers is useful but not 
methodologically rigorous. In large measure, this reflects the analytical and 
predictive limitations of contemporary political theory and sociology For the 
most part the reality is that only with hindsight can certain ends be explained 
by unravelling the complexity of variables that might over time constitute the 
means of their achievement, and not always convincingly so. Nor are the 
description of these dynamic processes uncontroverslal. For example, the 
foundational neo-liberal assumptions that economic globalisation, is a 
sufficient, or even a necessary determinant of democratization, have been 
seriously questioned by the other influential models of modernisation 
provided by the command economies of China and Russia. In particular too, 
Piketty's very detailed though incomplete economic history, based on 
comparisons of available statistical data from Western countries, suggests 
that the rise of capitalism in fact has consistently promoted a very 
undemocratic widening of socio-economic inequalities.^' 
By implication, one of the defining characteristic of quantitative sociological 
methodologies should be that they provide provisional rather than reliable 
paths to certain knowledge. As well, they should be regarded as creating 
interpretative edifices that are not only shaped by the ideological proclivities 
of their practitioners, but also by researchers who are often driven by a 
mission to change the world through exposing what they believe are its 
specific social, political and economic failings. Similarly, qualitative 
methodology, in which the plural of anecdote is assumed somehow to provide 
" Piketty, Thomas, Capitalism in the Century, Harvard University Press, 2014 
credible socio-economic data, demands further discussion and scepticism. By 
contrast, Berlin's contextualised history of ideas evokes the possibility of a 
much richer, empathic, experiential, literary and cultural world of 
conversation about the changeable patterns of our lives. 
Here the implication is that the best kind of interpretation is not about the 
struggle to understand societies through the lens of abstractions, such as Class 
Conflict, Liberalism, Democracy or Authoritarianism. Instead the processes 
and patterns of change are located in our reflections and stories about 
everyday social interactions, that is, in all the different ways and words we 
use to describe to each other the events around us. 
So where do such liberal pluralist perspectives leave the division between new 
Cold War warriors and re-invented fellow travellers? For the former, the 
harshest verdict condemns the poorly substantiated tenacity with which they 
assert Cold War prejudices about Russia. Against this often blind rigidity of 
thought, fellow travelling has much to commend it. At the same time, the 
history of the term's usage suggests the need to be mindful of the difference 
between pro-Russian sentiments and a defence of the indefensible; of 
reserving judgment when no easy distinction can be made between these 
camps; and of the importance of constructive pragmatism in an imperfect 
world. 
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